Martinez v. State

• Decision Date: 27 March 2007
• Docket Number: No. 03-05-00261-CR.,No. 03-05-00263-CR.,No. 03-05-00262-CR.,03-05-00261-CR.,03-05-00262-CR.,03-05-00263-CR.
• Citation: 220 S.W.3d 183
• Parties: John Rudolph MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

220 S.W.3d 183

John Rudolph MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 03-05-00261-CR.

No. 03-05-00262-CR.

No. 03-05-00263-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin.

March 27, 2007.

Todd S. Dudley, David M. Gonzalez, Sumpter & Gonzalez, L.L.P., Austin, for appellant.

M. Scott Taliaferro, Asst. Dist. Atty., Austin, for appellee.

Before Chief Justice LAW, Justices PEMBERTON and ONION.^*

OPINION

JOHN F. ONION, JR., Justice (Retired).

Appellant John Rudolph Martinez appeals three convictions for possession of four grams or more but less than 200 grams of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine. After waiving trial by jury, appellant entered pleas of guilty before the court to lesser included offenses of those charged in the original indictments as a part of a plea bargain. A prior conviction for possession of cocaine alleged for enhancement of punishment in each indictment was abandoned by the State.

The trial court assessed punishment in each case at eight years, six months confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. The sentences are to run concurrently.

POINT OF ERROR

Appellant presents his sole contention in the form of a question: "Did the trial court err by overruling appellant's motion to suppress based on the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure? In the instant case, the police officers failed to knock and announce before executing their narcotics search warrant."

Despite our concerns about the irregular procedure involving the motion to suppress evidence, the parties are apparently in agreement about the facts underlying the motion, and the trial court has certified appellant's right to appeal a motion filed and ruled on before trial. See Tex.R.App. P. 25.2(a)(2)(A).

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim.App.1999). The ruling will stand unless it falls outside the bounds of reasonable disagreement. Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 462 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). The appellate court must review the trial court's ruling in light of what was before the trial court at the time the ruling was made. Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Appellate courts give great deference to a trial court's determination of historical fact where supported by the record. Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). The reviewing court, however, conducts a de novo review of applicable law, Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543-44 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), as well as mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of a witness. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim.App.1997).

If the trial court has made no explicit findings of fact, as here, the evidence must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327-28 (Tex.Crim. App.2000). The trial court's ruling should be upheld if it is correct on any theory of the law applicable to the case, even if the wrong reason was given for the ruling. Willover, 70 S.W.3d at 845; Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996).

BURDEN OF PROOF

If a defendant seeks to suppress evidence on the basis of the Fourth Amendment, the burden of proof is on the defendant to overcome the presumption of proper police conduct. Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). If the defendant meets his burden by showing that a search or seizure occurred and no warrant was obtained, the burden shifts to the State. If the State produces a valid warrant, the burden shifts back to the defendant. Id. at 9-10. Here, the agreement of the parties shows that there was a valid search warrant. Appellant complains not of the validity of the warrant, but the manner of its execution. This would seemingly shift the burden back to the State as to the execution of the search warrant.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The pertinent facts are derived solely from Austin police officers' offense reports. Austin police officers received information from a confidential informant on June 14, 2004, that appellant was in possession of cocaine in a hotel room. Reliable information was received indicating that there was heavy foot traffic to Room 319 in the Best Value Motel. On the morning of June 15, 2004, Austin police officers set up a surveillance of Room 319. It was determined that appellant was registered as a guest in that room. The manager of the motel asked the officers if they were going to be able to clean up the drug problem at his motel. One officer set up his surveillance in Room 320, across the hall from Room 319. Another officer stationed himself in the parking lot. At approximately 10:00 a.m., a Hispanic female left Room 319, went to a car in the parking lot (known to have been driven by the appellant), got a purse out of the car, and walked to a nearby access road. She was not detained. Later that morning, a police officer observed appellant looking up and down the hallway from Room 319, and later opening the door to talk to the manager about staying another day. Still later, appellant walked to the motel's office and returned to his room.

At 12:40 a.m. on June 16, 2004, police officers obtained a search warrant to search appellant's motel room. In the early morning hours, the officers telephoned appellant in his room, hoping to get him to open his room door. He did not answer. One of the officers, posing as a motel maintenance worker, knocked on Room 319's door, announcing that he was there to fix the air conditioner. As appellant opened the door, the officers moved in, announcing that they were Austin police officers with a search warrant. Appellant was arrested and handcuffed. Balloons of heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine were found. The entry was obtained by ruse. No force was used and no "breaking" occurred. There was no damage to property, and evidence of contraband was not destroyed. The officers were executing a valid search warrant.

DISCUSSION

Appellant does not challenge the validity of the search warrant, but only the manner of its execution. Appellant relies solely upon the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and asserts the lack of reasonableness of the "no-knock" entry in the instant case.¹

The Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV; Brewer v. State, 932 S.W.2d 161, 167 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1996, no pet.). The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable. Ibarra v. State, 11 S.W.3d 189, 192 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). The central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is the reasonableness of the search or seizure under the totality of the circumstances. See Judge Robert R. Barton, Texas Law and Practice — Texas Search and Seizure § 2.01.3 (4th ed. 2006) (citing Hulit v. State, 982 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998)). "The reasonableness of a search is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Id. (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 117-18, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001)).

The "No Knock" Rule

It is an ancient common-law principle that law enforcement officers must announce their presence and provide residents with an opportunity to open the door. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-32, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995). The common-law background of the so-called "knock and announce" rule was extensively examined in Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958). Under the common law, "breaking was unlawful where the officer failed first to state his authority and purpose for demanding admission." Id. at 308, 78 S.Ct. 1190. The rule has been codified as a part of the federal statutory law. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3109 (West 2000).

In Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 88 S.Ct. 1755, 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968), the Court noted that section 3109 "is designed to incorporate fundamental values and the ongoing development of the common law." Id. at 589, 88 S.Ct. 1755. Section 3109 has been frequently interpreted by federal courts. In Sabbath, the Supreme Court held that entry into a residence by opening a closed but unlocked door was a "breaking" and violated section 3109. Id. at 588-91, 88 S.Ct. 1755. In Wilson, the United States Supreme Court was presented with the issue of whether the rule was also within the command of the Fourth Amendment. The Court concluded that it was. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931-36, 115 S.Ct. 1914.²

In light of Wilson, appellant urges that the "knock-and-announce" rule is incorporated within the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness inquiry. Noting the purposes served by the rule as set out in United States v. Cantu, 230 F.3d 148, 151 (5th Cir.2000),³ appellant urges that Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394, 117 S.Ct 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997), enunciated the standard or test to determine if a "no knock" entry will violate the Fourth Amendment:

In order to justify a "no knock" entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence under particular circumstances would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.

Richards at 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416.

Officers are not required to knock and announce their presence before entry if either (1) a magistrate has authorized the "no knock" entry or (2) the circumstances support...