Mason v. Black

• Decision Date: 31 October 1885
• Citation: 87 Mo. 329
• Parties: MASON et al., Appellants, v. BLACK.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

87 Mo. 329

MASON et al., Appellants,

v.BLACK.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1885.

Appeal from Daviess Circuit Court.--HON. JOHN C. HOWELL, Judge.

REVERSED.

William M. Rush, Jr., for appellants.

(1) When title to real estate has been vested in a grantee by a deed which has been lost or destroyed without being recorded, equity will establish the title in the grantee. Wright v. Christy, 39 Mo. 125; Wynn v. Cox, 43 Mo. 304. (2) A quit-claim deed passes only such title as the grantor has. May v. LeClare, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 217; Ridgway v. Holliday, 59 Mo. 444; Stivers v. Horn, 62 Mo. 473; Mann v. Best, 62 Mo. 491. (3) The law imputes to a purchaser a knowledge of all facts relating to the same land, appearing at the time of his purchase upon the muniments of title which it is necessary for him to investigate in order to ascertain the sufficiency of such title. 3 Washb. Real Prop. (4 Ed.) 327. (4) Where a purchaser cannot make out his title, but by a deed which leads him to another fact, he shall be presumed to have knowledge of such fact. 1 Story's Eq., secs. 400 and 408; Digman v. McCollum, 47 Mo. 372; Rhodes v. Outcalt, 48 Mo. 370; Speck v. Riggin, 40 Mo. 405; Vaughan v. Tracy, 22 Mo. 421; Scott v. McCulloch, 13 Mo. 13; Hilliard on Vendors, sec. 408. (5) One who has notice of one fact is chargeable with notice of all other facts to which it leads. Slayton v. Green, 4 John. Ch. 38; Nute v. Nute, 41 N. H. 60; Maupin v. Emmons, 47 Mo. 304; Eck v. Hatcher, 58 Mo. 235. (6) Where one purchases land of another who he thinks has title, but is informed by the other that he makes no claim to it, and yet, for a nominal consideration, receives a quit-claim deed therefor, such a one is not an innocent purchaser. Kearney v. Vaughn, 50 Mo. 284; Foster v. Breshear, 55 Mo. 22; Stoefel v. Schroeder, 62 Mo. 147. (7) Notice to an agent is notice to the principal. Jackson v. Sharp, 9 Johns. 163; Rhodes v. Out calt, 48 Mo. 370; Barnes v. McClinton, 3 Pa. St. 67; The Distilled Spirits, 11 Wall. 356.

Shanklin, Low & McDougal for respondent.

(1) The evidence is insufficient to show that the land was purchased of Turney by Cauthorn, as the agent and with the money of and for Mason. Nor does it appear from the proof that Turney executed a deed therefor to Mason, and, if so, that he ever delivered the deed to Cauthorn. (2) Plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations. The land was entered in 1856; the title emanated from the government, as shown by the date of the patent offered in evidence by plaintiffs, on the ninth day of June, 1858; this suit was commenced in 1879. If the land was in fact purchased and paid for by Mason, yet as no deed was “made, executed and delivered” therefor, Turney then became as to this land the trustee of a resulting trust. On the face of the petition the action was barred by limitation, and having the title through Turney, defendant may now make any defence that he could have made. Under these facts, conceded only for the argument, Turney became and was the trustee of a resulting trust. Valle v. Bryan, 19 Mo. 423; Stevenson v. Smith, 7 Mo. 610; Kelly v. Johnson, 28 Mo. 249. There was no privity, no agency as between Turney and Mason, and the latter had the unquestioned right to bring this suit the day the alleged purchase was made, to declare and enforce the trust, and the possession of the land had nothing to do with it. Smith v. Ricords, 52 Mo. 581-2. This being an implied, or resulting trust, and the plaintiff's ancestor having failed, for more than ten years next after his cause of action accrued, to institute his suit to declare and enforce the trust, the patent title having emanated from the government in 1858, the statute of limitations is a complete bar. Ricords v. Watson, 56 Mo. 553; Smithv. Ricords, 52 Mo. 581; Keeton v. Keeton, 20 Mo. 530; Bobb v. Woodward, 50 Mo. 95, 102. (3) The petition does not present a case for the removal of a cloud upon plaintiff's title, the proof showing that defendant was in possession under a deed. Clark v. Ins. Co., 52 Mo. 272. (4) Neither Cauthorn nor defendant Black, are chargeable with notice of plaintiff's claim. Upon the question whether one has taken a deed without notice of a prior unrecorded deed, the burden of proof is always upon the party alleging bad faith. Ryder v. Rush, 102 Ill. 338; Morris v. Daniels, 35 Ohio St. 406. And the evidence must be of a character to satisfy the court that the party taking the second deed was guilty of a fraud. Vest v. Michie, 31 Gratt. 149. The notice of a prior conveyance, if implied, must not be merely a probable but a necessary inference from the facts proved. McMahan v. Griffling, 3 Pick. 149; Comet v. Bertelsman, 61 Mo. 118. Vague reports from persons not interested in the property will not affect the purchaser's conscience. Dey v. Dunham, 2 Johns. Ch. 182; Colquitt v. Thomas, 8 Ga. 258; Rogers v. Hawkins, 14 Ga. 116; 61 Mo. 118, 126. The record of a deed is notice of the facts which a reader may learn by an examination of the record, not of all which he might ascertain by an inquiry suggested by the record. Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454; Bell v. Twilight, 23 N. H. 500; Hunter v. Watson, 12 Cal. 362; Hutchinson v. Hartman, 15 Kan. 133; Miller v. Crittenden, 2 Ia. 315. (5) The title of a bona fide purchaser of land is not affected by the fraud of the grantor or by notice to him. Thult v. Bigelow, 16 Mass. 406; Bank v. Fletcher, 44 Ia. 252; Dickerson v. Evans, 84 Ill. 451. (6) The plaintiffs and their ancestors have been guilty of such laches as to preclude their recovery. Sullivan v. Ry., 94 U. S. 807; Kelly v. Hurt, 74 Mo. 561; State, etc., v. West, 68 Mo. 229; Bliss v. Prichard, 67 Mo. 181.

