Velez v. Smith

• Decision Date: 12 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. A110868.,A110868.
• Citation: 142 Cal.App.4th 1154,48 Cal.Rptr.3d 642
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Lena VELEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Krista SMITH, Defendant and Respondent.

48 Cal.Rptr.3d 642

142 Cal.App.4th 1154

Lena VELEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Krista SMITH, Defendant and Respondent.

No. A110868.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1.

September 12, 2006.

Lena Velez, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Caren Callahan, Esq., Santa Rosa, for Defendant and Respondent.

SWAGER, J.

The trial court granted the motion of respondent to strike appellant's petition for dissolution of a domestic partnership. We conclude that appellant is not eligible to proceed with the dissolution action under the current domestic partnership laws, and must bring her other claims in a separate civil action. We therefore affirm the judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY¹

Most of the evidence before us is not in material dispute. Appellant and respondent met in 1989, and subsequently began a domestic partnership relationship. By July 7, 1994, they filed a declaration of domestic partnership with the City and County of San Francisco. In March of 1996, they registered with the City and County of San Francisco as domestic partners a second time, attended a public commitment ceremony in which they exchanged vows modeled upon traditional marriage vows, and received a domestic partnership ceremony certificate.

Thereafter, they acted and held themselves out as domestic partners. They lived and purchased real property together. They purchased and shared ownership of personal property, including automobiles, pension benefits, insurance coverage and benefits, and family pets. They were jointly responsible for household living expenses, and maintained joint bank accounts in which they commingled funds. For a few years, after appellant became disabled with multiple sclerosis respondent even listed her as a dependent on tax returns. Appellant was provided with health coverage and listed as an alternate payee of retirements benefits with respondent's employer, the San Francisco Fire Department. They were never registered as domestic partners with the State of California, however.

On November 23, 2004, respondent filed a "Notice for Ending a Domestic Partnership" with the San Francisco County Clerk, a copy of which was delivered by certified mail to appellant a few days later. Appellant commenced the present action by filing a petition for dissolution of domestic partnership on December 6, 2004, which listed a date of marriage as July 7, 1994, and the date of separation as November 23, 2004.

On December 13, 2004, respondent's counsel notified the attorney for appellant by letter that the dissolution action was "procedurally defective" and the court lacked "jurisdiction to hear it." The letter stated that unless appellant dismissed the action with prejudice a motion for sanctions (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7) would be filed by respondent.

Appellant filed an amended petition for dissolution on January 31, 2005, in which she requested dissolution of a domestic partnership with respondent, division of the accumulated partnership property, termination of jurisdiction to award support to respondent, and attorney fees. She also sought consolidation with her dissolution action of any related proceeding to determine the partnership rights of the parties.

Respondent promptly moved to strike the amended petition (Code Civ. Proc., § 436) as beyond the jurisdiction of the family law court. In her opposition to the motion, appellant requested "an evidentiary short cause trial" to present testimony to establish her standing as a "putative domestic partner" and her "detrimental reliance" upon respondent's promise not to terminate her rights as a domestic partner. The trial court found that adequate "documentation" had been presented to rule on the issue of the right of appellant to proceed with her dissolution action in the family law court, and declined to grant appellant the opportunity to present testimonial evidence. The trial court then found that appellant's amended petition for dissolution of domestic partnership was "without legal basis," and granted the motion to strike the pleading. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. The Failure of the Trial Court to Afford Appellant an Evidentiary Hearing.

We first confront appellant's contention that the trial court erred by ruling on respondent's motion to strike the amended petition "without giving her any opportunity to present specific evidence to support her claim of standing" under the domestic partnership laws to proceed with the dissolution action. Appellant claims that she was entitled to present testimony on the "presence or absence of Domestic Partnership registration," her "objectively measured, good faith belief in the bona fides of the Domestic Partnership," the "intent" of respondent to enter into a valid domestic partnership, and the "existence of the long-vested contractual provision" between the parties that was "tantamount to marriage." She asserts that by denying her the "chance to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses," the trial court violated her due process rights and "committed structural error" which requires "reversal per se."

