Massey v. State
Decision Date | 27 February 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 34450,34450 |
Citation | 253 S.E.2d 196,243 Ga. 228 |
Parties | MASSEY v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Thomas Stanley Sunderland, Buford, for appellant.
Bryant Huff, Dist. Atty., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Mary Beth Westmoreland, Atlanta, for appellee.
Appellant Ricky Lee Massey was indicted in Gwinnett County for armed robbery and murder. He was tried, and the jury found him guilty on both counts. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction.
1. Appellant complains that it was error to admit into evidence testimony of officers to whom appellant had made incriminating statements, on the grounds that his rights under the Juvenile Code of Georgia were violated, that the state failed to show that the statements made were voluntary, and that he was not advised of his Miranda rights.
Appellant admitted at trial that he lied to police officers about his age, telling them he was seventeen, because he "didn't want to go through the procedures of juvenile court." It also appeared from the evidence that appellant had in his possession a driver's license which showed his age to be seventeen. Other factors which reinforced the officers' belief that appellant would not come under the provisions of the Juvenile Code were appellant's appearance as an adult, his statement that he had his own apartment apart from his parents, that he was working and making his own living, and that he owned an automobile titled in his name.
Confessions of juveniles are to be scanned with great care, but are not automatically excluded if the provisions of the Juvenile Code are not complied with. Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 128, 226 S.E.2d 922 (1976); Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321, 323, 240 S.E.2d 824 (1977). In Riley, this court adopted a totality of the circumstance test to be used in considering whether a juvenile waived his right to remain silent.
In applying that test in this case we find that (1) appellant was 16; (2) he had a ninth or tenth grade education; (3) he admitted he was given Miranda warnings, and stated that he was familiar with them and understood them; (4) he came to the police voluntarily with several friends; (5) he was not under arrest when he made his first statement; (6) he volunteered the information and was not threatened in any way; (7) the interrogation time was not excessive; (8) he never refused to make a statement; and (9) he never repudiated his statement and the facts in the case. See: Riley v. State, supra.
Based on these facts and considering appellant's direct misrepresentation of his age to police, we conclude that the statements made by appellant were admissible. Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be questioned according to the provisions of the Juvenile Code. Appellant's enumerations of error 1-3 are without merit.
2. Appellant also complains of the court's failure to charge that the jury was to determine the voluntariness of his admissions using the "totality of the circumstances" test.
The charge as requested was an improper statement of the law and was properly refused. The "totality of the circumstances" test is to be applied by the trial court in determining the admissibility of a statement. The court charged the law fully and clearly as it pertains to incriminating statements. Appellant's eighth enumeration of error is without merit.
3. Appellant complains that it was error to allow his written statement to be read verbatim to the jury.
The trial court determined that the written statement was voluntarily made and was admissible. The evidence supports this determination. The officer, before reading the statement to the jury, testified that he had personally obtained the written statement from appellant. It was not error to allow the statement to be read to the jury. Williams v. State, 238 Ga. 298, 232 S.E.2d 535 (1977).
4. Appellant complains that the trial court erred in allowing the State to question him about previous arrests and about his involvement in previous juvenile court proceedings.
The record shows that this questioning occurred during the Jackson-Denno hearing, outside the presence of the jury. The information sought was relevant to the determination of voluntariness under the "totality of the circumstances" test. The information elicited sought to show that appellant had been involved in criminal proceedings before, and was familiar with the procedures used by the police. We find no error in allowing the questions. Appellant's fifth enumeration of error is without merit.
5. Appellant complains that the State improperly placed his character into issue. The questioning complained of was as follows:
This continued questioning about appellant's friends who had been convicted did not place appellant's character in issue. The district attorney was attempting to show that those friends, who appellant contended were innocent, had received a fair trial.
We find no merit in appellant's enumeration of error.
6. Appellant complains that the court refused to allow testimony regarding statements allegedly made by his co-indictee Danny Baker, to the effect that he was solely responsible for the murder and appellant was innocent. The trial court excluded the testimony as violative of the hearsay rule.
Code Ann. § 38-301 provides, Appellant has failed to give any assurances of the trustworthiness of the...
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