Mathews v. Ranger Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 13 June 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 43136,43136 |
| Citation | 281 So.2d 345 |
| Parties | Rebecca MATHEWS, a minor, et al., Petitioners, v. RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert Orseck, of Podhurst, Orseck & Parks, Miami, for petitioners.
James V. Dolan, of Walsh, Dolan & Krupnick, Fort Lauderdale, for respondent.
We have jurisdiction of this cause pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, F.S.A., because of a direct conflict between the decision sub judice of the District Court of Appeal, Third Disctrict, reported at 267 So.2d 867 (1972), and the cases of Home Insurance Company v. Southport Terminals, Inc., 240 So.2d 525 (Fla.App.1970), and Joseph Uram Jewelers, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 273 So.2d 111 (Fla.App.1972).
Petitioners are the Administratrix and survivors of the deceased, Charles Mathews, a student pilot who died as a result of injuries sustained when the Cessna 120 aircraft he was aboard crashed to the ground near Princeton, Florida. Petitioners brought an action in the Dade County Circuit Court against Miami Revival Center, Inc., owner of the aircraft, and Respondent Ranger Insurance Company, the liability insurer of Miami Revival Center, Inc. The complaint alleged that the plane was being flown under the direct supervision of Joe W. Lain, as flight instructor, and with the knowledge, permission and consent of the defendant, Miami Revival Center, Inc. Damages were sought under the Florida Survival Statute, F.S. Section 46.021, F.S.A., and the Wrongful Death Statute, F.S. Chapter 768, F.S.A.
Ranger answered the complaint by denying coverage. Miami Revival Center, Inc. crossclaimed seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether insurance coverage existed. The trial court severed the issue of coverage, and ordered that issue tried first. Following an examination of the terms of the insurance policy and the submission of memoranda of law by counsel, the trial judge issued an interlocutory order finding that the policy afforded coverage of the damages sought by Petitioners. 1 An appeal to the District Court of Appeal, Third District, resulted in a reversal of that judgment and a remand of that cause for further proceedings. Our jurisdiction stems from a timely petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court.
The record in this cause discloses the following background information: Miami Revival Center, Inc., is a religious organization that numbered the deceased among its membership. The Revival Center purchased three airplanes, two of which, including the Cessna 120, were to be used for 'limited commercial' purposes. Such purposes encompassed student pilot instruction for church members. Recognizing a need for liability insurance coverage, the Revival Center made application to the Respondent for aircraft insurance. Pertinent portions of the application for insurance coverage of the Cessna 120 read as follows:
'1. Name of Applicant--Miami Revival Center
'3. Liability Coverage and Limits Requested Each Person
A. Bodily Injury Liability, Excluding Passengers . . . $100,000.00
'5. Description of Aircraft
'6. Purpose(s) of Use: The aircraft will be used only for the purposes indicated by 'X'
(a) Pleasure and Business . . .
(b) 'Industrial Aid' . . .
X (c) 'Limited Commercial' The term 'limited commercial' is defined as including all the uses permitted in (a) and (b) above and Including Student Instruction and Rental to pilots but excluding passenger carrying for hire or reward:
'8. INSTRUCTION & RENTAL TO CHURCH MEMBERS ONLY.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Following approval of the above application for insurance, a policy was issued to the Miami Revival Center, Inc., which provided coverage as follows:
1. Coverage 'A' provides bodily injury liability, excluding passengers. This is defined as providing insurance to cover damages 'including death . . . sustained by any person, excluding passengers as defined herein, caused by an occurrence and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the aircraft.' There is a $100,000 limit for each person and a $300,000 limit for each occurrence.
2. A description of the insured aircraft is provided: 'Cessna 120 N--77168.'
3. There is a 'pilot clause' which allows only the following pilots to operate the aircraft in flight:
'N--77168: Any student, private or commercial pilot (See Endorsement No. 1).'
Endorsement No. 1 contains the following relevant provision:
'This policy does not apply to any occurrence or to any loss or damage occurring while the aircraft is being operated by a Student Pilot unless each flight is under the direct supervision and specifically approved by a Flight Instructor certified by the Federal Aviation Administration.'
4. On page 3 of the policy, under the heading 'Exclusions,' there appears:
'This policy does not apply
Crew or pilot is defined to mean 'any person involved in the operation of the aircraft while in flight.'
