Mason-Jares, Ltd. v. Peterson, MASON-JARE

Decision Date15 May 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96CA0975,LTD,MASON-JARE,96CA0975
Citation939 P.2d 522
Parties21 Colorado Journal 678 , a Colorado corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Earl E. PETERSON and Carl J. Peterson, Defendants-Appellants. . III
CourtColorado Court of Appeals

Robert J. Mason, Colorado Springs, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Frederick W. Newall, Colorado Springs, for Defendants-Appellants.

Opinion by Judge RULAND.

In this quiet title action, defendants, Earl E. and Carl J. Peterson, appeal from the trial court's order denying their motion to set aside a default judgment in favor of plaintiff, Mason-Jares, Ltd. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Defendants, who are brothers, were both intended assignees of an agreement to purchase a parcel of real property located in El Paso County, Colorado. Both defendants signed the instrument, but only one was actually described as the assignee.

After defendants failed to make several installment payments toward the purchase, plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to C.R.C.P. 105 to quiet title in the property. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a verified motion seeking to serve defendants by publication pursuant to C.R.C.P. 4(h), alleging that the efforts to locate defendants had been unsuccessful. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion and notice of the action was published in a newspaper between October 31, 1995, and November 21, 1995.

Some time prior to November 6, 1995, plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel received a handwritten letter from defendant Carl J. Peterson requesting that plaintiff not "take any legal steps." Defendants attempted to cure their delinquent installment payments by enclosing some money orders.

This letter also included a new address where plaintiff should contact "the Peterson." This reference apparently was intended to refer to both defendants, and plaintiff does not contend otherwise.

On November 6, 1995, more than two weeks prior to the completion of service by publication, plaintiff's counsel responded with a letter to the new address informing defendant Carl J. Peterson that plaintiff had commenced a quiet title action. The letter also indicated that the money orders were being returned and that "your alternative" is to pay the balance of the purchase price.

Thereafter, plaintiff filed notices with the court regarding the setting and date of a hearing for entry of a final decree. Notwithstanding the prior correspondence with defendant Carl J. Peterson at his new address, plaintiff mailed copies of these two notices to the old address.

After defendants failed to appear for the hearing, the trial court entered an order for default. The court then entered a decree quieting title in plaintiff.

Approximately two months later, defendants filed a motion to set aside the default judgment and underlying decree. Defendants argued that the service by publication was invalid because, among other things, it violated due process. Specifically, defendants argued that, since plaintiff had been in direct communication with defendant Carl J. Peterson, but failed to serve either defendant personally with the summons and complaint or with notice of the hearings, the judgment was void.

The trial court denied defendants' motion. In so doing, it noted that "[i]t appears ... Carl Peterson did have notice of the proceeding" and that neither defendant had asserted a meritorious defense.

Defendants contend that the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the default judgment entered against them. We agree.

C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) provides that the trial court may relieve a party from a final judgment if the judgment is void. A judgment is void if the procedure used to enter that decree violates a party's due process rights. Don J. Best Trust v. Cherry Creek National Bank, 792 P.2d 302 (Colo.App.1990); see also United Bank v. Buchanan, 836 P.2d 473 (Colo.App.1992) (judgment entered by a trial court against a defendant is void if the service of process is invalid).

Service by publication is authorized in a quiet title proceeding if the requirements of C.R.C.P. 4(g) and C.R.C.P. 4(h) are satisfied. However, the issue before us is whether published notice meets due process requirements if, as here, a party's location is discovered by plaintiff during the publication process.

In Bray v. Germain Investment Co., 105 Colo. 403, 98 P.2d 993 (1940), the plaintiff learned the names and addresses of certain previously "unknown" d...

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8 cases
  • Burton v. Colorado Access
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • August 13, 2015
    ...set it aside pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3). See Rainsberger v. Klein, 5 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo.App.1999) ; Mason–Jares, Ltd. v. Peterson, 939 P.2d 522, 524 (Colo.App.1997) ; United Bank of Boulder, 836 P.2d at 477–78. ¶ 18 In arguing to the contrary, Ms. Burton relies on that portion of sectio......
  • State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. George
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • January 18, 2002
  • In re the Petition of C.L.S.
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • March 3, 2011
    ...requires vacating” the resulting judgment. First Nat'l Bank v. Fleisher, 2 P.3d 706, 712 (Colo.2000); see also Mason–Jares, Ltd. v. Peterson, 939 P.2d 522, 524 (Colo.App.1997) (judgment void because service by publication did not satisfy due process where plaintiff discovered defendants' lo......
  • McGuire v. CHAMPION FENCE & CONST., INC., No. 03CA1583.
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • November 4, 2004
    ...Code. We agree. C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) provides for relief from a final judgment if the judgment is void. See Mason-Jares, Ltd. v. Peterson, 939 P.2d 522 (Colo.App.1997). A void judgment may be challenged at any time pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) and must be vacated upon request. Rainsberger v. ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Chapter 2 - § 2.5 • WHO IS AN "INSURED" FOR PURPOSES OF UM|UIM COVERAGE? — WHAT IS AN "UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE"?
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Automobile Accident Litigation & Insurance Handbook (CBA) Chapter 2 Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Claims and Coverage
    • Invalid date
    ...specifically require coverage for a death separate and apart from bodily injury, sickness, or disease suffered by the insured person." 939 P.2d at 522. Therefore, the court of appeals held that "exclusion of UM coverage for the wrongful death of a person who is not an insured under the term......

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