Matter of Saratoga Lake Protection and Improvement District v. Department of Public Works of the City of Saratoga Springs

• Decision Date: 06 December 2007
• Docket Number: 502254.
• Citation: 2007 NY Slip Op 09647,46 A.D.3d 979,846 N.Y.S.2d 786
• Parties: In the Matter of SARATOGA LAKE PROTECTION AND IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT et al., Respondents, v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS OF THE CITY OF SARATOGA SPRINGS et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

46 A.D.3d 979

846 N.Y.S.2d 786

2007 NY Slip Op 09647

In the Matter of SARATOGA LAKE PROTECTION AND IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT et al., Respondents, v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS OF THE CITY OF SARATOGA SPRINGS et al., Appellants.

502254.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Third Department.

Decided December 6, 2007.

Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Nolan, Jr., J.), entered February 10, 2006 in Saratoga County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78

and action for declaratory judgment, denied respondents' motion to dismiss the petition/complaint, and (2) from a judgment of said court, entered September 25, 2006 in Saratoga County, which, among other things, partially granted petitioners' application, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, to annul a determination of respondent City Council of the City of Saratoga Springs making certain findings pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act.

Spain, J.

In 1988, the Department of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter DEC) issued a report recommending that respondent City Council of the City of Saratoga Springs (hereinafter respondent) investigate alternative long-term sources of potable drinking water, including tapping ground water supplies or drawing water from Saratoga Lake, the Great Sacandaga Reservoir or the upper Hudson River. In response, respondent hired a consultant to investigate alternatives and it eventually recommended a plan for drawing water from Saratoga Lake, called the Water Source Development Project (hereinafter the Project).

In January 2001, acting as lead agency, respondent issued a positive declaration for the Project and, subsequently, completed a scoping process, prepared and published a draft environmental impact statement (hereinafter DEIS), held hearings and accepted comments. In March 2004, after the formal DEIS public comment period had been closed, respondent nevertheless permitted and received a presentation regarding the DEIS from petitioner Saratoga Lake Protection and Improvement District (hereinafter SLPID). Thereafter, a final environmental impact statement (hereinafter FEIS) was prepared, adopted and published. On or about October 18, 2005, respondent passed a resolution accepting the FEIS as complete and finding that the Project presented a solution to the City's water needs which minimizes adverse environmental impacts to the maximum extent practicable.

In this combined declaratory judgment action and CPLR article 78 proceeding, petitioners challenge the adequacy of respondent's review of the Project under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (hereinafter SEQRA; see ECL art 8), seeking to annul respondent's SEQRA determinations, to enjoin respondents from obtaining a water supply permit and a declaration that SLPID is an involved agency under SEQRA. Respondents made a preanswer motion to dismiss the petition pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (3) on the grounds that SLPID did not have the legal capacity to sue and that none of the petitioners had standing. In February 2006, Supreme Court denied respondents' motion. Thereafter, in a judgment entered September 25, 2006, Supreme Court held that SLPID was not an involved agency but, finding that respondent failed to adequately consider the environmental impacts the Project could have on activities, land use and development within the lake's watershed, annulled respondent's October 18, 2005 SEQRA determination. Respondents appeal from both the court's February 2006 order and its September 2006 judgment.¹

Initially, respondents challenge Supreme Court's February 2006 order, asserting that petitioner Town of Saratoga, petitioner Town of Stillwater (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Towns), SLPID and petitioner Saratoga Lake Association, Inc. (hereinafter SLA) all lacked standing to sue and, as such, their SEQRA claims must be dismissed.² To establish standing to challenge respondent's governmental action, it was incumbent upon SLPID to demonstrate both that it might suffer an "injury in fact"—i.e., actual harm by the action challenged that differs from that suffered by the public at large— and that such injury falls within the zone of interests, or "concerns[] sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision under which the agency has acted" (Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 773 [1991]; see Matter of Graziano v County of Albany, 3 NY3d 475, 479 [2004]; Matter of Save Our Main St. Bldgs. v Greene County Legislature, 293 AD2d 907, 908 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 609 [2002]; Matter of Dyer v Planning Bd. of Town of Schaghticoke, 251 AD2d 907, 908-909 [1998], appeal dismissed 92 NY2d 1026 [1998], lv dismissed 93 NY2d 1000 [1999]).

