Mathis v. State

• Decision Date: 25 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. S12A0126.,S12A0126.
• Citation: 728 S.E.2d 661,291 Ga. 268,12 FCDR 1997
• Parties: MATHIS v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

291 Ga. 268

728 S.E.2d 661

12 FCDR 1997

MATHIS

v.The STATE.

No. S12A0126.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 25, 2012.

Long Dai Vo, Georgia Public Defenders Standards Council, Atlanta, for appellant.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., Dist. Atty., Paige Reese Whitaker, Deputy Dist. Atty., Office Of The District Attorney, Sheila Elizabeth Gallow, Sr. Asst. Dist. Atty., Paula Khristian Smith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Katherine Ruth Thrower, Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, for appellee.

HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice.

Appellant Paul Mathis was convicted of malice murder and related offenses in connection with the 2006 shooting death of Jurell Williams. Appellant appeals the denial of his motion for new trial, asserting evidentiary errors and ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Finding no error, we affirm. ¹

[291 Ga. 269]1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence adduced at trial established as follows. On the evening of October 18, 2006, Jurell Williams was shot to death in the parking lot of the Park at Greenbriar apartment complex in Southwest Atlanta. The sole known eyewitness to the shooting, Larry Foster, testified that he and Williams, a friend of his who sold marijuana in the apartment parking lot, were in the parking lot on the evening of the shooting. Foster saw Appellant, whom Foster knew from the neighborhood, approach Williams, and say “where is the money at?” to which Williams replied, “I don't got none.” Appellant struck Williams in the face, knocking him to the ground, and then shot Williams. Foster further testified that co-defendant Bryant approached during the altercation and, after Williams was shot, helped Appellant search Williams' clothing. After the shooting, both men drove away in a red car, which Foster testified he believed was Bryant's wife's car. At the crime scene, Foster identified the shooters to police as “Payday” and “Ray–Ray” or “Billy Ray,” and later that evening as “Paul” and “Ray.” Approximately one week later, Foster gave a formal statement to police, providing physical descriptions of both men and identifying both in photo line-ups. Trial testimony established that Appellant's nickname was “Payday” and that Bryant's was “Ray–Ray.”

Witness Sonja White, a resident of the apartment complex, heard the gunshots on the night of the crime. White testified that, immediately after the shots were fired, she looked out her window and saw a black male get into a red car and quickly leave the parking lot. Witness Patricia Dukes, who was acquainted with Williams, testified that she heard the gunshots from her apartment and ran outside to assist, and that, as she was tending to Williams, he mumbled the words “Ray–Ray” and “Payday.” Dukes also testified that Bryant and his wife at the time, who happened to be Dukes' granddaughter, owned a red car. Witness Typurs Mitchell, another apartment resident, testified that he heard the shots, looked out the window, and realized the victim was Williams, a close friend of his with whom he had just spent several hours. Mitchell also testified that Williams had told him, a few days prior to the night of the shooting, that “two dudes named Ray–Ray and Payday” had been threatening to kill him for selling marijuana in the Park at Greenbriar parking lot. Witness Tameka James, a former girlfriend of Williams, testified that she had been with Williams earlier on the evening of the shooting and that during that time he had received disturbing text messages, which he said were from people who had robbed him two weeks earlier.

The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. Appellant alleges error in the trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial after it became clear that certain testimony given by Foster was based not on his personal knowledge but rather on hearsay. Specifically, Foster testified that Appellant and Bryant were in a dispute with Williams because he was selling marijuana in what they considered to be their territory. On cross-examination, however, Foster admitted that he had not personally witnessed any such dispute and knew of it only because of “something that someone said.” At that point, though declining to declare a mistrial, the trial court gave curative instructions directing the jury to disregard any testimony based on hearsay.

Appellant contends that the trial court's curative instructions were insufficient. Even if we were to accept this premise, however, reversal would not be warranted unless Appellant suffered harm from the admission of the hearsay. Heard v. State, 274 Ga. 196(6), 552 S.E.2d 818 (2001). Here, to the extent Foster's testimony exposed prior difficulties between the co-defendants and the victim, the testimony was cumulative of Mitchell's testimony (which we find to have been admissible, see Division 3, infra) that Appellant and Bryant had threatened Williams days prior to the shooting. See Smith v. Stacey, 281 Ga. 601, 601–602(1), 642 S.E.2d 28 (2007) (“[t]he admission of hearsay testimony is harmless when it is cumulative of legally admissible evidence showing the same fact”). In addition, in combination with Mitchell's testimony, the other evidence implicating Appellant in the shooting, including Foster's identification of Appellant as the shooter and Dukes' testimony regarding Williams' dying declaration, makes it highly probable that the hearsay testimony did not contribute to the verdict. See Morris v. State, 280 Ga. 179(3)(a), 626 S.E.2d 123 (2006). Accordingly, this enumeration is without merit.

3. Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in allowing Mitchell to testify about the victim's statement regarding threats he had received from “Ray–Ray” and “Payday” a few days before the shooting. The trial court held that the statement was admissible under the necessity exception to the rule against hearsay. See Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 810(2), 607 S.E.2d 579 (2005). To satisfy the necessity exception, the proponent must establish “a necessity for the evidence, a circumstantial guaranty of the statement's trustworthiness, and that ‘the hearsay statements are more probative and revealing than other available evidence.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Id. at 811(2), 607 S.E.2d 579.

As an initial matter, Appellant has failed to preserve this argument for review because, while Bryant's defense counsel vigorously opposed the State's request to elicit the hearsay statements, Appellant's counsel failed to object, join in Bryant's objection, or argue in any way regarding this issue. Further, even had the issue been properly preserved, the requirements of the necessity exception were met, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony. It is undisputed that, because Williams was deceased and thus unavailable to testify, the first prong of the necessity exception was met. See Brown, supra, 278 Ga. at 811(2), 607 S.E.2d 579. Regarding the second prong, we have held that a statement is trustworthy when made to someone with whom the declarant enjoys a close personal relationship. See id.;Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448(3), 689 S.E.2d 293 (2010). Here, Mitchell testified that he and Williams were friends who saw one another almost every day and described himself as a confidante of and mentor to Williams, who often sought Mitchell's advice. See id. at 449(3), 689 S.E.2d 293 (victim's girlfriend, whom victim trusted and had close...