Massey v. State
Decision Date | 20 March 2015 |
Docket Number | No. A14A2173.,A14A2173. |
Citation | 331 Ga.App. 430,771 S.E.2d 122 |
Parties | MASSEY v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Matthew Wayne Kilgo, Atlanta, Gregory Allen Willis, for Appellant.
Rosanna M. Szabo, Robert Walker Stills Jr., for Appellee.
Jonathan Aaron Massey was charged by accusation with the offense of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 grams or more in violation of OCGA § 40–6–391(a)(5). Massey brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of his pre-trial request pursuant to OCGA § 40–6–392(a)(4) for discovery concerning the blood test conducted by the State to determine his blood alcohol concentration. For the following reasons, we affirm.
1. At the time of his arrest for driving under the influence, Massey was given the implied consent notice and refused a State-administered chemical test of his breath requested by the arresting officer. After Massey refused the requested test, the officer immediately obtained a search warrant pursuant to which blood was forcibly taken from Massey. The officer sent Massey's blood to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, where a forensic toxicologist employed by the Forensic Sciences Division (the State Crime Lab) chemically tested the blood using a gas chromatography
instrument. Based on the test results, the toxicologist generated a report finding that the blood had an alcohol concentration of 0.133 grams (plus or minus 0.005 grams) per 100 milliliters. Massey filed a pre-trial discovery request seeking information about the blood test pursuant to the discovery provisions set forth in OCGA § 40–6–392(a)(4). The trial court denied the discovery request on the basis that OCGA § 40–6–392(a)(4) expressly limits discovery concerning chemical testing of a person's blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance to “the person who shall submit to a chemical test or tests at the request of a law enforcement officer.” The court concluded that the discovery provisions of subsection (a)(4) did not apply because Massey refused to submit to a breath test requested by the officer at the time of his arrest, and the alcohol concentration test at issue was conducted on blood forcibly taken from Massey pursuant to a search warrant obtained by the officer.
OCGA § 40–6–392(a) provides in relevant part:
An officer's authority to request at the time of arrest that a driver submit to the above described chemical testing for alcohol or drugs, and to direct the test to be administered (after obtaining consent), derives from the implied consent provisions of OCGA § 40–5–55(a), which provide that:
The State of Georgia considers that any person who drives or is in actual physical control of any moving vehicle in violation of any provision of Code Section 40–6–391 constitutes a direct and immediate threat to the welfare and safety of the general public. Therefore, any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the highways or elsewhere throughout this state shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to Code Section 40–6–392, to a chemical test or tests of his or her blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or any other drug, if arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed in violation of Code Section 40–6–391 or if such person is involved in any traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities. The test or tests shall be administered at the request of a law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been driving or was in actual physical control of a moving motor vehicle upon the highways or elsewhere throughout this state in violation of Code Section 40–6–391. The test or tests shall be administered as soon as possible to any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the highways or elsewhere...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Bostic v. State
...in a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities.” OCGA §§ 40–5–55(a), 40–5–67.1. See also Massey v. State, 331 Ga.App. 430, 432(1), 771 S.E.2d 122 (2015) (“[a]n officer's authority to request at the time of arrest that a driver submit to ... chemical testing for alcohol or......
-
Hynes v. State, A17A0633
...section is part of the implied consent statutory scheme which also includes OCGA §§ 40-5-67.1 and 40-6-392. See Massey v. State , 331 Ga.App. 430, 431-434, 771 S.E.2d 122 (2015).OCGA § 40-5-67.1 provides the specific implied consent notice to be given by the officer to the driver, including......
-
Tift Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Martinez, A14A1988.
... ... The stipulation went on to state that [however, because the school bus, which she was operating, was owned and insured by the Tift County School District, then the presence of this ... ...