Mathenia v. Brumbelow

• Decision Date: 18 May 2020
• Docket Number: S19G0426
• Parties: MATHENIA et al. v. BRUMBELOW.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

308 Ga. 714

843 S.E.2d 582

MATHENIA et al.

v.BRUMBELOW.

S19G0426

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: May 18, 2020

Hester Outman, Justin Y. Hester, James B. Outman, for appellants.

Timothy P. Healy ; Cathey & Strain, Dennis T. Cathey, Thomas L. Hatchett III, for appellee.

Kazmarek Mourey Cloud Laseter, Richard A. Horder, Jacqueline O. Eisermann, amici curiae.

Melton, Chief Justice.

This case stems from an action in which Joshua Brumbelow petitioned the Superior Court of Habersham County to legitimate his biological son, E. M.¹ The superior court denied the petition, concluding that, under In re Eason , 257 Ga. 292, 358 S.E.2d 459 (1987), Brumbelow had abandoned his opportunity interest to pursue a relationship with his son. Brumbelow appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in finding that he had abandoned his opportunity interest. The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the trial court's decision. See Brumbelow v. Mathenia , 347 Ga. App. 861 (2), 819 S.E.2d 535 (2018). The Court of Appeals further remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Brumbelow's legitimation petition should be granted based on Brumbelow being a fit parent for E. M., instead of being evaluated under the best interests of the child standard. Id. at 879 (3), 819 S.E.2d 535.

We granted certiorari to decide two issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the superior court's decision that Brumbelow had abandoned his opportunity interest to pursue a relationship with his son; and (2) if not, whether the Court of Appeals properly concluded that Brumbelow's legitimation petition must be assessed on remand under the parental fitness standard rather than the best interests of the child standard. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that, because evidence supported the superior court's finding that Brumbelow abandoned his opportunity interest, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying the legitimation petition. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in its decision on that issue, and we must reverse that portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment. With respect to the second question, we conclude that the portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion relating to the standard that must be applied to assess a biological father's right to custody of his child in a legitimation action should be viewed as dicta only.

1. Standard of Review.

An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision on a legitimation petition

for abuse of discretion only.... Moreover, "factual findings made after a hearing shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The appellate courts will not disturb fact findings of a trial court if there is any evidence to sustain them."

(Citations omitted.) Matthews v. Dukes , 314 Ga. App. 782, 786 (1), 726 S.E.2d 95 (2012), overruled on other grounds by Brine v. Shipp , 291 Ga. 376, 380 (3), 729 S.E.2d 393 2012. "On appeal of an order denying a petition to legitimate ..., the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the [trial] court's ruling." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of J. M. , 289 Ga. App. 439, 439, 657 S.E.2d 337 (2008).

The Court of Appeals’ opinion in this case included analysis of evidence that the superior court did not mention in its order – testimony and other evidence the superior court was entitled to discredit or afford no significant weight. See generally Brumbelow , supra, 347 Ga. App. at 862-864, 819 S.E.2d 535. We thus limit our discussion below to the facts as found by the superior court and supported by the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the superior court's ruling. Matthews , supra, 314 Ga. App. at 786 (1), 726 S.E.2d 95. As we have previously explained, with respect to evidence of record not referenced in a trial court's findings of fact:

We do not know — and the ... Court of Appeals could not have known — exactly why the trial court said nothing about these things. But we do know that the trial court could have assigned no weight at all to the testimony of the [witnesses] about these things to the extent that it found that their testimony was not credible. See Tate [ v. State ], 264 Ga. [53, 56 (3), 440 S.E.2d 646 (1994) ] ("Credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony is a decision-making power that lies solely with the trier of fact. The trier of fact is not obligated to believe a witness even if the testimony is uncontradicted and may accept or reject any portion of the testimony." (Citation omitted)).