The issue before this Court is whether the insurance policy in question affords coverage for the allegedly wrongful death of the deceased, Charles Mathews. In deciding that question, it is necessary to examine and construe the insurance contract,
'. . . according to the entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth in the policy and as amplified, extended, or modified By any application therefor or any rider or endorsement thereto.' (Emphasis supplied.) Section 627.419(1), Florida Statutes, 2 F.S.A.
The application thus becomes a part of the agreement between the parties and the policy together with the application form the contract of insurance. Quick v. National Indemnity Company, 231 So.2d 22 (Fla.App.1970); 13 Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, § 7582, p. 334. We have held that a single insurance policy provision should not be considered in isolation, but should be construed with other policy provisions against the background of the case. The Praetorians v. Fisher, 89 So.2d 329 (Fla.1956). Cf. General Acc. F. & L. Assur. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 260 So.2d 249 (Fla.App.1972).
The background of this case, including the application for liability insurance coverage, contains no ambiguity or problems of construction and interpretation. In short, the provisions of the application as set forth above reveal that the Miami Revival Center, Inc. sought to cover its church members aboard a Cessna 120 for 'limited commercial' purposes. Such purposes specifically include student instruction of church members.
The initial provisions of the insurance policy likewise present little difficulty. We note that there is nothing contained in the record to indicate that Joe W. Lain was not directly supervising the flight when the tragedy occurred or that he was not a certified instructor. Thus a reading of the main policy provisions hereinbefore discussed lead to one inescapable conclusion: Charles Mathews, a student trainee, was aboard an aircraft covered by bodily injury liability insurance in the amount of $100,000 as to his person when the plane crashed and he died.
The ambiguity which does exist and which has occasioned this litigation stems from a single exclusionary provision buried amidst three pages of 'Exclusions,' 'Definitions,' and 'Conditions' contained in the insurance policy. The District Court of Appeal examined that provision and concluded:
'In short, we see nothing in the plain language of this policy to indicate that any person lawfully aboard the aircraft at the time of the crash was covered.' Ranger Insurance Co. v. Mathews, 267 So.2d 867 (Fla.App.1972), at 870.
We do not agree. That single provision which makes reference to crew or pilots is so incongruous when read with the other terms of the contract as to render the entire agreement ambiguous. Every relevant statement in the application and the policy, except that single fine-print exclusion, is aimed at providing insurance coverage for church members taking flying instructions. To hold that such coverage is not present now would be an absurd result disallowed by any reasonable construction of the policy as dictated by the provisions of F.S. Section 627.419(1), F.S.A. Ambiguity such as...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Wright v. Newman
...with policy, endorsement, being the later expression of intent, controls). Plaintiffs counter with a citation to Mathew v. Ranger Insurance Company, 281 So.2d 345 (Fla.1973). There, the application and some portions of the policy itself indicated that coverage was to extend to student pilot......
-
Castro v. Fireman's Fund American Life Ins. Co.
...on decisions in other jurisdictions where, it is claimed, similar aviation exclusions were found ambiguous, e.g., Mathews v. Ranger Insurance Company (Fla.1973) 281 So.2d 345 and Foremost Ins. Co. v. Sheppard (8th Cir.1979) 610 F.2d 551. Having review the authorities cited, we think plainti......
-
Jordan v. Reliable Life Ins. Co.
...Volunteer Relief Ass'n, 215 Kan. 937, 529 P.2d 171 (1974); Cruz v. Home Ins. Co., 511 So.2d 22 (La.App.1987); and Mathews v. Ranger Ins. Co., 281 So.2d 345 (Fla.1973). This court could attempt to certify the question of contract interpretation to the Supreme Court of Alabama based on the ph......
-
Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. O'Brien, 5358
...1226 (1973). We protect the buying public who rely upon insurance companies and agencies in such transactions. Mathews v. Ranger Insurance Company, 281 So.2d 345 (Fla.1973). If a layman cannot understand the language in the policy in its full impact, the policy will be interpreted to yield ......
-
Chapter Twenty-Eight
...as a crewmember is a jury question); Edwards Aircraft, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 205 (“pilot,” “crew,” “passenger”); Mathews v. Ranger Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1973); Oriheula v. Prudential Ins. Co., 124 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1953), aff’d, 286 A.D. 1085, 147 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1st Dep’......