Matheny v. Frontier Local Bd. of Ed., s. 79-826
| Decision Date | 18 June 1980 |
| Docket Number | 79-827,Nos. 79-826,s. 79-826 |
| Citation | 16 O.O.3d 411,62 Ohio St.2d 362,405 N.E.2d 1041 |
| Parties | , 16 O.O.3d 411 MATHENY et al., Appellants, v. FRONTIER LOCAL BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellee. UZARSKI, Appellant, v. WARREN LOCAL BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Oths, Foley & Heiser, Mark A. Foley, Wellston, Green, Schiavoni, Murphy, Haines & Sgambati Co., L. P. A., and Frederick G. Cloppert, Jr., Columbus, for appellants.
Donald L. Jones, Pros. Atty., and James E. Schneider, Asst. Pros. Atty., for appellees.
In their third proposition of law, appellants contend that a non-tenured teacher in Ohio has an "expectancy" of continued employment, and that the Due Process Clause requires that such a teacher be afforded a hearing prior to divestiture of this property interest. We cannot agree.
The issue of property interest claimed to be held in a public teaching position is a matter of state law. Board of Regents v. Roth (1972), 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548; Bishop v. Wood (1976), 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684. We must decide, therefore, whether Ohio law gives non-tenured teachers "a legitimate claim of entitlement to" continued employment. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at page 577, 92 S.Ct. at page 2709.
R.C. 3319.11 provides a system for the employment of teachers in this state. When certain conditions are met, 1 a teacher may be awarded a continuing contract. When the conditions are not met, however, the teacher is employed under a limited contract, and is granted no specific right to continued employment.
In Depas v. Board of Edn. (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 193, 370 N.E.2d 744, this court was confronted with the issue of whether a school principal, employed under a limited contract, had an expectancy of continued employment where the school board was required to consider certain criteria in determining reappointment. We held that he did not. R.C. 3319.11 does not require a school board to set forth its reasons for refusing to renew a limited contract. We believe these causes presently under review present a less forceful claim of entitlement than that rejected by this court in Depas, in that here there is no claim that the board must consider any specific criteria for reappointment.
Appellants more specifically contend that R.C. 3319.07 gives rise to an expectancy of continued employment for non-tenured teachers. R.C. 3319.07 provides, in part, that:
"In making appointments teachers in the employ of the board shall be considered before new teachers are chosen in their stead."
Appellants maintain that this statute states a "preference" for retention of current employees, and thus gives rise to a constitutionally protected property interest. Even if this provision of R.C. 3319.07 were read so broadly as to grant a preference to non-tenured teachers, it is apparent that it refers to the situation where a vacancy occurs and a currently employed teacher may be transferred to fill it. R.C. 3319.07 is simply inapplicable to the facts at bar.
We hold that under the provisions of R.C. Chapter 3319, a non-tenured teacher has no expectancy of continued employment past the term of his limited contract. Therefore, there is no property right involved here as claimed by appellants. In the absence of such a constitutionally protected interest, due process does not require a hearing by the board on the issue of non-renewal of such contract.
In their first proposition of law, appellants assert that appellees have violated R.C. 121.22, commonly known as the "Sunshine Law," by failing to give them prior notice of discussions pertaining to their employment status, and by failing to hold those discussions in sessions open to the public. They further contend that any board action resulting from these violations is invalid.
The 1975 amendment to R.C. 121.22 was intended to expand public access to the operation of state and local governmental entities. The major thrust of this amendment was to require that not only formal actions of public bodies, but also the deliberations preceding those actions, take place in sessions open to the public. 2 To this end. R.C. 121.22(A) now provides that:
"This section shall be liberally construed to require public officials to take official action and to conduct all deliberations upon official business only in open meetings, unless the subject matter is specifically excepted by law."
R.C. 121.22(C) similarly proclaims that:
Under the definition set forth in R.C. 121.22(B)(1), a local school board is a public body, as that term is used in R.C. 121.22(C), and its deliberations and official actions are required to take place in open session. R.C. 121.22(G), however, provides that:
R.C. 121.22(G)(1) thus creates an exception to the open meeting requirement of division (C) of that section, and authorizes a public body to meet in executive session to consider matters relating to the employment of a public employee. This section, however, also carves an exception to the above exception. Under its terms, a public body may meet in executive session to consider the employment of a public employee, unless the public employee "requests a public hearing." In that event, an open session must be held.
Appellants contend that R.C. 121.22(G)(1) grants some form of public hearing to a non-tenured teacher whose limited contract is about to expire, when so requested by the teacher. Alternatively, appellants argue that, at a minimum, when sought by the teacher, this section requires that all discussions pertaining to renewal of a limited teaching contract must take place in open session. These arguments are not well taken.
As we pointed out earlier, the specific provisions of R.C. Chapter 3319 dealing with school boards and teachers do not require a school board to set forth reasons supporting its decision not to renew a limited teaching contract. This court has also held, in Delong v. Board of Edn. (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 62, 64, 303 N.E.2d 890, 892, that "(t)here is no requirement * * * anywhere in R.C. Chapter 3319, that a board of education must provide a teacher, whose limited contract is due to expire, with notice of, or opportunity to be heard at, the meeting where his reemployment is being considered."
It may reasonably be concluded, and we so hold, that, in enacting R.C. 121.22(G)(1), the General Assembly intended to leave undisturbed the provisions of R.C. Chapter 3319 relating to teacher employment. Supportive of this conclusion is the fact that absent an exception to the otherwise broad mandate of R.C. 121.22(C), such section would be in conflict with existing statutes which promulgate procedures applicable to teacher employment actions. For example, R.C. 3319.16 provides that a board of education may not terminate a teacher's employment contract except upon certain specified grounds. That section further provides that a teacher whose contract is terminated has the right to a hearing which "shall be private unless the teacher requests a public hearing." (Emphasis added.)
It is evident that R.C. 3319.16 is aimed at protecting the privacy of a teacher against whom charges of misconduct have been preferred. R.C. 121.22(C), standing alone, would erode this protection by requiring that all termination hearings be public. For this reason, the General Assembly, in R.C. 121.22(G)(1), enacted the following exception to the public meeting requirement which closely parallels the above-quoted language of R.C. 3319.16:
"The members of a public body may hold an executive session * * * to consider the * * * dismissal * * * of a public employee * * *," "(u)nless the public employee * * * requests a public hearing * * *."
We believe that R.C. 121.22(G)(1) was intended to bring the other provisions of that section into conformity with existing statutes, such as R.C. 3319.16, which prescribe the procedure applicable to public employee termination actions. We do not believe that the words "unless the public employee * * * requests a public hearing * * * " were intended to grant the right to a hearing where none existed previously, as in the instance of contract considerations of non-tenured teachers.
Appellants' assertion that R.C. 121.22(G)(1) was intended to give non-tenured teachers a right to demand a public hearing is also belied by actions taken by the General Assembly subsequent to the enactment of R.C. 121.22. In 1977, the 112th General Assembly passed Am.Sub.H.B.No.449, which would have amended...
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