Matiyn v. Henderson, 279
| Decision Date | 01 March 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 279,D,279 |
| Citation | 841 F.2d 31 |
| Parties | Faris Abdul MATIYN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert HENDERSON, Superintendent of Auburn Correctional Facility, and Joseph Costello, Deputy Superintendent for Security at Auburn Correctional Facility, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 87-2201. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Faris Abdul Matiyn, pro se.
Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., Albany, N.Y. , for defendants-appellees.
Before LUMBARD, PIERCE, and MINER, Circuit Judges.
In May, 1985, appellant Faris Abdul Matiyn was transferred from the general prison population of Auburn Correctional Facility ("Auburn") in New York to a special housing unit at the prison, and from the special housing unit to the general prison population at Attica Correctional Facility ("Attica"). Matiyn subsequently commenced this action for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against Robert Henderson, the Superintendent of Auburn, and Deputy Superintendent Joseph Costello, alleging that the transfers violated his constitutional rights under the fourteenth amendment. Matiyn now appeals pro se from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, Howard G. Munson, Ch. J., denying appellant's motion for summary judgment, granting appellees' motion for summary judgment, and dismissing the complaint. We affirm.
The essential facts herein are not in dispute. Appellant Matiyn, who is currently imprisoned at the Attica Correctional Facility, is a member of the Sunni Muslims, a religious sect. Prior to his transfer from Auburn to Attica, Matiyn was chosen by his fellow Sunni Muslim prisoners to serve as their prayer leader, or imam. On May 5, 1985, amid rumors of impending trouble among factions of the Muslim community of prisoners at Auburn, Sergeant Marroccia requested permission from his watch commander to search for contraband in the area of the prison chapel that served as Matiyn's office. Permission was granted and Marroccia, accompanied by the prison chaplain, Father Enright, searched Matiyn's office. During the course of the search, Marroccia found a folder, which Father Enright thought belonged to Matiyn, lying on top of the altar. Inside the folder was a twelve-inch homemade knife. Another knife, some eleven inches long, was discovered in another part of the chapel.
The following day, the corrections officer assigned to the chapel area observed a Muslim inmate by the name of Cunningham pacing nervously up and down the hallway outside the chapel. After the noon meal, Cunningham failed to return to the chapel at his usual hour, and stayed away until 2:15 p.m. In the meantime, Matiyn had inquired as to Cunningham's whereabouts a number of times. According to the observing officer, there seemed to be hard feelings between the Sunnis and another religious sect, the American Muslim Mission, over the knives found in the chapel.
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, officials at Auburn confined Matiyn to a "special housing unit" ("SHU") at 3 p.m. on May 6, 1985. Four days later, at about 2 p.m. on May 10, Matiyn was released from the SHU and transferred to Attica. It is not disputed that Matiyn was not informed of the reasons for his detention and transfer.
Matiyn subsequently commenced the subject action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982), alleging essentially that both his confinement in Auburn's SHU and his subsequent transfer deprived him of a liberty interest without due process. Matiyn and the defendants, Henderson and Costello, filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
On March 4, 1987, United States Magistrate Scanlon issued a report recommending that summary judgment be entered in favor of the defendants. Chief Judge Munson adopted the report, granted judgment for the defendants, and dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment for the reasons that follow.
Matiyn principally contends on appeal that appellees violated his right to due process (1) by confining him to SHU for four days without a hearing, and (2) by subsequently transferring him to Attica without notice and a hearing. In resolving these claims, we must determine (1) whether Matiyn was deprived of a protected liberty interest; and (2) if so, what process was due him. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1154, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982).
Initially, we note that Matiyn's claim that the transfer from Auburn to Attica deprived him of a protected liberty interest without due process is without merit. As a general rule, there is no constitutionally based liberty interest that entitles a prisoner to a hearing or any other safeguards before being transferred from one prison to another, absent a state law or regulation conditioning such transfer on proof of misbehavior or other specified events. See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 2547, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976). Matiyn had no liberty interest in remaining at the Auburn facility since New York law does not place conditions on interprison transfers. Montanye, 427 U.S. at 243, 96 S.Ct. at 2547; Sher v. Coughlin, 739 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1984).
