Mascarenas v. State, 01-225.

• Decision Date: 30 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-225.,01-225.
• Citation: 76 P.3d 1258,2003 WY 124
• Parties: Henry MASCARENAS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

76 P.3d 1258

2003 WY 124

Henry MASCARENAS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 01-225.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

September 30, 2003.

Representing Appellant: Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee: Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ; and BURKE, D.J.

HILL, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1] Henry Mascarenas (Mascarenas) challenges his conviction for felony interference with a peace officer in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) (LexisNexis 2003) on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence that the police officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties or that the officer suffered bodily injury. He also claims that the State failed to disclose material, exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and Kerns v. State, 920 P.2d 632 (Wyo.1996). We find sufficient evidence in the record to support the conviction and conclude that Mascarenas has failed to demonstrate a Brady violation. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Mascarenas states the following issues:

I. Was [Mascarenas's] arrest unlawful, as the police had no probable cause to arrest [him] (which was admitted by the charging officer); and as a result, was there insufficient evidence to convict [him]?

II. Was there insufficient [evidence] to convict [Mascarenas] as the alleged victim/officer did not suffer "physical pain"?

III. Did the State fail to disclose exculpatory evidence, warranting reversal?

The State condenses the issues into two:

I. Was the evidence presented by the State sufficient to support [Mascarenas's] conviction?

II. Did the State fail to disclose material exculpatory evidence?

FACTS

[¶ 3] The main issue Mascarenas raises in this appeal is whether or not the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction for interference with a peace officer. When considering claims related to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record:

[assuming] that the evidence favoring the prevailing party is true, disregard the evidence favoring the unsuccessful party, and give the prevailing party the benefit of every favorable inference that we may reasonably draw from the evidence.

Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 29, 42 P.3d 483, ¶ 29 (Wyo.2002) (quoting Lucero v. State, 14 P.3d 920, 924 (Wyo.2000)). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor re-examine the credibility of the witnesses. Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 375 (Wyo.1995).

[¶ 4] On December 31, 2000, the Rawlins Police Department received a call from an unknown person that a fight between Mascarenas and the bartender was in progress at the Wyoming Bar. The caller specifically identified Mascarenas by name. When the police arrived, there was shattered glass on the floor from a neon sign. It was later determined that the sign had broken when Mascarenas had stumbled into it while the bartender was unsuccessfully attempting to escort him from the premises. The officers spied Mascarenas standing by the bar engaged in a heated verbal argument with the bartender. Officer Davis asked the bartender what was going on and was told that Mascarenas had been asked to leave because of his intoxication but that he had refused to exit the premises.

[¶ 5] Officer Davis and Officer Grauberger asked Mascarenas to step outside and talk to them. Mascarenas ignored the officers and pulled away when Officer Davis attempted to grab his arm to escort him outside. Mascarenas then gripped the bar and refused to move. Two additional officers had arrived and they, along with Officer Grauberger, pried Mascarenas's fingers from the bar and took him to the floor to cuff his hands behind his back. At that point, Officer Davis informed Mascarenas that he was under arrest for "fighting in public."

[¶ 6] Officer Grauberger began to search Mascarenas for weapons. The officer placed Mascarenas's personal items, such as his cigarettes and wallet, on the floor as he proceeded with the search. This apparently upset Mascarenas who responded by stomping on his cigarettes and saying, "Here are my cigarettes, here are your balls," whereupon Mascarenas kneed Officer Grauberger in the groin. In response, the officers took Mascarenas to the floor again and placed him in leg restraints.

[¶ 7] Mascarenas was charged with one count of intentionally causing bodily injury to a peace officer engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) (LexisNexis 2003).¹ After a trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict.

DISCUSSION

[¶ 8] Mascarenas challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting two elements of interference with a peace officer. In his initial claim, Mascarenas contends that the evidence does not support a conclusion that the officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties when Mascarenas kneed him in the groin. Mascarenas's argument is predicated on the contention that his arrest was not supported by probable cause. During the course of the encounter at the bar, Mascarenas was arrested when he refused to accompany the police officers outside for "fighting in public." The crime of "fighting in public" is defined at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-6-101 (LexisNexis 2003) as:

A person commits a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both, if, by agreement, he fights with one (1) or more persons in public.

Mascarenas points out that there was no evidence that there was any agreement between him and the bartender to fight in public. Accordingly, he contends that there was no probable cause to arrest him and that the actions taken by the police were not in the "lawful performance" of their duties.

[¶ 9] The State counters that Mascarenas unreasonably assumes that Officer Davis was referencing § 6-6-101 when the officer announced that Mascarenas was under arrest for "fighting in public." The State argues that aspects of Mascarenas's conduct encompassed in the phrase, "fighting in public," could be construed to justify Mascarenas's arrest "for not only a variety of potential but unknown municipal offenses, but also for a number of statutory crimes." Later, the State suggests that Mascarenas's conduct supported probable cause for an arrest for: (1) simple battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) (LexisNexis 2003)² for unlawfully touching another in a rude, insolent or angry manner; (2) property destruction pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201(a) (LexisNexis 2003)³ for knowingly defacing, injuring or destroying another's property without his consent; and (3) for breach of the peace in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-6-102(a) (LexisNexis 2003)⁴ for disturbing the peace by using threatening, abusive or obscene language or violent actions. In effect, the State argues that the officer's statement that Mascarenas was being arrested for "fighting in public" is more of a description of conduct rather than a reference to a specific offense.

[¶ 10] Our discussion begins with a review of the standards for determining whether or not a warrantless arrest is justified by probable cause:

This court also has defined probable cause as "`the facts and circumstances within the peace officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information * * * sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious or prudent man to believe that the person arrested has committed * * * an offense (emphasis added).'" Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471, 476 (Wyo. 1983); Neilson [v. State, 599 P.2d 1326 (Wyo.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S.Ct. 1031, 62 L.Ed.2d 763 (1980) ]. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879, reh. denied, 338 U.S. 839, 70 S.Ct. 31, 94 L.Ed. 513 (1949). It is recognized that the standard is an objective one which is not subject to police discretion, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964), but, even so, the matter of probable cause "is to be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer on the scene at the time of the arrest guided by his experience and training." United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C.Cir.1972). The experience and expertise possessed by the arresting officer is to be taken into account. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 95 S.Ct. 2585, 45 L.Ed.2d 623 (1975); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).

The facts and circumstances which justify a determination that probable cause was present must amount to more than mere suspicion, but they need not rise to the level of proof of guilt, nor even to the level of prima facie evidence of guilt. Ostrowski; Raigosa v. State, 562 P.2d 1009 (Wyo. 1977); Brinegar. The determination of whether the standard was met must be made upon an evaluation of the record. Ostrowski; Neilson. In applying the standard, we evaluate the record, with a practical view using good sense. Vrooman v. State, 642 P.2d 782 (Wyo.1982).

Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512, 518 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶ 11] We agree with the State's analysis and conclude that probable cause existed justifying the warrantless arrest of Mascarenas. At the time of the arrest, Officer Davis was in possession of the following information: An anonymous phone call had reported a fight between the bartender and Mascarenas, who was specifically identified by name; upon arrival, Mascarenas was observed standing by the bar engaged in what appeared to be a heated verbal exchange with the bartender, and there was a broken neon sign and glass on the floor. When the officers indicated to Mascarenas that they wished to...