Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp.

• Decision Date: 21 January 1997
• Docket Number: 96-1556,Nos. 96-1555,s. 96-1555
• Citation: 104 F.3d 683
• Parties: 146 A.L.R. Fed. 683, 65 USLW 2496, 6 A.D. Cases 434, 19 A.D.D. 705, 9 NDLR P 96 Harald E. MARTINSON, II, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff, v. KINNEY SHOE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. Epilepsy Foundation of America; Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington, D.C., Amici Curiae. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Harald E. Martinson, II, Plaintiff, v. KINNEY SHOE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. Epilepsy Foundation of America; Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington, D.C., Amici Curiae.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 683

104 F.3d 683

146 A.L.R. Fed. 683, 65 USLW 2496, 6

A.D. Cases 434,

19 A.D.D. 705, 9 NDLR P 96

Harald E. MARTINSON, II, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff, v. KINNEY SHOE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Epilepsy Foundation of America; Disability Rights Council

of Greater Washington, D.C., Amici Curiae.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Harald E. Martinson, II, Plaintiff, v. KINNEY SHOE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Epilepsy Foundation of America; Disability Rights Council

of Greater Washington, D.C., Amici Curiae.

Nos. 96-1555, 96-1556.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Dec. 2, 1996.

Decided Jan. 21, 1997.

ARGUED: Karen Marie Moran, Office of General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, DC, for Appellant EEOC; Jesse James Richardson, Jr., Law Offices Of Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., P.C., Winchester, Virginia, for Appellant Martinson. Alexander Neal Barkus, Hunton & Williams, Washington, DC, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: C. Gregory Stewart, General Counsel, Gwendolyn Young Reams, Associate General Counsel, Vincent J. Blackwood, Assistant General Counsel, Office of General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, DC, for Appellant EEOC. E. Eugene Gunter, Winchester, Virginia, for Appellant Martinson. Thomas J. Flaherty, David A. Walsh, Elizabeth C. Smith, Hunton & Williams, McLean, Virginia, for Appellee. Robert A. Long, Jr., Covington & Burling, Washington, DC; Alexandra K. Finucane, Vice President for Legal Affairs, The Epilepsy Foundation of America, Landover, Maryland; Marc Fiedler, President, The Disability Rights Council Of Greater Washington, D.C., Washington, DC, for Amici Curiae.

Before RUSSELL, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge MOTZ wrote the opinion, in which Judge RUSSELL and Judge MICHAEL joined.

OPINION

DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:

The district court concluded that an employer did not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), when it discharged a shoe salesman who suffered from epilepsy. EEOC v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 917 F.Supp. 419 (W.D.Va.1996). The district court's analysis was flawed in some respects but much of its reasoning and the court's ultimate holding were correct. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

Because the district court fully set forth the facts, id. at 422-24, we relate here only those necessary to understand our holding.

Harald Martinson worked for Kinney as a shoe salesman in a Winchester, Virginia shopping mall at various times between 1989 and 1992. In January 1992, Kinney rehired Martinson as a full-time salesperson. Martinson suffers from epilepsy, which was first diagnosed in 1967. During previous periods of employment with Kinney, Martinson had experienced seizures at work, and Kinney rehired him with the knowledge that seizures could occur. The seizures that Martinson experienced during the work day were usually similar to fainting spells; his body would collapse to the ground and he would appear to be sleeping. He would remain in this state for five to ten minutes, after which he would "awake" and take a twenty to forty-five minute break from work to compose himself. Other than "a bump or a scratch," Martinson has never injured himself or anyone else during any of his seizures over the past twenty-nine years. Furthermore, Martinson has not requested any accommodation other than tolerance of his seizures.

Kinney supervisors acknowledged that Martinson was a good salesman; he received two "Employee of the Month" awards, one just before his final dismissal. They also admitted that his "sales book" was "better than average." One of his managers testified that but for the seizures, Martinson was fully capable of performing his job; he was a reliable employee and had very good knowledge of the merchandise. Moreover, although Martinson's supervisors disagreed about this, one conceded that Martinson's seizures did not cause Kinney to lose customers.