EWING, C.

This was an action instituted on the twentieth day of August, 1879, by the plaintiffs as the sole heirs at law of William B. Mason, Sr., deceased, to divest the defendant of the title to the lands in controversy, and vest such title in plaintiffs. The substantial allegations of the bill are:

“That on the sixteenth day of July, 1856, plaintiffs' ancestor appointed one Geo. W. Cauthorn, as his agent to enter and purchase Missouri lands for him, and entrusted to his said agent large sums of money for that purpose; that on the day last mentioned, said Cauthorn, ‘with some of the money so furnished, as aforesaid, and in pursnance of the agency aforesaid, purchased in behalf of, and for their said ancestor, of one Daniel M. Turney,’ the lands in controversy, among other lands, and out of the money aforesaid paid to said Turney the purchase price thereof; and that said Turney thereupon made to deceased a deed for said land, and delivered the same to Cauthorn and his agent; that said deed was never recorded or delivered to their ancestor, or themselves. That on January 27, 1876, said Cauthorn, by false and fraudulent representation, procured from Turney a deed, whereby he remised, released, and quitclaimed to one Thomas B. Crowder, ‘all the right, title, interest, and estate, that he had in and to said land,’ with the following clause therein written: ‘It is intended to convey, by these presents, all title of which I am vested this day, and not to invalidate any sale heretofore made, if any exists;’ that said quit-claim deed was duly recorded February 9, 1876, and that thereafter, on June 26, 1877, said Crowder conveyed said lands by a deed ‘ with the usual and general covenants of warranty to the defendant.’ That Crowder, at the time of the execution of both these deeds, ‘and the defendant, at the time and before the execution of the deed last aforesaid, had notice of plaintiffs' ancestor's title;’ that neither Cauthorn, Crowder, nor Black, ever made any claim to the land until within ten years prior to the institution of the suit, and that the land was never occupied until after defendant's purchase; that the two deeds last aforesaid are a cloud upon plaintiffs' title, and concludes with a prayer for a divestiture of title apparently in defendant, and a decree for title in plaintiffs.”

The answer was a general denial, except that defendant admitted possession under a claim of title; and then alleges that defendant “purchased said land and took possession thereof in good faith, believing that Crowder was the true owner thereof, free of all adverse claims and equities, and at the time of making said purchase he agreed to pay therefor the sum of nine hundred dollars, which is the full value of said land, and that said purchase price he paid to said Crowder on or about the twenty-sixth day of June, 1877, the sum of eight hundred and fifty dollars, all of which was paid before he had any notice of plaintiffs' claim, or that of said ancestor, W. B. Mason, to said land, and without any notice of said quit-claim deed, or the recitals therein, except such notice as is given constructively by the record of said deed.”

The evidence at the trial was voluminous, and we do not think it necessary to cumber the record with it in detail. The plaintiffs offered a patent from the United States to Daniel M. Turney for the land described in the petition. Also a quit-claim deed from Turney to Thomas B. Crowder, filed for record the ninth of February, 1876. Various records of deeds and entries of public lands, and witnesses, and depositions were introduced, tending to prove, substantially, that Geo. W. Cauthorn acted as the agent of William B. Mason, deceased, the ancestor of plaintiffs; that Mason resided in Kentucky, and furnished Cauthorn large sums of money to enter and buy and sell lands for Mason, in Missouri, and that Cauthorn was Mason's only agent for that purpose in 1856, 1857, 1858 and 1859; that Cauthorn attempted to enter, as Mason's agent, a part of the land in controversy, which was cancelled for some reason, and in July, 1856, it was entered by Daniel M. Turney. That, including the land entered by Turney, and by Cauthorn, for Mason, in Daviess county, there were six hundred and eighty acres; that four hundred and...