Massa v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist.

• Decision Date: 26 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. B083933,B083933
• Citation: 43 Cal.App.4th 1217,51 Cal.Rptr.2d 164
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2049, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3431 Jerry MASSA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 164

51 Cal.Rptr.2d 164

43 Cal.App.4th 1217, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2049,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3431

Jerry MASSA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. B083933.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

March 26, 1996.

[43 Cal.App.4th 1219] Charles H. Hack, Beverly Hills, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Graves & King and Douglas N. Harty, Upland, for Defendants and Respondents.

EPSTEIN, Associate Justice.

Appellant Jerry Massa appeals from summary judgment entered in his action seeking damages for injuries related to excessive force used by respondent, Jay P. Vuninich, a police officer with the Southern California Transit Police, while questioning appellant. Officer Vuninich's motion for summary judgment was granted on the ground that appellant failed to file his complaint against him within the applicable one year statute of limitations. Appellant argues that the Tort Claims Act allows him to file his complaint within six months after his claim was denied by the governmental entity, even though the six-month period extends beyond the ordinary one-year statute of limitations. We conclude this position has merit and that the trial court erred in dismissing the lawsuit on statute of limitations grounds.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On November 26, 1990, appellant was detained and questioned by respondent, Officer Vuninich. Appellant alleged that respondent used excessive force while questioning him. It is undisputed that the alleged conduct of Officer Vuninich occurred during the performance of his duties as an officer of the Southern California Rapid Transit District Police. Appellant requested that respondent's employer, the Southern California Rapid Transit District, accept a late claim against the district. The claim, which named Officer Vuninich (misspelled as "Vunich"), was presented on November 26, 1991. The employer agreed to accept the late claim, and denied it on December 3, 1991.

On May 22, 1992, a date within six months of the denial but more than one year after the alleged incident, appellant filed a lawsuit against respondents for personal injuries related to the detention. Respondent Vuninich moved for summary judgment, arguing that appellant's complaint was barred by the one-year statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 340. The trial court granted his motion on that ground. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

This case presents a single issue of statutory construction. Since the interpretation of statutes is a matter of law for the courts to decide, the usual rules of summary judgment on appeal do not apply. (Simpson v. Unemployment Ins. Comp. Appeals Bd. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 342, 350, 231 Cal.Rptr. 690; Pacific Legal Foundation v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 101, 111, 172 Cal.Rptr. 194, 624 P.2d 244).

Two statutes are under review. Government Code section 945.6 provides that "any suit brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented ... must be commenced: [p] (1) If written notice is given in accordance with Section 913, not later than six months after the date such notice is personally delivered ...." Code of Civil Procedure section In ascertaining legislative intent, we look first to the language of the statute, giving effect to its plain meaning. (KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1174, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 676; Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202, 209, 271 Cal.Rptr. 191, 793 P.2d 524; citing Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University and Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 218-219, 188 Cal.Rptr. 115, 655 P.2d 317.)

                340 provides that plaintiffs must file suit within one year of an occurrence of an assault, battery or for injury to or for the death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another. 1  The complaint in this case satisfies the former;  the issue is whether it is barred by the latter.  Resolution of that issue is governed by the rules for ascertaining legislative intent
                

For the statutes at issue here, most of the ground already has been covered in a recent decision by Division Two of this district, in Schmidt v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 23, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 340. Schmidt holds the one-year statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 340 is satisfied if a lawsuit against a governmental entity is filed within six months of the time the claim is denied, even though it is filed more than one year from the date the cause of action arose.

The facts in Schmidt are almost identical to the present case, with a single exception: the lawsuit was against a governmental entity rather than an employee. The appellant was injured when the bus on which she was riding lurched, causing her to fall and break her hip. She filed a timely claim with the RTD, a public entity, which was denied. Mrs. Schmidt filed a complaint against the RTD more than one year after the cause of action arose, but within six months of the date that her claim was denied. (14 Cal.App.4th at p. 25, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 340.) The trial court granted the RTD's motion for judgment on the pleadings because it thought the one-year statute of limitations had expired. The Court of Appeal held that compliance with Government Code sections 911.2 and 945.6 effectively extended the section 340 period. (Id. at pp. 25, 30, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 340.)

In reaching this decision, the Schmidt court relied upon rules of statutory construction, case law and the legislative history of the Tort Claims Act. The court reasoned that "it is assumed that the Legislature has existing laws in mind at the time that it enacts a new statute. (Estate of McDill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 831, 837, 122 Cal.Rptr. 754, 537 P.2d 874....) We therefore expect that the Legislature was aware of Code of Civil Procedure section 340 at the time it amended section 911.2. [p] Where possible, the goal of the courts is to achieve harmony between conflicting law (14 Cal.3d at p. 837, 122 Cal.Rptr. 754, 537 P.2d 874), and avoid an interpretation which would require that one statute be ignored. (Fuentes v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 1, 7, 128 Cal.Rptr. 673, 547 P.2d 449....) However, equally important are the familiar postulates that we should give effect to the more recently enacted law (ibid.), and that a specific statute relating to a particular subject will govern over a general one. (Young v. Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883, 897, 226 Cal.Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909....) Obviously, the provisions of sections 911.2 and 945.6 are both more recent and specific than Code of Civil Procedure section 340." (14 Cal.App.4th at p. 27, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 340.) The Tort Claims Act provides time deadlines which differ from those in the general statutes of limitation. Additionally, Code of Civil Procedure section 342 refers claimants suing an entity to the relevant provisions of the Tort Claims Act and provides that the deadlines of Government Code section 945.6 must be followed. The legislative history of section 342 strongly suggests that the time provisions of that Act govern the period within which a lawsuit must be filed. (14 Cal.App.4th at pp. 28, 30, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 340.)

The trial court in our case concluded that the reasoning of Schmidt does not apply As we have discussed, Government Code section 950.6 requires that a written claim for money or damages for injury be presented to the employing public entity as a prerequisite to suing the agency or any of its employees who are claimed to have acted within their official capacity. The statute also requires that any suit against the public employee be commenced within the time prescribed by Government Code section 945.6 for bringing an action against the public entity--i.e. within six months of the time the claim is denied by the entity. The plain meaning of this section is that a suit is timely if it is filed against a public employee within six months of the date the claim was rejected by the entity.

to suits against governmental employees. We do not believe that distinction is tenable in light of the rationale of the case, the plain language of the statute, and the legislative purpose of providing a parallel scheme for suing government entities and their employees.

Government Code section 905 provides, "there shall be presented in...