Supreme Court correctly concluded that SLPID has standing. SLPID's enabling legislation provides that it was formed to "supervise, manage and control" Saratoga Lake and the surrounding lands to ensure real property values, improve water quality so as to enhance recreational opportunities and conserve fish and wildlife, and enhance the beauty of the surrounding municipalities (L 1986, ch 460, § 1). Furthermore, SLPID has the power "[t]o acquire, manage, operate, maintain, repair and replace aquatic weed control equipment," as well as to "[t]ake any and all other actions reasonably necessary and proper to further the purposes of the district" (L 1986, ch 460, § 7 [c], [p]). The complaint alleges that the Project will limit SLPID's options for controlling aquatic weeds; specifically, it states that more aggressive methods than the current methodology of mechanically harvesting weeds are necessary and that at least one alternative—the lake-wide application of certain herbicides—would be incompatible with the use of Saratoga Lake as a water supply source. The FEIS acknowledges that the Project will impact weed control methodology, at least insofar as recognizing that, if a herbicide alternative were to be implemented, manual harvesting will be necessary within one-quarter mile of the intake pipe. Given these specific allegations, we conclude that Supreme Court did not err in finding that SLPID has alleged a sufficiently particularized injury. Further, the injury that SLPID seeks to prevent falls squarely within the zone of interests protected by SEQRA and, thus, Supreme Court did not err in finding that SLPID had standing (see Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d at 772-773; Matter of Graziano v County of Albany, 3 NY3d at 479; Matter of Otsego 2000 v Planning Bd. of Town of Otsego, 171 AD2d 258, 260 [1991], lv denied 79 NY2d 753 [1992]).

We also conclude that SLA has demonstrated standing to challenge respondent's determination. To establish standing, an organization must demonstrate that at least one of its members would have standing to sue individually, that the interests it asserts are germane to its purpose and that the resolution of the claim does not require the participation of its individual members (see Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d at 775; Matter of County of Oswego v Travis, 16 AD3d 733, 734 [2005]). Here, respondents' challenge to SLA's standing is premised solely on SLA's ability to demonstrate standing on the part of one of its members.

SLA asserts its standing based on alleged injuries "different in kind or degree from that of the public at large" that would be suffered by SLA president Wilma Koss (Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d at 775). Koss alleges that her property is located within 1,000 feet of the development with an unobstructed view of the proposed pumping infrastructure (see Matter of Ziemba v City of Troy, 37 AD3d 68, 71 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 806 [2007] [a petitioner has standing where proposed project will affect the scenic view from his or her residence]). Koss also alleges that the Project will result in restrictions in areas that she and her family have historically enjoyed using for boating, fishing and swimming. Although the restrictions that Koss cites will result in the same kind of harm as suffered by the public at large, the proximity of Koss's property to the proposed site will result in her suffering that harm to a greater degree. Thus, SLA has demonstrated individual standing on the part of one of its members (see Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d at 775; Matter of Ziemba v City of Troy, 37 AD3d at 71).

With respect to the Towns, we reach a different conclusion. In order to establish standing, a municipality must demonstrate "how its personal or property rights, either personally or in a representative capacity, will be directly and specifically affected apart from any damage suffered by the public at large" (Matter of City of Plattsburgh v Mannix, 77 AD2d 114, 117 [1980]; see Matter of Dyer v Planning Bd. of Town of Schaghticoke, 251 AD2d at 909). Here, the complaint alleges that regulations and measures that would be necessary in implementing the Project will "entail significant restrictions on both development and agricultural operations within the Saratoga Lake watershed." In its supporting affidavit, the Town of Saratoga attempts to define the threatened injury with more specificity, citing loss of the ability to manage and direct development within its watershed, loss of opportunities for lake recreation, damage to that Town's economy, limitations and loss of agriculture and continued suburbanization of the Town, loss of wetlands and a reduction in land values. The Town of Stillwater submitted an affidavit making general reference to the fact that the project will "have direct effect on land use." These generalized claims of harm have failed to identify any "specific, direct environmental harm" to the Towns' personal or property rights, either personally or in a representative capacity, that differs from that of the public at large and, thus,...