Matjoulis v. Integon General Ins. Corp.

• Decision Date: 14 May 1997
• Docket Number: No. A97A0671,A97A0671
• Citation: 226 Ga.App. 459,486 S.E.2d 684
• Parties: , 97 FCDR 2048 MATJOULIS v. INTEGON GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 684

486 S.E.2d 684

226 Ga.App. 459, 97 FCDR 2048

MATJOULIS v. INTEGON GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION et al.

No. A97A0671.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

May 14, 1997.

Certiorari Denied Oct. 31, 1997.

Cofer, Beauchamp, Stradley & Hicks, Frank R. Seigel, Atlanta, for appellant.

Smith, Howard & Ajax, James T. Brieske, Atlanta, for appellees.

JOHNSON, Judge.

Terry Matjoulis had a car insurance policy with Integon General Insurance Corporation which included collision damage coverage. When Matjoulis left her car at a garage for service, the garage rented a Toyota Camry for her to use. Matjoulis totaled the Camry in a one-car accident. Integon refused to pay for the Camry, claiming Matjoulis' policy provided only liability coverage, not collision damage coverage, for "temporary substitute" vehicles. Integon also refused to defend Matjoulis when she was sued by the rental company that owned the Camry. Matjoulis then filed this action against Integon, seeking a declaratory judgment that it was obligated both to pay for the Camry and to defend the action against her. The trial court denied Matjoulis' motion for summary judgment and granted Integon's cross-motion for summary judgment. Matjoulis appeals. For the reasons set out below, we affirm.

1. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56(c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Rice v. Huff, 221 Ga.App. 592-593, 472 S.E.2d 140 (1996).

2. Matjoulis claims the language of the policy provides collision damage coverage for the Camry. Construction of a contract is generally a matter of law for the court, unless the contract contains an ambiguity that cannot be resolved under the rules of construction. Duke v. KHD Deutz of America Corp., 221 Ga.App. 452, 453, 471 S.E.2d 537 (1996); see OCGA § 13-2-1. A coverage exclusion in an insurance policy must be clearly defined to be enforceable, and any ambiguity is to be construed against the insurer. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Plantation Pipeline Co., 214 Ga.App. 23, 28-29(2), 447 S.E.2d 89 (1994). So long as the policy does not violate the law, however, an insurer may insure against certain risks and exclude others. American Home Assur. Co v. Smith, 218 Ga.App. 536, 538(1), 462 S.E.2d 441 (1995).

The policy states: " 'Your covered auto' means ... 4. Any auto or trailer not owned by you while used as a temporary substitute for any other auto described in this definition which is out of normal use because of its (a) breakdown; (b) repair; (c) servicing; (d) loss; or (e) destruction. This provision 4. does not apply to Part D--Coverage for Damage to Your Auto [the collision damage portion of the policy]." (Emphasis supplied.) This language clearly excludes the Camry from collision damage coverage.

Matjoulis contends, however, that the "acquired auto" portion of the policy provides such coverage, or at least creates ambiguity regarding whether such coverage exists. We do not agree. The "acquired auto" provision of the policy states that if the insured acquires a vehicle, then on the date the insured becomes the owner the acquired vehicle will have the same coverage as the vehicle it replaced, or the broadest coverage provided for any vehicle shown in the declarations, if the insured asks Integon to insure it within 30 days after the insured becomes the owner. Because the "acquired vehicle" language includes these two references to the policyholder's owning the acquired vehicle, and because the "temporary substitute" vehicle clause clearly describes the situation in which Matjoulis drove the rented Camry, the trial court was correct in finding that the policy unambiguously excludes collision damage coverage for the Camry. Any other reading would render the "temporary...