Matthew v. Hamrick

• Decision Date: 21 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 109,249.,109,249.
• Citation: 258 P.3d 509,2011 OK 60
• Parties: Matthew V. HAMRICK, Plaintiff,v.STATE of Oklahoma ex rel., OFFICE OF the CHIEF MEDICAL EXAMINER, Defendant.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

258 P.3d 509

2011 OK 60

Matthew

v. HAMRICK, Plaintiff,

v.STATE of Oklahoma ex rel., OFFICE OF the CHIEF MEDICAL EXAMINER, Defendant.

No. 109,249.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

June 21, 2011.

FEDERAL CERTIFIED QUESTION¶ 0 Invoking Oklahoma's Revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 20 O.S.2001, 1601 through 1611, the Honorable Claire V. Eagan, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Oklahoma, certified the following question of law to this Court: “Does an unclassified state employee who alleges his employer failed to pay him wages have a private right of action under 40 O.S.2001, 165.9?” We reformulate the question of law within the confines of the federal court's statement of relevant facts to read as follows: Can an unclassified state employee maintain a private right of action under 40 O.S.2001, 165.1 through 165.11, Protection of Labor Act, to recover wages allegedly owed the employee by his state entity employer? We have recast the question in order to fully address the scope of state employees' rights under the Act. Our answer to the reformulated question is: An unclassified state employee can maintain an action pursuant to the Protection of Labor Act to recover unpaid wages but cannot recover liquidated damages.REFORMULATED CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED.Charles C. Vaught, Kevin S. Merritt, Armstrong & Lowe, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff.Kindanne C. Jones, Sandra J. Balzer, Susan K. Noland, Assistant Attorneys General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant.REIF, J.:

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Matthew V. Hamrick, sued the State of Oklahoma ex rel., Office of the Chief Medical Examiner in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. He seeks recovery for wrongs he allegedly suffered during his employment with the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner. Plaintiff initially asserted seven claims against the State, grounded on both federal and state law. Plaintiff later dismissed all of the state law claims except his claim for unpaid wages under the Protection of Labor Act, 40 O.S.2001 and Supp. 2010, 165.1 through 165.11. Relying specifically on section 165.9, plaintiff claimed entitlement to liquidated damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees, in addition to the unpaid wages.

¶ 2 The State contested plaintiff's right to rely on section 165.9 as a basis to recover such relief. The State noted that the State is not included in the statutory definition of “employer” as used in sections 165.1 through 165.11. In response, plaintiff contended that the statutory definition of “employer” as used in sections 165.1 through 165.11 is broad enough to include the State and should be so construed to afford unclassified state employees, like plaintiff, a state law remedy to collect unpaid wages. Plaintiff pointed out that unclassified employees cannot pursue wage claims through the Merit Protection grievance process and will have no state law remedy to pursue a wage claim if the State is not treated as an employer under sections 165.1 through 165.11.

¶ 3 Citing the absence of precedential authority on the rights of unclassified state employees to pursue a claim for unpaid wages, the plaintiff and State jointly requested the federal court to certify a question of law to determine the applicability of section 165.9 to such a wage claim. The federal court granted the parties' request and inquired: “Does an unclassified state employee who alleges his employer failed to pay him wages have a private right of action under 40 O.S.2001, 165.9.”

¶ 4 The federal certification order set forth the following facts relevant to the certified question:

Mr. Hamrick was employed by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) as an investigator in its Tulsa office from September 1, 2006, through February 10, 2010. Throughout his service as an investigator, Mr. Hamrick's employment status was that of a full time “unclassified” state employee. There is no dispute that during Mr. Hamrick's tenure with OCME, the agency's scheduling required that its investigators work day shifts in the office, overnight “on call” shifts, and weekend “on call” shifts on a rotating basis. During the time in question, a Tulsa investigator's scheduled office hours, combined with the hours the investigator was scheduled to be “on call,” commonly exceeded forty (40) hours in a week.

OCME compensate Mr. Hamrick and continues to compensate its investigators for the hours for which they are engaged to work and which time is recorded on their time sheets and/or daily activity logs. However, OCME does not pay investigators for the entire period during which they are “on call.”

