Mathis v. State
Decision Date | 09 September 1986 |
Docket Number | 5 Div. 84 |
Citation | 497 So.2d 231 |
Parties | Terry Lynn MATHIS, alias v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Charles R. Gillenwaters, Alexander City, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Cecil G. Brendle, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Terry Lynn Mathis was indicted for assault in the second degree, in violation of § 13A-6-21, Code of Alabama 1975. The jury found the appellant "guilty as charged in the indictment." He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment, and the trial judge ordered a split sentence of three years in the county jail to be served on weekends and at night.
On the night of February 1, 1985, Johnny Pogue and Orion Reese, the victim in this case, went to the Dadeville Amoco station. When Pogue and Reese arrived, the appellant, Mathis, and some of his friends were there.
At some point, a fight ensued between the appellant and Pogue. During the course of the fight, the appellant, Mathis, stuck Pogue with his knife and Pogue threw a bottle at the appellant. As Pogue and the appellant continued fighting, Reese attempted to break up the fight and was cut by the appellant with his knife.
Reese went to the hospital and received stitches in his neck. He remained in the hospital overnight.
The appellant testified that he did not intend to cut Reese on the night in question, but he meant to cut Pogue.
The appellant contends the trial judge erred by instructing the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent. We do not agree.
The doctrine of transferred intent is applicable in prosecutions for assault and battery. 1 See generally, 6 Am.Jur.2d, Assault and Battery, § 18. "... Bradberry v. State, 37 Ala.App. 327, 67 So.2d 561, 564 (1953). "Not only is intent transferred, but also the degree of the crime and any defenses that would be valid if the intended victim had been hit." Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 Tex.L.Rev. 650, 653 (1967).
Evidence was presented at trial that the appellant unintentionally injured Reese while he was fighting with Pogue. The appellant's intention on to injure Pogue can be inferred from his use of a deadly weapon (the knife), and the character of the assault. Free v. State, 455 So.2d 137 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 455 So.2d 137 (Ala.1984).
There was some evidence presented at trial that the appellant and Pogue were mutual combatants and that the appellant was not the initial aggressor. This evidence, however, does not render the doctrine of transferred intent inapplicable to the present set of facts. It does, though, allow the appellant to raise any defenses which would have been available to him if he had injured Pogue, his intended victim.
The trial judge properly instructed the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent.
The appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the grounds that the appellant intended to injure Reese. As we alluded in our discussion of Issue I, it was not necessary to prove the appellant had the intent to injure Reese. The State had to show that the appellant, with intent to cause physical injury to another person, caused physical injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon.
As we stated before, the appellant's intent to injure another person (i.e., Pogue) can be inferred by his use of the knife and the character of the assault in question.
Thus, the evidence clearly showed that the appellant while intending to cause physical injury to Pogue, caused physical injury to Reese (cut on the neck) by means of a deadly weapon (the knife). Thus, there was sufficient evidence presented by the State to sustain the appellant's conviction for assault in the second degree. See Baldwin v. State, 342 So.2d 940 (Ala.Cr.App.1977).
The following is an excerpt from the closing argument of defense counsel.
The appellant now asserts on appeal that the trial court erred to reversal by not allowing defense counsel to define reasonable doubt to the jury. We disagree.
"Counsel may argue law generally to the jury, subject to the control and guidance of the trial court." Crowe v. State, 435 So.2d 1371 (Ala.Cr.App.1983). The trial judge did not allow defense counsel to define "reasonable doubt" to the jury because he believed it would be confusing to the jury. "[A]rguments which tend to mislead or confuse the jury on the applicable law are improper." Wade v. State, 381 So.2d 1057, 1062 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 381 So.2d 1062 (Ala.1980).
The trial judge, in his oral charge to the jury, thoroughly and properly defined "reasonable doubt" to the jury. Thus, the trial judge did not err by refusing to allow defense counsel to also define reasonable doubt to the jury.
The appellant claims he was not allowed to impeach Pogue's credibility because the trial court would not allow him to ask Pogue if he had "ever been convicted of assault." (R. 26)
A party may impeach his opposing party's witness by proving his former conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 145.01(1) (3rd ed. 1977). "The most common manner of eliciting a witness's former conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, as a means of impeaching his credibility, is to question him on cross-examination regarding such conviction." McElroy's, supra, at 145.01(15).
However, the crime of assault and battery has been held not to involve moral turpitude. McElroy's, supra, at 145.01(10); Hall v. State, 375 So.2d 536 (Ala.Cr.App.1979). Thus, the trial judge correctly refused to...
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...another person, he causes the death of that person or of another person....' (Emphasis added [in Carter])." See also Mathis v. State, 497 So.2d 231, 232 (Ala.Crim.App.1986). This distinction is problematic. Cases taking a similar view to the one taken in California (rejecting the doctrine o......
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Ex parte State, No. 1021997 (AL 5/7/2004), 1021997.
...person, he causes the death of that person or of another person ....' (Emphasis added [in Carter])." See also Mathis v. State, 497 So. 2d 231, 232 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986). This distinction is problematic. Cases taking a similar view to the one taken in California (rejecting the doctrine of t......
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Cockrell v. State
...see Free v. State, 455 So.2d 137, 147 n. 1 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), and although we have spoken to this issue in dicta, Mathis v. State, 497 So.2d 231 (Ala.Crim.App.1986), we have not addressed this precise issue in an In Free v. State, this Court discussed the fact that attempted murder is a s......
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Carter v. State
...would be valid if the intended victim had been hit.' Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 Tex.L.Rev. 650, 653 (1967)." Mathis v. State, 497 So.2d 231, 232 (Ala. Crim.App.1986)(some internal quotation marks and citations Legal scholars are in agreement with the foregoing principle. "So too if A a......