MATTER OF MULE v. Hawthorne Cedar Knolls Union Free School District

• Decision Date: 10 January 2002
• Citation: 736 N.Y.S.2d 464,290 A.D.2d 698
• Parties: In the Matter of KIMBERLY MULE et al., Appellants,<BR>v.<BR>HAWTHORNE CEDAR KNOLLS UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

290 A.D.2d 698

736 N.Y.S.2d 464

In the Matter of KIMBERLY MULE et al., Appellants,

v.HAWTHORNE CEDAR KNOLLS UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Respondents.

Rose, J.

Decided January 10, 2002.

Crew III, J.P., Peters, Spain and Lahtinen, JJ., concur.

Rose, J.

In 1998, respondent Hawthorne Cedar Knolls Union Free School District (hereinafter the District) proposed construction of two school buildings on its 120-acre campus in the Town of Mount Pleasant, Westchester County. Respondent Dormitory Authority of the State of New York (hereinafter DASNY), as lead agency under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8 [hereinafter SEQRA]), determined that the project would have no significant environmental impacts, issued a negative declaration and authorized the issuance of tax-exempt bonds to finance the project in September 1999. Petitioners, who are neighboring landowners, allegedly did not learn of the project until late July 2000. In response to its requests for reconsideration, the District held a public hearing in October 2000 but declined to change the location of its planned buildings, which were sited to take advantage of existing, adjacent facilities. This matter was commenced on November 21, 2000 seeking a judgment annulling the negative declaration, enjoining the project and directing respondents to begin the SEQRA process anew. When petitioners moved for a preliminary injunction, Supreme Court converted the action to a CPLR article 78 proceeding and dismissed it as barred by the statute of limitations.

Petitioners' primary contention on this appeal is that, in light of the unique circumstances present here, respondents' failure to provide notice and opportunity to be heard prior to the negative declaration tolled the four-month statute of limitations (see, CPLR 217) until they became aware of the project's potential impact on them. We disagree. Where a complaint alleges a violation of SEQRA, a CPLR article 78 proceeding is appropriate and the applicable statute of limitations is the four-month period following when the agency's determination became final and binding (see, Matter of Roenke v State Univ. of N.Y., 284 AD2d 781, 782; see also, Matter of Young v Board of Trustees of Vil. of Blasdell, 89 NY2d 846, 848). Further, an aggrieved party may not avoid the four-month period by characterizing the agency's action as a denial of due process rights (see, Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 230-231).

In determining when the four-month period began to run here, we note that the negative declaration was final upon its issuance on September 19, 1999 (see, Matter of Cathedral Church of St. John the Divine v Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y., 224 AD2d 95, 99, lv denied 89 NY2d 802), and the decision to proceed with the project became final and binding no later than October 28, 1999, when DASNY issued the tax-exempt bonds to fund the project and committed itself to a definite course of future action (see, Matter of Young v Board of Trustees of Vil. of Blasdell, supra, at 849; Matter of J.B. Realty Enter. Corp. v City of Saratoga Springs, 270 AD2d 771, 773, lv denied 95 NY2d 758). Si...