Marvin Johnson, P.C. v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa
| Citation | 181 Ariz. 1,887 P.2d 1 |
| Decision Date | 02 August 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,CA-SA,1 |
| Parties | MARVIN JOHNSON, P.C., and Marvin Johnson, Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, the Honorable Robert D. Myers, a judge thereof, Respondent Judge, The ESTATE OF Keith Harlan CURTIS, Real Party in Interest. 94-0125. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Arizona |
Petitioners in this special action challenge the probate court's order consolidating a tort action in which they are defendants with a pending probate proceeding involving the estate that filed suit against them for tort damages. The only issue we address is whether the probate court exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction by consolidating the tort action into the probate proceeding. 1 Because petitioners have no plain, adequate, and speedy remedy by appeal from the consolidation order, and because the issue is purely one of law, we accepted special action jurisdiction. See generally Rules 1 and 3, Arizona Rules of Procedure for Special Actions.
On July 15, 1993, in cause number CV 93-16680 (the tort action), the estate of Keith Harlan Curtis (estate) filed a civil complaint entitled "Tort; Non-Motor Vehicle" against the law firm of Marvin Johnson, P.C., and individual defendants Marvin Johnson and Neal T. Roberts, attorneys who had previously represented the estate and handled the probate, as well as individual defendant Delmar Whitehead, who had formerly been the personal representative of the estate. 2 The complaint alleged that defendants, acting in concert and while Roberts was within the course and scope of his employment with the law firm, converted $50,000 of estate assets. The complaint alleged Johnson's liability based upon his negligent hiring, training, and supervision of Roberts. The complaint also alleged fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and racketeering, and sought compensatory damages for the converted assets, treble damages pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-2314, punitive damages, prejudgment interest, costs, and attorneys' fees.
The estate filed a motion to consolidate the tort action in probate court, 3 and, after oral argument, 4 the probate court ordered consolidation, ruling in part:
Clearly and unequivocally ... A.R.S. § 14-3105 gives this Court jurisdiction to hear the tort case here. The witnesses in both cases may be substantially the same, the issues may be substantially the same, this Court will be able to set this matter for trial earlier than a civil division, and therefore for both judicial economy and speed of resolution of the issues, the Court grants the Personal Representative's Motion to Consolidate....
(First emphasis in original; second emphasis added.)
Petitioners Marvin Johnson, P.C., and Johnson brought this special action, challenging the probate court's subject matter jurisdiction to consolidate a tort action against them with the probate proceeding.
Petitioners contend that the probate court has no subject matter jurisdiction over the tort action within the scope of its statutory jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-1302, which provides:
A. To the full extent permitted by the constitution, the court has jurisdiction over all subject matter relating to:
1. Estates of decedents, including construction of wills and determination of heirs and successors of decedents, and estates of protected persons.
2. Protection of minors and incapacitated persons.
3. Trusts.
B. The court has full power to make orders, judgments and decrees and take all other action necessary and proper to administer justice in the matters which come before it including power to enforce orders against a fiduciary by contempt proceedings and to compel action by a fiduciary by body attachment.
Citing the same statute, the estate argues that the probate court has jurisdiction over the estate's action "to recover damages to replenish the assets wrongfully converted." The probate court, however, found the basis for its jurisdiction to consolidate the tort action in A.R.S. § 14-3105, which provides, in pertinent part:
The court has jurisdiction of any other action or proceeding concerning succession or to which an estate, through a personal representative, may be a party, including actions to determine title to property alleged to belong to the estate, and of any action or proceeding in which property distributed by a personal representative or its value is sought to be subjected to rights of creditors or successors of the decedent.
We begin our analysis with the recognition that a probate court is a court of limited jurisdiction; when it acts outside of its statutory jurisdiction, its orders are void. Estate of Wright, 132 Ariz. 555, 560, 647 P.2d 1153, 1158 (App.1982). When a superior court division acts as a court of probate, its jurisdiction and functions are different from its jurisdiction and functions when sitting as a court of law or equity. Shattuck v. Shattuck, 67 Ariz. 122, 128, 192 P.2d 229, 231 (1948); see also Gonzalez v. Superior Court, 117 Ariz. 64, 66, 570 P.2d 1077, 1079 (1977).
It has long been recognized that a probate court does not have jurisdiction to determine claims against individuals; rather, the probate court may determine claims only against the estate, or among individuals involving their respective interests in the estate. See, e.g., Estate of Alfaro, 18 Ariz.App. 173, 500 P.2d 1161 (1972) (); Gonzalez, 117 Ariz. at 66, 570 P.2d at 1079 (); Estate of Wright, 132 Ariz. at 560, 647 P.2d at 1158 (); Estate of Soble, 137 Ariz. 223, 224, 669 P.2d 1000, 1001 (App.1983) (). These long-standing principles have not necessarily been replaced by Arizona's 1973 revision of the probate code. See A.R.S. § 14-1103 ().
This recognition of the limits to the jurisdiction of the probate court has also been well-established in other jurisdictions with statutes similar to A.R.S. §§ 14-1302 and 14-3105. 5 For example, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a probate court's statutory jurisdiction, under a statute providing that the probate court had jurisdiction over "[m]atters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person ...," did not include a claim for money damages for breach of contract brought by the estate of the deceased person against a third party defendant, nor did it include the defendant's counterclaim. In re Kus Estate, 136 Mich.App. 343, 356 N.W.2d 23, 25 (1984). The appellate court reasoned, "Probate courts do not become courts of general jurisdiction just because an estate is involved," although the court noted that the probate code does allow the filing of a claim against the estate of a deceased person and a determination whether such a claim is justifiable and should be paid. Id.; see also Noble v. McNerney, 165 Mich.App. 586, 419 N.W.2d 424, 427 (1988) (). Similarly, a Florida appellate court found authority for a probate court to "freeze" or "marshal assets," which included corporate stock in which decedent might have had an interest, but concluded that the probate court erred in further restraining the corporations themselves, which were not parties to the probate proceedings. Perez v. Lopez, 454 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla.App.Dist. 3 1984). The Montana Supreme Court has held that a probate court has no power or authority to distribute assets that are not owned by the estate, Estate of Swandal, 179 Mont. 429, 587 P.2d 368, 371 (1978), nor does it have jurisdiction to approve a settlement of a wrongful death suit filed by the personal representative. Estate of Pegg, 209 Mont. 71, 680 P.2d 316, 322 (1984).
All of the above-cited cases implicitly recognize that no provision of the probate code authorizes the probate court to enter judgments against third parties if those parties have not brought a claim against the estate. In Gonzalez, our supreme court recognized that, notwithstanding the legislature's intent in revising the probate code "to confer upon the Superior Court sitting in probate its full constitutional jurisdiction in matters which might arise affecting estates," the "summary in rem procedure of probate" was not meant to be employed to determine the rights of third parties. 117 Ariz. at 66, 570 P.2d at 1079. Similarly, in Soble, this court held that the statutory jurisdiction of the probate court did not include the right to enter a judgment regarding a non-estate asset. 137 Ariz. at 224, 669 P.2d at 1001.
In this case, the probate court attempted to distinguish the holdings of Gonzalez and Soble on the following bases:
The Soble case is distinguishable from the instant case because in Soble the Appellate Court held that the probate court did have the jurisdiction to determine whether the contested assets represent a corporate property or property of the estate. However, said the Appellate Court, the probate court did not have...
To continue reading
Request your trial