Mr. Hamrick's responsibilities as an investigator OCME required him to drive a state vehicle to death scenes over which the agency exercised jurisdiction. OCME had in place a personnel policy and practice provision that provided that “[a]ny employee violating the provisions of this section (operation of state vehicle) may be subject to disciplinary action and/or termination and may be subject to fine or imprisonment in accordance with State Law.” Employee Handbook, p. 39.

Mr. Hamrick contends that OCME's “on-call” system is onerous that it has created an “engaged to wait” system and that he should be compensated for all time he was “on-call.” Mr. Hamrick contends that OCME's practice of conducting performance reviews concerning an investigator's ability to respond to death calls within 15 minutes of receipt 95% of the time is evidence which supports this contention. OCME disputes that it created such a system and contends that the employees were “waiting to be engaged.”

Prior to initiating this action, Mr. Hamrick submitted a claim to OCME in which he contended that he had not been fully compensated by OCME for wages earned. Among the issues raised by Mr. Hamrick was his contention that he should be compensated for all hours he was “on call” as opposed to the hours he was actually engaged to work while on call. Upon receipt of his (and other) allegations, OCME unilaterally contacted the United States Department of Labor (USDOL) regarding the allegations. USDOL investigated Mr. Hamrick's allegations and as a result, OCME paid the gross amount of $727.19 for wages owed. Mr. Hamrick contends, however, that this amount is insufficient and that the amount owed to him is far greater that $727.19. Mr. Hamrick further contends that he was not given any opportunity to be heard before the USDOL, and has not ever been afforded the opportunity to be heard regarding his claim.

In addition and prior to initiating this action, Mr. Hamrick submitted a complaint to the Oklahoma Merit Protection Commission (OMPC) regarding the type of leave he was required to take as a result of a family member's death. OCME and Mr. Hamrick engaged in mediation through OMPC and resolved Mr. Hamrick's complaint. There is no dispute, however, that OCME has no formal grievance procedure within the employee handbook.

Mr. Hamrick has initiated an action against OCME alleging, inter alia, that OCME's failure to compensate him for every hour he is scheduled to be on-call is a violation of OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 165.1 et seq. Mr. Hamrick claims that denying a private right of action to “unclassified” state employees would violate the Oklahoma Constitution. OCME denies that it has failed to pay Mr. Hamrick wages and asserts that he does not have a private right of action under §§ 165.1 et seq. In particular, OCME argues that state agencies are excluded from the definition of “employer” in the administrative regulations implementing OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 165.1 et seq.

Upon review of all the provisions of sections 165.1 through 165.11, we reformulate the question within the confines of the foregoing statement of facts to read: Can an unclassified state employee maintain a private right of action under 40 O.S.2001 and Supp. 2010, 165.1 through 165.11 to recover wages allegedly owed the employee by his state entity employer?

¶ 5 We recast the question because section 165.9 cannot be construed in isolation, but must be interpreted in context of the Protection of Labor Act as a whole. In this way, the full scope of a state employee's rights under these statutes can be addressed. This approach leads us to answer the reformulated question in the affirmative, except as to the recovery of liquidated damages.

¶ 6 As previously noted, the plaintiff asserts that the State Merit Protection grievance process is not available to him and other unclassified state employees to resolve a dispute with the State concerning unpaid wages for overtime. As a consequence, plaintiff contends that section 165.9 provides the only remedy for an unclassified state employee to pursue a claim for overtime allegedly worked, but not compensated. Plaintiff points out that section 165.9 provides, in pertinent part, that an action may be maintained by “an employee to recover unpaid wages and liquidated damages ... for and in behalf of himself and ... other employees similarly situated....” In addition, section 165.1(4) defines wages to include “overtime pay.” Furthermore, the term “employee” as used in sections 165.1 through 165.11 is defined to mean “any person permitted to work by an employer,” § 165.1(2).

¶ 7 In response, the State notes that the State is not included in the definition of an “employer” as used in sections 165.1 through 165.11. ¹ The Legislature provided that the term “employer,” as used in sections 165.1 through 165.11, means “every individual, partnership, firm, association, corporation, the legal representative of a deceased individual, or the receiver, trustee or successor of an individual, firm partnership, association or corporation, employing any person in this state.”

¶ 8 In review of sections 165.1 through 165.11, it is readily apparent that the Legislature intended to allocate certain rights and duties under the Act to parties that meet the special statutory definitions of...