Mathel v. Josephine County

• Decision Date: 16 August 1994
• Citation: 319 Or. 235,875 P.2d 455
• Parties: In the Matter of the Compensation of Jerry B. Mathel, Claimant. Jerry B. MATHEL, Petitioner on Review, v. JOSEPHINE COUNTY, Respondent on Review. WCB 90-18752; CA A76236; SC S40735.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 455

875 P.2d 455

319 Or. 235

In the Matter of the Compensation of Jerry B. Mathel, Claimant.

Jerry B. MATHEL, Petitioner on Review, v. JOSEPHINE COUNTY, Respondent on Review.

WCB 90-18752; CA A76236; SC S40735.

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted May 9, 1994.

Decided June 23, 1994.

Reconsideration Denied Aug. 16, 1994.

Michael M. Bruce of Rasmussen & Henry, Eugene, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With him on the petition was Eveleen Henry.

Michael G. Bostwick of Bostwick, Sheridan & Bronstein, Portland, argued the cause and filed a response for respondent on review.

James S. Coon and Susan Dobrof of Royce, Swanson, Thomas & Coon, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Workers' Compensation Attys.

Before CARSON, C.J., and GILLETTE, VAN HOOMISSEN, FADELEY, UNIS and GRABER, JJ.

GRABER, Justice.

This case involves the interpretation of provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law, ORS chapter 656, relating to types of compensable claims. Claimant is a corrections officer at the Josephine County jail. He had hypertension, which had been under control for many years. On August 23, 1990, after experiencing two days of abnormally high stress at work, claimant suffered an episode of acute hypertension culminating in a myocardial infarction (heart attack). He filed a workers' compensation claim. His employer denied the claim.

After a hearing, the referee found that claimant's heart attack was caused by acute hypertension and that "claimant's job-related stress was a material contributing cause" of his hypertension. The referee concluded that claimant's hypertension and resulting heart attack constituted a compensable injury. The Workers' Compensation Board initially affirmed the referee's order.

Thereafter, however, the Court of Appeals decided SAIF v. Hukari, 113 Or.App. 475, 833 P.2d 1307, rev. den. 314 Or. 391, 840 P.2d 709 (1992). In Hukari, the Court of Appeals held that, under the 1987 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Law,

"any claim that a condition is independently compensable because it was caused by on-the-job stress, regardless of the suddenness of the onset or the unexpected nature of the condition, and regardless of whether the condition is mental or physical, must be treated as a claim for an occupational disease under ORS 656.802." Id. at 480, 833 P.2d 1307 (emphasis in original).

Relying on the Court of Appeals' decision in Hukari, the Workers' Compensation Board reconsidered claimant's case and reversed its initial decision. The Board concluded that the claim must be analyzed under ORS 656.802 and that, because claimant did not have a diagnosed mental disorder as required by ORS 656.802(3)(c), the claim was not compensable.

Claimant petitioned for judicial review. The Court of Appeals, sitting in banc, affirmed the Board's order on reconsideration. Mathel v. Josephine County, 122 Or.App. 424, 858 [319 Or. 238] P.2d 450 (1993). We allowed claimant's petition for review and now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

ORS 656.005(7)(a) provides:

"A 'compensable injury' is an accidental injury, or accidental injury to prosthetic appliances, arising out of and in the course of employment requiring medical services or resulting in disability or death; an injury is accidental if the result is an accident, whether or not due to accidental means, if it is established by medical evidence supported by objective findings, subject to the following limitations:

"(A) No injury or disease is compensable as a consequence of a compensable injury unless the compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the consequential condition.

"(B) If a compensable injury combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment, the resultant condition is compensable only to the extent the compensable injury is and remains the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment."

ORS 656.802 provides:

"(1) As used in this chapter, 'occupational disease' means any disease or infection arising out of and in the course of employment caused by substances or activities to which an employee is not ordinarily subjected or exposed other than during a period of regular actual employment therein, and which requires medical services or results in disability or death, including:

"(a) Any disease or infection caused by ingestion of, absorption of, inhalation of or contact with dust, fumes, vapors, gases, radiation or other substances.

"(b) Any mental disorder which requires medical services or results in physical or mental disability or death.

