Ernest W. Hahn, Inc v. Superior Court

• Citation: 166 Cal.Rptr. 644,108 Cal.App.3d 567
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 25 July 1980
• Parties: ERNEST W. HAHN, INC., Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent. TINY NAYLOR'S RESTAURANTS, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. Civ. 59343.

Page 644

166 Cal.Rptr. 644

108 Cal.App.3d 567

ERNEST W. HAHN, INC., Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent.

TINY NAYLOR'S RESTAURANTS, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Civ. 59343.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

July 25, 1980.

Dean, Mansell & Manchester by Robert E. Kuhn, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

James F. Callopy, Los Angeles, for real party in interest and respondent.

No appearance, for respondent court.

COMPTON, Associate Justice.

Proceedings in mandamus to vacate an order denying petitioner's motion for summary judgment and to direct the superior court to enter summary judgment in favor of petitioner. We issue the writ as prayed for.

One Talma E. Hopper slipped and fell on an allegedly defective step at the entrance to Tiny Naylor's Restaurant (RPI) in January of 1976. She commenced a personal injury action against RPI in January of 1978.

RPI cross-complained for indemnification against petitioner the building contractor who built the restaurant. Construction of the restaurant was completed in 1967.

Code of Civil Procedure section 337.1 provides that no action for damages resulting from patent defects may be maintained against persons who construct improvements to real property more than four years after substantial completion of the improvement. Code of Civil Procedure section 337.15 provides, in the case of latent defects, a limitation period of ten years after completion.

Inasmuch as it appears that Hopper's action against RPI was commenced more than ten years after petitioner completed construction of the building, we are not here concerned with whether the defect complained of was "patent" or "latent." A direct action by Hopper against petitioner would be barred in either event.

The sole issue presented in these proceedings is whether Code of Civil Procedure section 337.15 operates to bar an action for indemnity against petitioner. The essential facts being uncontroverted, a motion for summary judgment is the proper vehicle for resolution of the issue. The trial court's ruling was that the action was not barred because of the California Supreme Court holding in People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.3d 744, 163 Cal.Rptr. 585, 608 P.2d 673. We disagree.

That case involved a cross-complaint for indemnity against the State of California filed by a number of defendants in a personal injury action. The Tort Claims Act requires the filing of a claim within certain prescribed time periods following the accrual of a cause of action against the State. Neither the plaintiff nor the cross-complainants had filed such a claim.

The court there held that (1) the cause of action for indemnity did not accrue until after judgment and payment of damages in the plaintiff's action against the original defendants, and (2) the defendants' action for indemnity is a separate and independent action and is not barred by the fact that the statute of limitations may have run on a direct action by the plaintiff against the alleged indemnitor.

Assuming arguendo that the broad language of People ex rel Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court, supra, can be interpreted as applying to all statutes of limitation and not just to the rather short limitation periods of the Tort Claims Act, we are of the opinion that the clear legislative policy embodied in Code of Civil Procedure section 337.15, and the specific language of that statute itself, places it beyond the pale of the holding in that case.

Code of Civil Procedure section 337.15 fixes the point at which the period of limitations begins to run at the completion of construction and not the accrual of any cause of action resulting therefrom. Further, since it deals with latent defects and places a finite limit on the time in which an action can be brought, the limitation period contained therein is not one which can be...