Maston v. State

• Decision Date: 25 January 1904
• Citation: 83 Miss. 647,36 So. 70
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: ROBERT MASTON v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

36 So. 70

83 Miss. 647

ROBERT MASTON v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

Supreme Court of Mississippi

January 25, 1904

FROM the circuit court of Tunica county. HON. SAMUEL C. COOK Judge.

Maston appellant, was indicted, tried, and convicted of the murder of one William Harris, was sentenced to suffer death, and appealed to the supreme court.

The facts upon which the decision turned are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Reversed and remanded.

F. A Montgomery, for appellant.

The first instruction for the state is directly on the weight of evidence, and should have been refused. The defense relied on is that the defendant is subject to occasional spells of insanity, caused by a fall received by him in his youth, that at such times he is utterly incapable of knowing right from wrong, that these spells are brought on by any great excitement or distress of mind, that in this instance it was brought on by the abduction and debauching of appellant's step-daughter, whom he loved as his own daughter, by the deceased, and this instruction in the language of Judge Woods, "emasculates this testimony and charges upon the weight of the fragments left." Wilburn v. State., 73 Miss. 245; Wilson v. State, 71 Miss. 880; Coleman v. Adair, 75 Miss. 660.

The court refused to allow the appellant to prove by witnesses who had known him for many years, lived in the same community, and were well acquainted with him and with his general reputation in the community, that his reputation and character was good, and that he was a peaceable and law-abiding citizen.

There is, so far as I have been able to find, only one case in Mississippi where a defendant in a murder case or any other, was denied the right to prove his good character, and that is the case of McDaniels v. State, 8 Smed. & M., 416. In that case the supreme court intimates that evidence of good character is only admissible where the guilt of the party accused is in doubt.

But this case has been overruled in all of our later decisions, and it is now the well settled law of this state that the defendant in a criminal case is always entitled to prove his good character, and the only limitation on the universal rule is that this character of evidence must be confined to the particular trait of character involved in the nature of the charge. Westbrooks v. State, 76 Miss. 710.

For instance, in larceny, evidence is admissible to show the good character of the accused for honesty; in rape and seduction, for chastity; in perjury, for truth and veracity; and in murder, manslaughter, and assaults, for peace or violence, etc.

"In all cases the prisoner is permitted to prove his good character." Roscoe's Crim. Ev., 72; Wharton's American Crim. Law, 235, 233.

The good character of the accused, says our supreme court, should be left to the jury, and they should not be instructed that it may or may not raise a reasonable doubt of guilt. Cotton v. State, 31 Miss. 504; Wesley v. State, 37 Miss. 351; Coleman v. State, 59 Miss. 490; Hammond v. State, 74 Miss. 214; Powers v. State, 74 Miss. 777; Westbrooks v. State, supra.

J. N. Flowers, assistant attorney general, for appellee.

Defendant offered to show that his character and reputation for peace or violence was good. His defense was insanity. He had the witnesses and offered them, and the court held that this character of testimony has no place in a case of this kind.

The prevailing rule seems to be that such testimony is admissible, but it is not reversible error to exclude it in cases where guilt is established by overwhelming testimony and where proof of the best character could not possibly excuse the crime or mitigate its horror. Coleman v. State, 59 Miss. 490; State v. Hull, 20 L. R. A., 609, and notes.

Argued orally by F. A. Montgomery, for appellant, and by J. N. Flowers, assistant attorney general, for appellee.

OPINION

TRULY, J.

The first instruction granted by the court for the state stated to the jury that certain testimony therein detailed "was only admitted in evidence for the purpose of showing the sanity or insanity of the defendant," and proceeded further to state that, if they believed he (the defendant) was sufficiently sane at the time of the homicide to know right from wrong, then "they will not consider the evidence in justification, palliation, or excuse of the crime." This was an instruction clearly on the weight of the evidence, and hence an invasion of the province of the jury. What weight is to be given testimony, and what inferences can be logically deduced from it, are questions which, by our law, are to be submitted solely to the judgment of the jury. This is the plain meaning of § 732 of the code of 1892. None but material facts should be admitted, but, having decided that the testimony offered is competent and admissible, the duty and power of the judge in that regard are ended. He is without authority to intimate to the jury his own opinion as to the effect of the testimony, or the weight to which it is entitled. An instruction which charges a jury upon the weight of evidence has been repeatedly held by this court to be error, and in certain cases error of a reversible nature. Fore v. State, 75 Miss. 727, 23 So. 710; Wesley v. State, 37 Miss. 327, 75 Am. Dec., 62; Wilburn v. State, 73 Miss. 245, 18 So. 576. We might not, on the state of case made by this record, reverse for this cause alone; but, as the case must be reversed upon another ground, the instruction herein under review should not be given on another trial hereof.

The defendant introduced several witnesses by whom he sought to prove "his general reputation for peace or violence, and that he was a peaceable and law-abiding citizen." To this an objection interposed by the state was sustained. We are not advised upon what theory the testimony was rejected. The language of the trial judge in his final ruling upon the objection was: "I rule that character of testimony has no place in this sort of a case." What meaning was meant to be conveyed by the expression "this sort of a case," we are not advised. The general rule as to the admissibility of testimony to show the general reputation of the defendant is that such testimony is always admissible, the only limitation being that it must be confined to the particular trait involved in the nature of the charge against ...