Matsen v. N.Y. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles

• Decision Date: 10 December 2015
• Citation: 134 A.D.3d 1283,21 N.Y.S.3d 441
• Parties: In the Matter of Caralyn A. MATSEN, Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

134 A.D.3d 1283
21 N.Y.S.3d 441

In the Matter of Caralyn A. MATSEN, Appellant,
v.
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Dec. 10, 2015.

21 N.Y.S.3d 442

Gerstenzang, O'Hern, Sills & Gerstenzang, Albany (Eric H. Sills of counsel), for appellant.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Jeffrey W. Lang of counsel), for respondents.

Before: McCARTHY, J.P., ROSE, LYNCH and DEVINE, JJ.

ROSE, J.

134 A.D.3d 1283

Appeal from an order and judgment of the Supreme Court (Ceresia Jr., J.), entered June 20, 2014 in Albany County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, among other things, granted respondents' motion for summary judgment dismissing the petition/complaint.

Petitioner was convicted in 2010 of driving while intoxicated, her third alcohol-related driving offense within a 10–year period. As a result of her conviction, her driver's license was revoked for a minimum period of one year (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193[2][b][3] ). When petitioner applied for a new license in June 2012, respondent Department of Motor Vehicles

21 N.Y.S.3d 443

(hereinafter DMV) held the application in abeyance until later that year when emergency regulations were adopted concerning the review of applications for relicensing by persons with multiple alcohol- or drug-related driving offenses (see 15 NYCRR part 136). Once the new regulations were in place, DMV relied upon them to deny petitioner's application because she was a person with "three or four alcohol- or drug-related driving convictions or incidents in any combination ... and ... one or more serious driving offenses within the 25 [–]year look[–] back period" (15 NYCRR 136.5 [b][2] ).¹ Specifically, during the look-back period, petitioner committed the "serious driving offense" of having been twice convicted of speeding violations "for which five or more points [were] assessed on [her] driving record" (15 NYCRR 136.5 [a][2][iii] ).

After her application was denied, petitioner commenced this combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and action for declaratory judgment against DMV and respondent Commissioner of Motor Vehicles seeking, among other things, an order granting her a new driver's license and declaring that the emergency

134 A.D.3d 1284

regulations are invalid. Respondents joined issue and moved for summary judgment dismissing petitioner's petition/complaint, and Supreme Court granted the motion. Petitioner appeals.

Although petitioner argues that a number of the provisions of 15 NYCRR part 136 either impermissibly conflict with preexisting statutes and case law or are arbitrary and capricious, she fails to establish that she has suffered an injury in fact from the operation of any of the provisions she challenges other than 15 NYCRR 136.5(a)(2) and (b)(2) (see New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v. Novello, 2 N.Y.3d 207, 211, 778 N.Y.S.2d 123, 810 N.E.2d 405 [2004] ; Matter of Gym Door Repairs, Inc. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 112 A.D.3d 1198, 1199, 977 N.Y.S.2d 478 [2013] ). Thus, with the exception of her specific arguments seeking the invalidation of 15 NYCRR 136.5(a)(2) and (b)(2), her challenges are nonjusticiable, inasmuch as she lacks "an interest sufficient to constitute standing to maintain th[ose claims]" (American Ins. Assn. v. Chu, 64 N.Y.2d 379, 382, 487 N.Y.S.2d 311, 476 N.E.2d 637 [1985], appeal dismissed and cert. denied 474 U.S. 803, 106 S.Ct. 36, 88 L.Ed.2d 29 [1985] ; accord Police Benevolent Assn. of N.Y. State Troopers, Inc. v. New York State Div. of State Police, 40 A.D.3d 1350, 1352, 838 N.Y.S.2d 199 [2007], appeal dismissed and lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 942, 844 N.Y.S.2d 783, 876 N.E.2d 511 [2007] ).²

Turning to petitioner's justiciable claims, we have previously held that other, similar provisions of 15 NYCRR 136.5 were promulgated by the Commissioner in accordance with her broad discretionary authority granted by the Legislature to approve or deny relicensing applications, that she did not exceed her delegated rule-

21 N.Y.S.3d 444

making authority in doing so and that the challenged regulations are otherwise rational, legal and valid (see Matter of Noonan v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., ––– A.D.3d ––––, 19 N.Y.S.3d 920 [decided herewith]; Matter of Joy v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 133 A.D.3d 1167, ––––, 20 N.Y.S.3d 475, 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 08686, *2 [2015]; Matter of Carney v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 133 A.D.3d 1150, ––––, 20 N.Y.S.3d 467, 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 08681, *2–3 [2015]; Matter of Acevedo v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 132 A.D.3d 112, 118–122, 14 N.Y.S.3d 790 [2015] ; Matter of Kenny v. Fiala, 127 A.D.3d 1359, 1359–1360, 9 N.Y.S.3d 692 [2015] ; Matter of Berroa v. Fiala, 122 A.D.3d 1209, 1210, 997 N.Y.S.2d 808 [2014] ; Matter of Scism v. Fiala, 122 A.D.3d 1197, 1198–1199, 997 N.Y.S.2d 798 [2014] ). The legal principles and analyses that undergird our prior decisions are fully applicable

134 A.D.3d 1285

to petitioner's challenge to 15 NYCRR 136.5(b)(2) and, ultimately, confirm the validity of this regulatory provision as well. Accordingly, we need not address each of petitioner's arguments to the contrary.

We have not, however, addressed petitioner's contention that 15 NYCRR 136.5(a)(2)(iii) arbitrarily designates a "conviction of two or more violations for which five or more points are assessed on a violator's driving record" to be a serious driving offense. She argues that this definition is unfair because the two speeding tickets she received within the 25–year look-back period should not lead to a presumptive lifetime driving ban. We must disagree.

In the broadest sense, 15 NYCRR part 136 was promulgated to "establish [ ] criteria to identify individual problem drivers," that is, applicants for new licenses that "ha[ve] had a series of convictions, incidents and/or accidents ... which in the judgment of the [C]ommissioner ... upon review of the applicant's entire driving history, establishes that the person would be an unusual and immediate risk upon the highways" (15 NYCRR 136.1 [a], [b][1] ). In developing these regulations, the Commissioner considered empirical data, which indicated that drivers with three or more alcohol- or drug-related driving convictions are involved in a disproportionate number of motor vehicle accidents. Accordingly, the Commissioner rationally determined that such drivers "pose the highest risk to the general population" (N.Y. Reg., Mar. 13, 2013 at 43) and, thus, should not be granted new, unrestricted licenses until after a waiting...