Between January and July 1992, Martinson "guess[ed]" that he had approximately five seizures at work but he explained that he did not remember his seizures and so had to rely on others as to their occurrence; Kinney maintained that he had approximately sixteen. In July 1992, a Kinney manager warned Martinson that he would be fired if he "had another seizure." When Martinson did have another seizure, Kinney discharged him. On Martinson's employee separation report, Kinney District Sales Manager, Allen Bosworth, wrote that Martinson's discharge was attributable to "[s]eizures in store, sales floor, and stockroom. Inability to control timing of same." ¹

The EEOC initiated this suit against Kinney on Martinson's behalf, and Martinson intervened. The district court held that while there were material issues of fact with regard to whether Martinson was qualified to do his job, Kinney was entitled to summary judgment because it had not engaged in "unlawful discrimination." Id. at 430.

II.

Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to ... discharge of employees ... and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). Therefore, to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory firing, a plaintiff must prove: (1) he has a "disability;" (2) he is a "qualified individual;" and (3) in "discharg[ing]" him, his employer "discriminate[d] against [him] because of [his] disability." Id.; see also Doe v. University of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1264-65 (4th Cir.1995).

For purposes of summary judgment, the district court concluded that Martinson had a disability and thus the first prong of this test had been satisfied, a conclusion that Kinney does not contest at this stage. Kinney, 917 F.Supp. at 425. Further, the court determined that the EEOC and Martinson had met the second prong by producing sufficient evidence at least to raise an issue of fact as to whether Martinson was qualified for his job despite his seizures. Id. at 425-29. However, the district court concluded that the EEOC and Martinson could not carry their burden on the third prong of the prima facie test. Id. at 430-32. The court reasoned that since Kinney did not discharge Martinson because he suffered from the "general disability" of epilepsy but rather "because of the specific attributes of [Martinson's] specific form of the disability," i.e., his seizures, Martinson could not prevail on the third prong. Id. at 430-31.

The district court erred with regard to its conclusion as to the third prong. When an employer concededly discharges an employee because of a disability, the employee need prove nothing more to meet the third prong of the prima facie test. See Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., 84 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir.1996). Kinney concededly discharged Martinson because of his "[s]eizures in store, sales floor, and stockroom" and his "[i]nability to control timing of same." To fire for seizures is to fire for a disability. ² Seizures are "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of [Martinson's] major life activities," i.e., a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (defining disability). Whether Kinney fired Martinson because he suffered from epilepsy or because of the "specific attributes" of his disease, i.e., his seizures, is immaterial--both are disabilities and an employer may not use either to justify discharging an employee so long as that employee is qualified for the job. ³ Thus, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Kinney discharged Martinson because of a disability. This is all the EEOC and Martinson must prove to satisfy the third prong of the prima facie test.

Although the district court erred with regard to the third prong, we can affirm if its decision was correct for any other reason. See, e.g., McMahan v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers Local 601, 964 F.2d 1462, 1467 (4th Cir.1992). Here, we believe the district court was correct for another reason. Specifically, we believe the undisputed facts establish that Martinson was not qualified to perform at least one essential function of his position with Kinney.

To satisfy the second prong of the prima facie test, an ADA plaintiff must demonstrate that "with or without reasonable accommodation, [he] can perform the essential functions of the employment position." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining"qualified individual with a disability"). The Kinney managers repeatedly testified that maintaining store security was an essential function of a Kinney salesperson's job. Martinson offered no evidence to the contrary. Thus, the undisputed evidence demonstrated and the district court properly recognized that this was "an inherent part of a shoe salesperson's job given that Kinney does not hire security guards." Kinney, 917 F.Supp. at 426. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(ii) (explaining that a job "function may be essential because of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed").

Just as the evidence was uncontroverted that providing security was an "essential function" of a Kinney salesperson's job, so too the evidence was uncontroverted that Martinson was not...