Marts v. State
Citation | 968 S.W.2d 41,332 Ark. 628 |
Decision Date | 23 April 1998 |
Docket Number | No. CR,CR |
Parties | Billy Richard MARTS II, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 97-1212. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
John Wesley Hall, Jr., Little Rock, for Appellant.
Winston Bryant, Atty. Gen., Mac Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for Appellee.
Appellant Billy Richard Marts II appeals the judgment of the Sebastian County Circuit Court convicting him of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to deliver, a Class Y felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class C felony, and sentencing him to concurrent terms of life and three years' imprisonment, respectively. Our jurisdiction of this appeal is pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1-2(a)(2). Appellant raises three points for reversal, contending that the trial court erred (1) in admitting into evidence a statement given by Appellant and a notebook seized from him at the time of his arrest; (2) in allowing an officer to testify as to the ultimate issue of whether Appellant had possessed the drugs with the intent to deliver them; and (3) in denying Appellant's motion for directed verdict on the issue of the weight of the drugs. We find no error and affirm.
The record reflects that on December 13, 1996, Detective Wayne Barnett of the Fort Smith Police Department, Narcotics Division, received a tip from a confidential informant (CI) that a person named "Bo" was going to make a trip to Dallas, Texas, to pick up a large quantity of methamphetamine, and that he would be returning to Fort Smith either that night or the following morning. The following day, Barnett received information from the CI that "Bo" was back in town, that he was in possession of a large quantity of methamphetamine, and that he was on his way to a tire shop located on 6th Avenue in Fort Smith. The CI told the officer that "Bo" would be carrying the drugs in the inside pocket of his coat, and that he would be driving a red extended-cab GMC pickup truck that had a big blue air compressor on the back of it. The CI also gave the officer the license plate number of the truck. Barnett then informed other officers to be on the lookout for the vehicle. Shortly thereafter, one of the other officers spotted the vehicle and stopped it.
When Barnett arrived, he told the suspect, later identified as Appellant, that he had reason to believe that he was in possession of a large quantity of methamphetamine. Barnett observed that Appellant's coat was sagging down on one side, as if something heavy was in the pocket. Barnett reached inside the pocket and pulled out a Payless Cashways sack that contained a large amount of suspected methamphetamine and a glass pipe with burnt residue on it. When Barnett asked Appellant how much was in the bag, Appellant replied, "about a pound." Appellant was subsequently charged with and convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
For his first point for reversal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence an oral statement given by him and a notebook seized from him on the date of his arrest. Appellant contends that he was not provided discovery of this evidence prior to trial, despite the fact that he had filed a motion pursuant to A.R.Cr.P. Rule 17.1. We do not reverse on this point, as Appellant did not raise this issue at the first opportunity, nor has he demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the evidence.
A party who does not object to the introduction of evidence at the first opportunity waives such an argument on appeal. Wilburn v. State, 317 Ark. 73, 876 S.W.2d 555 (1994). The policy reason for this rule is that a trial court should be given an opportunity to correct any error early in the trial, perhaps before any prejudice occurs. Id. Similarly, objections to discovery violations must be made at the first opportunity in order to preserve them for appeal. Turner v. State, 325 Ark. 237, 926 S.W.2d 843 (1996); Clark v. State, 323 Ark. 211, 913 S.W.2d 297 (1996).
Here, Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence, including any and all statements made by him at the time of his arrest. A suppression hearing was conducted on the morning of the trial, during which Detective Barnett testified that he had read Appellant his Miranda rights and had proceeded to interview him about the possibility of cooperating with police in drug investigations. Barnett stated that Appellant indicated that he would consider working with the police if Barnett would agree to (1) shred the statement-of-rights form and all other paperwork on Appellant's case, (2) return the pound of "crank" to Appellant, and (3) release Appellant without filing any charges against him. Barnett stated that he did not agree with those conditions; he then terminated the interview and booked Appellant. At no point during direct examination of Barnett, or at any other time during the suppression hearing, did Appellant object to the statement on the ground that he had not been provided discovery of it. To the contrary, Appellant's sole argument for suppression of the evidence was the lack of reliability of the confidential informant.
Likewise, when the officer took the stand during trial, Appellant only objected to the alleged discovery violations after some prodding from the trial court. That colloquy is as follows:
MR. WATSON:
Q. Okay. Detective Barnett, did you read him his rights?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And did he go over the rights form with you?
A. Yes, I[sic] did. I have it here.
Q. Did he sign that?
....
....
It is thus apparent that Appellant's discovery objection was that the statement-of-rights form was not in the State's file prior to trial; Appellant did not argue that he had no knowledge or notice of the statement itself. It is equally apparent that his objection was actually directed to making sure that the State's file did not contain any surprises that may have been brought up at a later time. Moreover, when asked by the trial court if he wanted a hearing on the issue, defense counsel did not indicate that such a hearing was necessary.
We are persuaded by the trial court's reasoning that a defendant must be diligent in raising objections to alleged discovery violations. The fact that Appellant chose to wait until trial to make an objection, and then only in response to inquiries made by the trial court, demonstrates that he was not diligent in bringing the matter to the court's attention. Although we do not necessarily agree with the trial court's holding that Appe...
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...exceptions outlined in Rule 803. Ark. R. Evid. 801(c) (2001). A general objection will not preserve a specific point. Marts v. State, 332 Ark. 628, 968 S.W.2d 41 (1998). Thus, in order to preserve a hearsay objection, a defendant must make a timely, specific objection, stating that ground. ......
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