Massachusetts Broken Stone Co. v. Town of Weston

• Decision Date: 16 November 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-P-0860,97-P-0860
• Citation: 701 N.E.2d 636,45 Mass.App.Ct. 748
• Parties: MASSACHUSETTS BROKEN STONE COMPANY & another 1 v. TOWN OF WESTON & another. 2
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 636

701 N.E.2d 636

45 Mass.App.Ct. 748

MASSACHUSETTS BROKEN STONE COMPANY & another ¹ v. TOWN OF WESTON & another. ²

No. 97-P-0860.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Argued May 12, 1998.

Decided Nov. 16, 1998.

Judith C. Cutler, Boston, for the defendants.

Franklin C. Huntington, IV, Boston (John J. Griffin, Jr., with him) for the plaintiffs.

Before ARMSTRONG, PERRETTA and SPINA, JJ.

SPINA, Justice.

The town of Weston (town) and the planning board of Weston (planning board) (collectively, the defendants) appeal from a judgment of the Land Court which declared (count I of the complaint) that a zoning freeze triggered by Massachusetts Broken Stone Company's (Broken Stone's) filing of a subdivision plan, also applied to an entirely different project (not a subdivision) later proposed by AMA Funding Corporation (AMA). ³ We reverse.

Broken Stone is the owner of a seventy-four acre parcel of land on Route 20 near the intersection of Route 128 in Weston (site). On January 7, 1986, Broken Stone filed a preliminary subdivision plan proposing to develop the site as a combined life care facility and office complex (1986 plan). The site was located variously in the town's "Business," "Industrial," and "Single Residence C" zoning districts. ⁴ The filing of that plan triggered a zoning freeze pursuant to G.L. c. 40A, § 6, fifth par. ⁵ The preliminary subdivision plan was disapproved by the planning board. ⁶ Broken Stone filed a definitive subdivision plan within seven months of the filing of the preliminary plan. On October 6, 1986, the planning board approved the definitive subdivision plan. ⁷

On April 6, 1988, Broken Stone and the town entered into a settlement agreement resolving their pending lawsuits, pursuant to which the town agreed, inter alia, to reclassify the entire site as a "Business B" zoning district. In return, Broken Stone agreed, inter alia, to limit development of the site to less than one-half (359,000 square feet) of the density permitted by the zoning by-law. On May 9, 1988, the town approved amendments to the zoning by-law consistent with the settlement agreement (1988 zoning by-law).

On April 28, 1989, Broken Stone filed a preliminary subdivision plan for a five-lot office complex on the site (1989 plan). The proposed subdivision was consistent with the terms of the settlement agreement and the 1988 zoning by-law. ⁸ The filing of that preliminary subdivision plan triggered a zoning freeze pursuant to G.L. c. 40A, § 6, fifth par.

On May 9, 1989, the town approved substantial amendments to the 1988 zoning by-law. Pursuant to these amendments, the only unrestricted as-of-right uses in a "Business District" were open spaces and public parks. All other substantive uses over 1,000 square feet required a special permit from the zoning board and site plan approval from the planning board.

On June 6, 1989, Broken Stone's preliminary subdivision plan was disapproved by the planning board. Broken Stone timely submitted a definitive subdivision plan for the site which also was disapproved by the planning board. On March 5, 1990, Broken Stone timely appealed the planning board's disapproval of its definitive plan to the Land Court. ⁹ The filing of that appeal extended the existing zoning freeze, pursuant to G.L. c. 40A, § 6, seventh par. ¹⁰

For the next several years, Broken Stone put its plans to develop the site on hold because of a widespread downturn in the real estate market in Massachusetts. In August, 1994, Broken Stone and AMA (collectively, the plaintiffs) held informal meetings with the planning board to discuss proposals for developing the site. On June 30, 1995, AMA submitted an application for site plan review to the zoning board in connection with the construction of a single 359,000 square foot office building on the site (1995 plan). In contrast to the 1986 and 1989 plans, the 1995 plan did not propose any subdivision of the site. The application was filed pursuant to Section X of the 1988 zoning by-law, as a prerequisite to applying for the necessary special permit. The zoning board referred the application to the planning board for review and recommendation.

