Mason v. Woerner

• Decision Date: 31 October 1853
• Citation: 18 Mo. 566
• Parties: MASON, Plaintiff in Error, v. WOERNER & SCHLEIER, Defendants in Error.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

18 Mo. 566

MASON, Plaintiff in Error,

v.WOERNER & SCHLEIER, Defendants in Error.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1853.

1. The act of February 23, 1853, establishing the St. Louis land court, and giving it exclusive jurisdiction in certain cases, did not oust the jurisdiction of the other courts in such cases, until the land court was organized by the election of a judge and clerk.

Error to St. Louis Court of Common Pleas.

J. E. Munford, for plaintiff in error.

The act establishing the St. Louis Land Court did not take away the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas and Circuit Court. in cases affecting real estate, until the Land Court was organized by the election of judge and clerk. If this is not the true construction of the act, then there was a period of about seven months when all remedy of any nature in regard to real estate in St. Louis County was abolished; the liens of judgments and mechanics' liens were abolished. and the statute of limitations suspended during this period. The language of a law will, if possible, be so construed as to prevent a failure of justice, and courts will never impute to the legislature a design to enact an absurd or contradictory law. (7 Mass. 524; 1 Pick. 250: 1 Green's [N. J.] 242; 3 Cow. 95.) When the first section of the act says that a court of record is hereby established, it means when the judge and clerk are elected and qualified, and a record is kept of the proceedings of the court. And when it is said that said court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all suits of a certain class hereafter to be brought, and that all mechanics' liens shall hereafter be filed in the office of the clerk of said court, it is meant after the court is organized and after a clerk is elected. The intention of a law is to prevail even against the letter. (1 Bay's [S. C.] 98; 1 Harp. [[[[[S. C.] 102; 17 Vermont, 179.) If, however, the legislature intended to suspend all remedy for the recovery of real estate in St. Louis county, from the passage of the act until the Land Court was organized, then the act is unconstitutional. Art. 13 sec. 7 of constitution.

Simmons and Colman, for defendants in error.

I. The act establishing the Land Court took effect from its passage, and divested the Court of Common Pleas of its jurisdiction in cases thereafter arising involving the title to real estate.

II. The constitutional argument could only apply to the Circuit Court, which is established by the constitution. The Court of Common Pleas is not a statutory court, and the power which confers jurisdiction may take it away.

GAMBLE, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

The act establishing the St. Louis Land Court was approved February 23d, 1853. Its last clause declares “this act to take effect from its passage.” The first section is in these words: “A court of record to be called the St. Louis Land Court is hereby established within and for the county of St. Louis.” The second section gives to the court “original and exclusive jurisdiction in all actions to be brought hereafter at law or equity,” in a great variety of cases stated in the section, comprehending all actions for the possession of land, and nearly all proceedings by which the title or possession of land can be affected. It is provided in the fifth section, that there shall be a judge of the court whose qualification, election and compensation are provided for, and the terms of the court are, by that section, fixed for the first Mondays in March and October. Section 12 provides for the qualification and powers of the clerk of the court, and section 13 declares that “the first election for a judge and clerk of said court thall be held on the first of August next, and the governor shall issue his writ of election accordingly.” The subsequent sections provide for the filing of abstracts of the judgments of other courts with the clerk of the Land Court, before the judgments shall become liens on real estate, and also for the filing of transcripts of the judgments of justices of the peace, in order to make them liens, and for the filing of mechanics' liens, arising under the acts giving them liens on buildings.

The plaintiff brought the present action in the Court of Common Pleas, after the passage of the act establishing the Land Court, for the purpose of recovering the possession of a tract of land. The defendant demurred, because of the want of jurisdiction in the court to entertain the cause. The demurrer was sustained, and the case is brought here by writ of error.

1. It is evident that the questions involved in this case affect many important interests of the people of St. Louis. Between the approval of the act and the organization of the court by the election of the officers, there intervened a period of some six months, in which there were probably not only many actions and proceedings affecting the title to real estate commenced in other courts, but many judgments were rendered in such courts and many transcripts from justices, and liens by mechanics were filed, by which the title to real estate was understood to be incumbered; and a construction is now to be given which is to affect all such proceedings.

The question in this case is, whether the jurisdiction of the other courts, in causes which were previously within their cognizance, is, by the passage of this act, and before the organization of the Land Court, by the election of the necessary officers, entirely taken away?

It is to be observed, that the jurisdiction of the other courts is not affected by this act in any other manner than by the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Land Court. It is not said that the other courts shall not exercise jurisdiction in the classes of cases mentioned in the second section. It is by the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Land Court that theirs is cut off. Now it is obviously the design of the general assembly that jurisdiction of such causes shall continue to be entertained, and justice in them administered by some court. It would be improper to impute to the legislature, sitting under a constitution that declares, “that courts of justice ought to be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character, and that right and justice ought to be administered without sale, denial or delay,” the design to suspend the administration of justice in several of the most...