More difficult to resolve is the issue of whether Matiyn's four-day confinement in Auburn's SHU prior to being transferred to Attica deprived him of a protected liberty interest. In analyzing intraprison restrictive confinements, this circuit has drawn a distinction between confinement as a disciplinary sanction and confinement as an administrative procedure. Generally, when an inmate of the New York prison system is confined to SHU for disciplinary reasons, he is deprived of a liberty interest which is protected by state law. Sher, 739 F.2d at 81. Under such circumstances, due process entitles the prisoner to certain procedural protections as set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). On the other hand, when a prisoner is confined to SHU for administrative reasons, he is entitled to fewer procedural protections. Generally, prison inmates have no liberty interest in remaining within the general prison population, and out of administrative segregation, unless the state has chosen to create such an interest by enacting certain statutory or regulatory measures. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468-69, 103 S.Ct. 864, 869-70, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). The mere adoption by the state, however, of "procedural guidelines, without more," is insufficient to give rise to a liberty interest protected under the fourteenth amendment; only "the repeated use of explicitly mandatory language in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates demands a conclusion that the State has created a protected liberty interest." Id. at 471-72, 103 S.Ct. at 871. In addition, even when the state creates a protected liberty interest, the inmate confined for administrative reasons is entitled to only minimal process--"some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation." Id. at 476, 103 S.Ct. at 874; see also Bolden v. Alston, 810 F.2d 353, 357 (2d Cir.1987). Ordinarily, a written statement by the inmate to the prison officials who are reviewing his confinement will demonstrate that an inmate has been notified of the charges against him and that he has been given an adequate opportunity to present his views to those officials. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476, 103 S.Ct. at 874.
In the present case, appellees claim (1) that Matiyn's four-day confinement was administrative, not punitive; and (2) that the governing statutes and regulations of the State of New York do not bestow upon prison inmates a protected liberty interest in remaining free from administrative segregation. To assess these claims, we note first that the relevant state statute permits the State Department for Correctional Services to adopt whatever regulations it sees fit for the classification of inmates. N.Y.Correc.Law Sec. 137(1) (McKinney 1987); see also Hall v. Unknown Named Agents, 825 F.2d 642, 645-46 & n. 1 (2d Cir.1987); Sher, 739 F.2d at 81. Pursuant to this grant of authority, the Commissioner has promulgated Title 7, Part 304 of the New York Code of Rules and Regulations, relating to "Admission to Special Housing Units." Our reading of Part 304 suggests that Matiyn may have been placed in administrative confinement under either 7 N.Y.C.R.R. Sec. 304.1(a), relating to "automatic admissions," or Sec. 304.1(b), relating to "protective admissions." Therefore, we must determine whether a protected liberty interest can arise out of either of these provisions.
Turning first to Sec. 304.1(a), we note that "automatic admission" shall apply, inter alia, in the case of "a special housing unit used for inmates assigned there temporarily by the central office reclassification and review team for the purpose of evaluation and reclassification." 7 N.Y.C.R.R. Sec. 304.1(a)(1)(4). See also 7 N.Y.C.R.R. Sec. 300.3(5) (). The regulations set forth no procedures that must be undertaken prior to an automatic admission; consequently, the state impairs no protected liberty interest by placing an inmate in SHU for the purpose of reclassification. Hall, 825 F.2d at 644; Sher, 739 F.2d at 81. We conclude that if Matiyn was confined pursuant to automatic admission, he was not deprived of a protected liberty interest.
As noted above, however, Matiyn may have been confined to administrative segregation pursuant to 7 N.Y.C.R.R. Sec. 304.1(b), which...
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