We find that the trial court did not err by declining to grant appellant's request to present testimonial evidence at the hearing on the motion to strike. "Motions are normally heard on affidavits alone." (Crocker Citizens Nat. Bank v. Knapp (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 875, 880, 60 Cal.Rptr. 66; see also McDonald v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 364, 370, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 310.) The trial court is empowered to determine motions upon affidavits, and has the discretion to refuse oral testimony. (Beckett v. Kaynar Mfg. Co., Inc. (1958) 49 Cal.2d 695, 698, fn. 3, 321 P.2d 749; Eddy v. Temkin (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1115, 1121, 213 Cal.Rptr. 597; Reifler v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 479, 483, 114 Cal.Rptr. 356; McLellan v. McLellan (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 343, 359, 100 Cal.Rptr. 258; Armstrong v. Armstrong (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 322, 326-327, 183 P.2d 905.) "`"Discretion is abused whenever . . . the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered."' [Citation.] . . . `A trial court's exercise of discretion will be upheld if it is based on a "reasoned judgment" and complies with the ". . . legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue."' [Citation.]" (Security Pacific Nat. Bank v. Bradley (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 89, 94, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 220.)

Here, the motion to strike tested the sufficiency of the allegations of the amended petition to determine appellant's right to the relief requested — that is, to dissolution of a domestic partnership. If a complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 425.10,² it is not "drawn in conformity with the laws of this state," and the defendant may take advantage of the pleading defect by moving to strike and dismiss the complaint. (See Lodi v. Lodi (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 628, 631, 219 Cal.Rptr. 116; Monahan v. Blossom (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 951, 952, 199 P.2d 738.) A motion labeled as a motion to strike a pleading, based upon the ground it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, may also be treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (See American Airlines, Inc. v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1110, 1118, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 251, 912 P.2d 1198; Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342-343, 264 Cal.Rptr. 673.) In either case, the purpose of the motion is to test the sufficiency of the pleadings, so the court does not consider testimonial evidence or information extraneous to the complaint and judicially noticed matters. (Shin v. Kong (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 498, 502-503, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 304.) "A trial court ruling on the motion must consider only the face of the complaint and matters subject to judicial notice, accept as true the properly pleaded factual allegations of the complaint, and liberally construe the complaint." (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 842, 849, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 653.) "`"[W]e look only to the face of the pleading under attack . . . ." . . . .' [Citation.]" (Third Eye Blind, Inc. v. Near North Entertainment Ins. Services, LLC (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1317, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 452.)

Given the nature of the motion, the trial court properly limited the inquiry to the pleadings and affidavits submitted, which incorporated documentary evidence of respondent's notice of termination of domestic partnership mailed to appellant and filed with the county clerk. The essence of respondent's motion as presented to the trial court was that the action filed by appellant sought improper relief in the form of dissolution of a domestic partnership that did not exist, and thus was not subject to dissolution in the family court as requested in the amended petition. The motion was appropriately resolved without taking into account any testimonial evidence proffered by appellant. The evidence appellant sought to elicit at an oral hearing was related to issues and claims that were not within the scope of the court's consideration of the propriety of the dissolution petition. To decide the matter of appellant's entitlement to the relief requested in the dissolution petition, the court was not required to consider the testimony of witnesses on the intent of the parties to enter into a valid domestic partnership or the nature of any agreement between them. Appellant's right to proceed under the domestic partnership laws as requested in the amended petition was amenable to resolution based exclusively upon the pleading and the scant documentary evidence presented. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing appellant leave to present oral testimony and deciding the motion to strike upon the facts contained in the pleading and affidavits. (Eddy v. Temkin, supra, 167 Cal.App.3d 1115, 1120-1121, 213...