Mathison v. United States
| Decision Date | 26 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 4:18-cv-1851 |
| Parties | RYAN KEITH MATHISON, PLAINTIFF, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., DEFENDANTS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This action is before the Court on the complaint of plaintiff Ryan Keith Mathison ("Mathison") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants United States of America ("United States"), Joshua I. Grant ("Grant"), Marty McLaughlin ("McLaughlin"), and "unknown defendants" (collectively, "defendants").1 (Doc. No. 1 ["Compl."]). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mathison claims that defendants violated his rights under the United States Constitution by unlawfully seizing funds he obtained from the settlement of a civil lawsuit. (Id. ¶ 1.) For the reasons that follow, this case is DISMISSED.
Mathison is currently a prisoner at FCI Elkton in Lisbon, Ohio. (Id. ¶ 3.) Grant, McLaughlin, and the unknown defendants are Assistant United States Attorneys and, during all times relevant here, were acting within the course and scope of their employment with the United States (Id. ¶ 4.) Mathison's claims in this case involve the interplay among three events: (1) acriminal conviction obtained against Mathison in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, Case No. 5:06-cr-04030 ("Criminal Case"), (2) a heart attack he experienced at FCI Pekin in Illinois while serving the sentence imposed in the Criminal Case, and (3) a civil lawsuit Mathison filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois concerning the medical treatment he received for his heart attack.
In connection with the Criminal Case, the district court judge issued a Final Order of Forfeiture against Mathison (Criminal Case Doc. No. 463) for a personal money judgment in the amount of $400,000.00 ("Forfeiture Order").2 According to the public docket, McLaughlin was a United States Attorney of record representing the United States in the Criminal Case. Mathison claims that the Forfeiture Order is void because it was obtained in violation of the law. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.)
On August 26, 2010, Mathison experienced a heart attack while incarcerated at FCI Pekin pursuant to his conviction in the Criminal Case. (Id. ¶¶ 5-6.) Mathison alleges that the FCI Pekin staff did not obtain timely medical assistance, causing him to sustain permanent heart damage, and he filed a federal civil rights lawsuit in the Central District of Illinois. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) Mathison's civil lawsuit in the Central District of Illinois was resolved by written agreement ("settlement agreement") and a $50,000.00 monetary settlement ("settlement funds"), which was signed on behalf of the United States by Grant. (See id. ¶¶ 8-13.)
Mathison claims that the defendants seized the settlement funds to satisfy a portion of the allegedly void Forfeiture Order with an unlawful warrant and without due process. (Id. ¶¶ 11-14.) In addition to being injured by loss of his settlement funds, Mathison claims future injury because defendants could seize any money or property he receives to satisfy the allegedly void Forfeiture Order. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.)
In counts 1 and 2, Mathison alleges that Grant, McLaughlin, and the unknown defendants unlawfully seized the settlement funds without due process in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution and seeks compensatory damages. (See id. ¶¶ 17-24). In count 3, Mathison claims that the United States breached the settlement agreement by seizing the settlement funds to satisfy the Forfeiture Order and seeks compensatory damages. (Id. ¶¶ 25-28.) In count 4 against the United States and its agents, Mathison seeks a declaration from this Court that the Forfeiture Order, issued pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853, is void because § 853 cannot be used to obtain a money judgment against a defendant for property not in their possession. (Id. ¶¶ 29-33). And in count 5, also asserted against the United States and its agents, Mathison seeks to permanently enjoin defendants from seizing money or property pursuant to the Forfeiture Order that he may acquire in the future. (Id. ¶¶ 34-42).
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S. Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972) (per curia,), the Court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can begranted, lacks an arguable basis in law or fact, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised upon an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
The dismissal standard for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) governs dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks plausibility in the complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564.
A pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 197).
Mathison's complaint is subject to dismissal on all counts.
Mathison fails to state a § 1983 claim
Mathison brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. ¶ 1.) To state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983, Mathison must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of his rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 101 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1988).
Mathison alleges Grant, McLaughlin, and the unknown defendants are Assistant United States Attorneys and were acting within the course and scope of their employment with the United States during all times relevant to his claims. (Compl. at ¶ 4.) The Court cannot reasonably infer from Mathison's allegations that these defendants acted under color of state law. Mathison cannot bring a § 1983 claim against federal employees acting under color of federal law rather than state law. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424-25, 93 S. Ct. 602, 34 L. Ed. 2d 613 (1973) (); see also Ana Leon T. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, 823 F.2d 928, 931 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing Broadway v. Block, 694 F.2d 979, 981 (5th Cir. 1982) (). Mathison fails to state a § 1983 claim against Grant, McLaughlin, and the unknown defendants upon which relief can be granted.
Mathison fails to state a Bivens claim
Considering Mathison's pro se status, the Court will construe his complaint as claimsunder Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971). But even construing Mathison's allegations as a Bivens claim, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that federal officials may be sued individually for violating a plaintiff's constitutional rights. Principles of sovereign immunity shield the federal government and its agencies from suit without its consent, and the Supreme Court has declined to extend Bivens to permit such suits. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86, 114 S. Ct. 996, 127 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1994).
In Bivens, the Supreme Court created a limited private right of action for damages against federal government officials who allegedly violate a person's constitutional rights, but there is no implied damages remedy under the Constitution itself and such implied causes of action are disfavored. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855-56, 198 L. Ed. 2d 290 (2017); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. There are only three contexts in which the Supreme Court has permitted an implied damages remedy for a constitutional violation against federal officials: (1) a Fourth Amendment deprivation claim in Bivens; (2) a Fifth Amendment gender discrimination claim in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49, 99 S. Ct. 2264, 60 L. Ed. 2d 846 (1979); and (3) an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16-17, 100 S. Ct. 1468, 64 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1980). The Supreme Court reemphasized in Ziglar that federal courts should refrain from extending Bivens actions beyond the three existing contexts absent certain factors. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1857 ().
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