"(c) Any series of traumatic events or occurrences which requires medical services or results in physical disability or death.

"(2) The worker must prove that employment conditions were the major contributing cause of the disease or its worsening. * * *

"(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a mental disorder is not compensable under this chapter:

"(a) Unless the employment conditions producing the mental disorder exist in a real and objective sense.

"(b) Unless the employment conditions producing the mental disorder are conditions other than the conditions generally inherent in every working situation or reasonable disciplinary, corrective, or job performance evaluation actions by the employer, or cessation of employment.

"(c) Unless there is a diagnosis of a mental or emotional disorder which is generally recognized in the medical or psychological community.

"(d) Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the mental disorder arose out of and in the course of employment." ¹

It is not disputed on review that claimant established his case by medical evidence supported by objective findings and that he met the requirements of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) and (B), set out above. What is at issue is whether claimant's heart attack properly is analyzed as an accidental injury under that statute or, instead, must be analyzed under ORS 656.802, relating to occupational diseases, including mental disorders.

In interpreting a statute, the court's task is to discern the intent of the legislature. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). The best evidence of the legislature's intent is the text of the statute. Id. at 610-11, 859 P.2d 1143. In reading the text, the court uses relevant rules of construction, such as the rule that words of common usage typically should be given their ordinary meaning. Id. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143. Also at the first level of analysis, the court considers the context of the statutory provision at issue, including other provisions of the same statute and other statutes relating to the same subject. Ibid. If the intent of the legislature is not clear from the text and context of the statute, the court considers the legislative history of the statute. Id. at 611-12, 859 P.2d 1143. If the intent of the legislature remains unclear after the completion of the foregoing inquiries, the court may resort to general maxims of statutory construction for assistance in resolving the remaining uncertainty. Id. at 612, 859 P.2d 1143. Also relevant in this case is the principle that, when the Supreme Court has construed a statute, that construction becomes part of the statute. Stephens v. Bohlman, 314 Or. 344, 350 n. 6, 838 P.2d 600 (1992).

The Workers' Compensation Law does not define the terms "injury" or "disease." The ordinary meaning of the term "injury" is "an act that damages, harms, or hurts"; "hurt, damage, or loss sustained." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1164 (unabridged ed 1993). The ordinary meaning of the term "disease" is "an impairment of the normal state of the * * * body"; "sickness, illness." Id. at 648. "Sickness" is defined in part as "the condition of being ill." Id. at 2111. "Illness" is defined in part as "an unhealthy condition of the body or mind." Id. at 1127. The foregoing definitions suggest that a heart attack is an "injury," because it is an event, as distinct from an ongoing condition or state of the body or mind.

That conclusion is consistent with this court's decision in James v. SAIF, 290 Or 343, 624 P.2d 565 (1981). In that case, this court considered the difference between "injury" and "disease" under the Workers' Compensation Law and adopted the following distinction:

" 'What set[s] occupational diseases apart from accidental injuries [is] * * * the fact that they [are] gradual rather than sudden in onset. * * * ' " Id. at 348, 624 P.2d 565 (quoting 1B Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law § 41.31 as cited in O'Neal v. Sisters of Providence, 22 Or.App. 9, 537 P.2d 580 (1975)).

A heart attack likewise fits the criterion of sudden onset.

More particularly, this court's previous cases have treated heart attacks arising from physical exertion as "injuries" within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Law for over 30 years. In Olson v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 222 Or. 407, 352 P.2d 1096 (1960), this court considered whether the deceased worker's heart attack was a compensable injury under the 1957 amendments to the statute. The worker was a jackhammer operator who suffered a fatal heart attack while operating that tool. Id. at 409, 352 P.2d 1096. His widow sought workers' compensation benefits. The trial court found in her favor, and this court affirmed. Id. at 410, 416, 352 P.2d 1096.

The court examined the extant statutory provisions. Under ORS 656.202(1) (1959), a worker was entitled to compensation if the worker "sustain[ed] an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment." ORS 656.002(19) (1959) provided that "[a]n injury is accidental if the result is an accident, whether or not due to accidental means." Applying those provisions, the court held that "any workman who undesignedly and unexpectedly suffer[s] a hurt, without reference to whether the cause of the injury itself was accidental," meets the requirement of an ...