Martinez v. Traubner

• Decision Date: 29 November 1982
• Citation: 32 Cal.3d 755,187 Cal.Rptr. 251,653 P.2d 1046
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 653 P.2d 1046 Salvador MARTINEZ et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Edward TRAUBNER, Defendant and Respondent. L.A. 31571.

Page 251

187 Cal.Rptr. 251

32 Cal.3d 755, 653 P.2d 1046

Salvador MARTINEZ et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Edward TRAUBNER, Defendant and Respondent.

L.A. 31571.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Nov. 29, 1982.

Rand & Goodchild, Schermer & Rand and Matt J. Batt, Sherman Oaks, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Michael D. Nelson, Danville, as amicus curiae on behalf of plaintiffs and appellants.

Long & Levit and Michael M. Pollak, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.

Anderson, McPharlin & Conners and Eric Winter, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and respondent.

BY THE COURT ^*:

We granted a hearing in this case to resolve a conflict between the Court of Appeal decision herein and the decision in Ernest W. Hawn, Inc. v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 567, 166 Cal.Rptr. 644. We have concluded that the analysis contained in Justice McClosky's opinion for the Court of Appeal in the present case correctly On March 28, 1978, Salvador Martinez fell from the roof of a house on which he was working, sustaining serious personal injuries which caused him to be a paraplegic. He and his wife Isabel filed a complaint for damages for personal injuries on September 19, 1978, against the owners of the house and several Does. Thereafter, on March 8, 1979, they filed a first amended complaint for personal injury damages against Edward Traubner, the builder of the house, and others, alleging that the roof collapsed due to a latent defect. It was further alleged that construction of the house was completed on July 20, 1959.

treats the issues and we adopt the relevant [653 P.2d 1047] portions of that opinion, ^** which reads as follows:

Mr. and Mrs. Martinez appeal from judgment entered in favor of Mr. Traubner after the trial court granted his motion for judgment on the pleadings, contending:

1. [Appellants'] first amended complaint does state a viable cause of action against respondent.

2. As properly construed Code of Civil Procedure section 337.15 does not apply to personal injury actions.

3. Public policy considerations require that section 337.15 not apply to personal injury actions.

DISCUSSION

I

Respondent's motion for judgment on the pleadings was based on the sole ground that appellants' cause of action was barred by the 10-year statute of limitations provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 337.15. All statutory references herein are to the Code of Civil Procedure. That section provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) No action may be brought to recover damages from any person, or the surety of a person, who develops real property or performs or furnishes the design, specifications, surveying, planning, supervision, testing, or observation of construction or construction of an improvement to real property more than 10 years after the substantial completion of such development or improvement for any of the following:

"(1) Any latent deficiency in the design, specification, surveying, planning, supervision, or observation of construction or construction of an improvement to, or survey of, real property.

"(2) Injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such latent deficiency.

"(b) As used in this section, 'latent deficiency' means a deficiency which is not apparent by reasonable inspection.

"...

"(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending the period prescribed by the laws of this state for bringing any action.

"(e) The limitation prescribed by this section shall not be asserted by way of defense by any person in actual possession or the control, as owner, tenant or otherwise, of such an improvement, at the time any deficiency in the improvement constitutes the proximate cause for which it is proposed to bring an action.

"..." (Italics added.)

The issue presented in this appeal is whether this section bars a personal injury action for damages brought against a building contractor more than 10 years after his substantial completion of the improvement where the personal injury damage is alleged to have arisen out of such latent deficiency.

The applicable rules of statutory construction require that "[w]e begin with the fundamental rule that a court 'should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.' [Citation.] In determining such intent '[t]he court turns first to the words themselves for the answer.' [Citation.] We are required to give effect to statutes 'according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them.' [Citations.] 'If possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.' [Citation]; 'a construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided.' [Citation.] 'When used in a statute [words] must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear.' [Citations.] Moreover, the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. [Citations.]" (Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230-231, 514 P.2d 1224.)

Applying these principles to the case before us, we note that when it was first introduced in the Legislature the original bill, which was ultimately enacted as section 337.15, contained express language applying it to personal injury and wrongful death arising out of latent defects. (Assem. Bill No. 2742, Apr. 15, 1971.) This language was removed by amendments and the section was enacted in its present form. (Stats. 1971, ch. 1569, § 1, p. 3148; see also, Wagner v. State of California (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 922, 931, 150 Cal.Rptr. 489, dis. opn.) This deletion was highly significant, especially since section 337.1, a similar section providing a four-year statute of limitations for damages arising from patent defects, was in existence at the time, and specifically provided that it applies to "injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any such patent deficiency." (§ 337.1, subd. (a)(3).)

From these circumstances it appears that when the Legislature intended to set a limitation on the period during which a builder or developer could be liable in damages for a personal injury or wrongful death resulting from a defect in construction, it did so specifically. It follows that where it did not do so, it did not so intend.

Moreover as enacted, and as it remains the law of this state, section 337.15, subdivision (a) provides for the 10-year limitation for bringing an action for damages against certain kinds of persons "... for any of the following:" It then lists as the following, only:

"(1) Any latent deficiency in the design, specification, surveying, planning, supervision or observation of construction or construction of an improvement to, or survey of, real property.

"(2) Injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such latent deficiency."

Thus, by its express language, section 337.15 only bars actions for damages for (1) the deficient work or property itself and (2) damage to other real or personal property arising from such deficiency.

Our reading of the express words of section 337.15, our giving consideration to its legislative history, and harmonizing that section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole, leads us to conclude that section 337.15 does not limit the time within which direct actions for personal injury damages or wrongful death may be brought against the persons specified in the statute.

II

Respondent [ ] [relies upon] Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Superior Court [, supra,] 108 Cal.App.3d 567, 166 Cal.Rptr. 644, [ ] for the proposition that "a personal injury action against a building contractor was barred by the applicable statute of limitations where the construction had been completed more than 10 years before plaintiff filed suit."

In Hahn the plaintiff sustained personal injuries when she fell on an allegedly defective step at [real party in interest (RPI) ] Tiny Naylor's restaurant. She did not file her personal injury action against RPI owner until January 1978, more than 10 years after the building contractor, Hahn, had substantially completed construction in 1967. (Hahn, supra, at p. 569, 166 Cal.Rptr. 644.) RPI owner then cross-complained against the building constructor, petitioner Hahn, who brought a motion for summary judgment on the cross-complaint. After the trial court denied the motion, the Court of Appeal granted a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the superior court to vacate its order denying petitioner's motion, and enter an order granting the motion. The Hahn court freely acknowledged that "[t]he sole issue presented in [the Hahn] proceedings is whether Code of Civil Procedure section 337.15 operates to bar an action for indemnity against petitioner." (Hahn, supra, at p. 569, 166 Cal.Rptr. 644.) The Hahn court held that the [owner's] cross-complaint for indemnity was barred because it was not brought within the 10-year limitation period...