Mateo v. State

Decision Date31 March 2006
Docket NumberNo. 2D04-1191.,2D04-1191.
Citation932 So.2d 376
PartiesKem MATEO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Heather M. Gray, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Katherine Coombs Cline, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

STRINGER, Judge.

Kem Mateo challenges his convictions and sentences for aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, introduction of contraband into a detention facility, and resisting an officer without violence, raising four grounds for relief. We find no merit in Mateo's arguments that the trial court should have dismissed the charges against him or that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal. However, we agree with Mateo that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit him to present evidence that supported his defense. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. This resolution renders Mateo's remaining argument moot.

Mateo was originally charged with two counts of aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer, introduction of contraband into a detention facility, and resisting an officer with violence. These charges stemmed from an incident that occurred while Mateo was being held in a Hillsborough County jail. According to the State's witnesses, the incident began when Mateo's request for additional juice with his lunch was denied. Mateo then allegedly refused to return his lunch tray to jail officials and subsequently broke the tray and fashioned one of the pieces into a shank. Mateo then covered the window to his cell and flooded it by clogging the toilet. Jail officials attempted to calm Mateo down by reasoning with him, but ultimately they decided to forcibly remove Mateo from his cell. As they tried to do so, Mateo allegedly swung at the officers with the shank he made from his lunch tray. Mateo was then sprayed with pepper spray, after which he gave up resisting and was removed from his cell. The State's witnesses admitted that Mateo had several cuts and bruises after he was removed from his cell and that he was kept in a form of disciplinary confinement for seven hours after this incident.

Mateo's theory of defense was that the jail officials became angry when he refused to return his lunch tray and used the opportunity to punish him with excessive force. Mateo admitted that he had been in this particular jail before, and he contended that because he was vocal about complaints, the jail officials did not like him and "had it in for him." Mateo contended that the jail officials made up the story about the shank and the assault as a cover for their use of excessive force.

In support of this defense, Mateo sought to introduce the substance of a telephone conversation that had occurred between Mateo's wife and a placement official at the jail several days before the alleged incident. During that conversation, the following occurred:

MS. MATEO: Yes, Ms. Brown, my name is Kathy Mateo

MS. BROWN: Uh-huh.

MS. MATEO: — and they've got my husband in lockdown.

MS. BROWN: I'm moving him out.

MS. MATEO: Okay. I just wondered because he said he hadn't done anything.

MS. BROWN: He hadn't done a thing. You know, they did it based on his past behavior.

MS. MATEO: Right. Well, he's trying his hardest —

MS. BROWN: Right. To hang in there and do right.

MS. MATEO: Right. Right.

MS. BROWN: I understand. So I'm moving him out. I talked with the lieutenant today and told him that I was going to move him, but I'm going to move him over to Orient Road.

MS. MATEO: Okay.

MS. BROWN: That way the supervisor won't go after him.

During Mateo's first trial on these charges, the substance of this conversation was admitted in evidence through the in-court testimony of Ms. Brown. At the conclusion of that trial, the jury found Mateo not guilty on one of the two aggravated assault charges, but it was unable to reach a verdict on the remaining three charges, and the trial court declared a mistrial as to those charges.

Before the retrial on the remaining three charges, the parties determined that Ms. Brown was unavailable to testify at the retrial due to previously scheduled surgery. Rather than agreeing to a continuance of the scheduled retrial, the State stipulated to the authenticity and chain of custody of an audiotape of the conversation and indicated that it had no foundational objections to the use of the audiotape in lieu of Ms. Brown's live testimony. However, when Mateo sought to introduce the audiotape in evidence, the State objected to its introduction based on relevance.1 Despite Mateo's argument that the tape was relevant to show that the jail officials had a predisposition against him, the trial court sustained the objection and held that the audiotape would not be admitted because it was irrelevant. The trial court then also stated that even if there was some way that the audiotape was relevant, any relevance was outweighed by the prejudicial effect.

At the conclusion of the retrial, the jury found Mateo guilty as charged on the counts for aggravated assault and introduction of contraband into a detention facility and guilty of the lesser-included offense of resisting an officer without violence. The trial court subsequently denied Mateo's motion for new trial based on the trial court's alleged error in refusing to admit the tape.

Florida law is clear that "where evidence tends in any way, even indirectly, to establish a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, it is error to deny its admission." Rivera v. State, 561 So.2d 536, 539 (Fla.1990). This principle is based, in part, on the U.S. Supreme Court's holding that "[f]ew rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). Thus, as a general proposition, any evidence that tends to support the defendant's theory of defense is admissible, and it is error to exclude it. Dean v. State, 916 So.2d...

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6 cases
  • Reyes v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • 30 Junio 2020
    ...v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). Id. Petitioner's main citation was to a Florida appellate court decision, Mateo v. State 932 So. 2d 376, 379 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Petitioner's counsel quoted from Mateo, which cited Chambers. In his appellate brief, Petitioner's counsel wrote:Florida law ......
  • Yarbrough v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • 23 Septiembre 2022
    ...to establish reasonable doubt, it is error to deny its admission. See Rivera v. State, 561 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1990); Mateo v. State, 932 So.2d 376 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). This principle is based, in part, on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.C......
  • Mathis v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 14 Octubre 2016
    ...any way, even indirectly, to establish a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, it is error to deny its admission.’ " Mateo v. State, 932 So.2d 376, 379 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (quoting Rivera v. State, 561 So.2d 536, 539 (Fla.1990) ). We note that the law generally disfavors crimes containing n......
  • Ayala v. State, Case No. 2D16–3327
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 13 Diciembre 2017
    ...to raise entrapment as a defense and to introduce evidence in support of it. See Ivory, 173 So.2d at 760 ; see also Mateo v. State, 932 So.2d 376, 379 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (explaining that "where evidence tends in any way, even indirectly, to establish a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt,......
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