(Emphasis in original.) Hughes v. State , 296 Ga. 744, 747, 770 S.E.2d 636 (2015) (decided in the context of a motion to suppress).² See also Chalk v. Poletto , 346 Ga. App. 491, 495 n.11, 816 S.E.2d 432 (2018) (In deciding whether a biological father in a legitimation action has abandoned his opportunity interest, the "[c]redibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony is a decision-making power that lies solely with the trier of fact. The trier of fact is not obligated to believe a witness even if the testimony is uncontradicted and may accept or reject any portion of the testimony.") (citation and punctuation omitted). "Unless [the trial court's] findings of fact ... are shown to be clearly erroneous or wholly unsupported by evidence[, an appellate court] cannot substitute its judgment for that exercised by the trial court in its findings of fact." Parr v. Jones , 163 Ga. App. 597, 598, 295 S.E.2d 570 (1982). See also Matthews , supra, 314 Ga. App. at 786 (1), 726 S.E.2d 95 (where "any evidence" supports the superior court's findings, those findings must be accepted).³

2. Factual Background.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the superior court's ruling and factual findings, the evidence presented at the hearing on Brumbelow's legitimation petition showed the following: In late 2015, Jeannie Mathenia became pregnant with E. M. after a one-time sexual encounter with Brumbelow. Mathenia was married to a different man at the time that she became pregnant with Brumbelow's child,⁴ and she remained married to her husband after E. M. was born. Thus, there is a statutory presumption that Mathenia's husband is E. M.’s legal father. See OCGA § 19-7-22 (a) (2) (B) (" ‘Legal father’ means a male who has not surrendered or had terminated his rights to a child and who ... [w]as married to the biological mother of such child at the time such child was born or within the usual period of gestation, unless paternity was disproved by a final order pursuant to Article 3 of this chapter").⁵

As soon as Mathenia found out she was pregnant, which was approximately six weeks after conception, she informed Brumbelow of the pregnancy. Brumbelow denied that the child was his, but attended one of Mathenia's doctor's appointments in an attempt to figure out how far along Mathenia was in the pregnancy in order to determine if he could be the father. At that point, Brumbelow offered to pay for Mathenia to have an abortion. Mathenia refused, and, from that point on, Brumbelow did not visit Mathenia, inquire about her well-being, or offer her any emotional or financial support, even though Brumbelow was employed and capable of providing such support.⁶

Lance and Ashley Hall planned to adopt E. M. After E. M. was born on July 10, 2016, Mathenia surrendered her parental rights to E. M., and the child went home with the Halls. E. M. has remained in the Halls’ exclusive care and custody ever since. At some point after E. M. was born and before Brumbelow filed his petition to legitimate E. M. on August 23, 2016, Brumbelow's mother got in touch with Mathenia and arranged for Mathenia to meet with Brumbelow at his attorney's office. Brumbelow requested visitation with E. M. only once, through his attorney, on December 29, 2016.⁷ The superior court found that Brumbelow had abandoned his opportunity interest in E. M. and that denying the petition for legitimation was in E. M.’s best interest.

3. Analysis.

(a) Jurisdiction.

As an initial matter, we must resolve an issue that the Court of Appeals did not consider: whether the superior court had jurisdiction to decide Brumbelow's legitimation petition. We conclude that it did. "Although the parties have not raised any objections to jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or conferred on a court by agreement." (Citations omitted.) Brine , supra, 291 Ga. at 377 (1), 729 S.E.2d 393 (2012). See also OCGA § 15-1-2 ("Parties may not give jurisdiction to a court by consent, express or implied, as to the ... subject matter of an action."). And, "[i]n the context of domestic relations cases, this Court has held that jurisdiction, whether subject-matter or personal, is dependent upon the state of things at the time that an action is filed." (Citation omitted.) Plummer v. Plummer , 305 Ga. 23, 27 (2) (a), 823 S.E.2d 258 (2019).

Our jurisdictional analysis begins with our decision in Brine , supra, 291 Ga. at 380 (3), 729 S.E.2d 393, in which we held that the superior court did not have jurisdiction to decide the legitimation petition of a biological father whose child was born to a mother who was married at the time the child was born. This was so because

the biological father's petition to legitimate a child who was born in wedlock [was] in essence a petition to terminate the parental rights of the legal father.... Since all children born in wedlock are deemed legitimate by law, the superior court was faced with a situation where the biological father of [the] child sought to delegitimate the child and sever an existing father-child relationship. See Baker v. Baker , 276 Ga. [778, 781 (1), 582 S.E.2d 102 (2003) ] ; Davis v. LaBrec , 274 Ga. [5, 7, 549 S.E.2d 76 (2001) ]. To grant the legitimation petition required the superior court to first terminate the parental rights of the legal father.

Brine , supra, 291 Ga....