On August 10, 1995, the planning board notified AMA of the board's position that the site was governed by the provisions of the current (1989) zoning by-law and that AMA's application was subject to the site plan approval process enacted on May 9, 1989, when the 1988 zoning by-law was substantially amended. ¹¹ As such, the planning board processed AMA's application as one for "site plan approval" under Section XI of the current zoning by-law, rather than as one for "site plan review" under Section X of the 1988 zoning by-law. Numerous public hearings on the proposed site plan were held. By letter dated May 10, 1996, the planning board recommended that the zoning board deny AMA's application on the grounds that the provisions of the 1988 zoning by-law, pursuant to which AMA had sought site plan review, were no longer in effect and that, pursuant to the provisions of the 1989 amendments, the zoning board had no jurisdiction to act upon the proposed site plan. The planning board set forth substantive comments and recommendations in the event that the zoning board determined that it did, in fact, have jurisdiction over AMA's application. ¹²

On May 29, 1996, the plaintiffs filed a four-count complaint with the Land Court. In count I of their complaint, which is at issue here, the plaintiffs sought a declaration under G.L. c. 240, § 14A, that the 1988 zoning by-law was applicable to the site. In the alternative, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the zoning by-law which was in place on May 21, 1987, when the Land Court invalidated the residential classification of a portion of the site, was applicable. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to count I of their complaint. They asserted, inter alia, that the planning board had admitted all facts necessary for the Land Court to conclude, as a matter of law, that a freeze of the 1988 zoning by-law remained in effect with respect to the site.

Following a hearing, the Land Court judge allowed the plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to count I of their complaint. He found, inter alia, that, pursuant to G.L. c. 40A, § 6, a freeze of the 1988 zoning by-law was triggered when Broken Stone filed its preliminary subdivision plan on April 28, 1989, and remained in effect while Broken Stone's appeal of the denial of its definitive subdivision plan was pending. ¹³ He then concluded that the 1988 zoning by-law applied to the site and governed AMA's application for site plan review, which had been submitted to the zoning board on June 30, 1995. ¹⁴ The defendants brought the present appeal.

1. Jurisdiction of the Land Court. The defendants first argue that the judge erred in allowing the plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to count I of their complaint because the Land Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to grant the requested relief. General Laws c. 240, § 14A, as amended by St.1975, c. 808, § 5, provides in pertinent part, as follows:

"The owner of a freehold estate in possession in land may bring a petition in the land court against a city or town wherein such land is situated ... for determination as to the validity of a municipal ordinance, by-law or regulation, passed or adopted under the provisions of chapter forty A ... which purports to restrict or limit the present or future use, enjoyment, improvement or development of such land ... or for determination of the extent to which any such municipal ordinance, by-law or regulation affects a proposed use, enjoyment, improvement or development of such land by the erection, alteration or repair of structures thereon or otherwise as set forth in such petition."

The defendants assert that the plaintiffs' request for relief, pursuant to G.L. c. 240, § 14A, was not based upon a claim that any zoning by-law was invalid or ambiguous. Rather, the plaintiffs sought an interpretation of G.L. c. 40A, § 6, to determine its effect upon the use and development of the site. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs are not entitled to a declaratory judgment as to the applicability of a zoning freeze under G.L. c. 40A, § 6, because the interpretation of a statute is outside the scope of G.L. c. 240, § 14A. Therefore, the defendants contend, the Land Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief requested in count I of the plaintiffs' complaint.

General Laws c. 240, § 14A, is a remedial statute and allows landowners "to petition for a decision concerning the validity or invalidity of any zoning restriction applicable to [their] land." Sturges v. Chilmark, 380 Mass. 246, 249, 402 N.E.2d 1346 (1980). The language of G.L. c. 240, § 14A, also allows landowners to petition for a decision as to the extent to which a zoning enactment affects the landowners' proposed use of their property. Banquer Realty Co. v. Acting Bldg. Commr. of Boston, 389 Mass. 565, 570-571, 451 N.E.2d 422 (1983). The statute is one which is to be broadly construed. Harrison v. Braintree, 355 Mass. 651, 654, 247 N.E.2d 356 (1969). However, where a landowner seeks a determination regarding matters other than those relating to the validity or application of a zoning by-law, such as the effect of a special permit, the Land Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under G.L. c. 240, § 14A, to consider the claim. Whitinsville Retirement Soc. v. Northbridge, 394 Mass. 757, 477 N.E.2d 407 (1985).

In count I of their complaint, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the site was governed by the provisions of the 1988 zoning by-law on grounds that the filing of their preliminary subdivision plan on April 28, 1989, triggered a zoning freeze under G.L. c. 40A, § 6, and the filing of an appeal from the denial of their definitive subdivision plan extended the zoning freeze. The plaintiffs...