Matthews v. Bryerton, 14

• Decision Date: 10 July 1963
• Docket Number: A,No. 14,14
• Citation: 193 A.2d 83,56 Del. 222
• Parties: , 56 Del. 222 William G. MATTHEWS and David C. Harrison Postmerican Legion, Inc., a corporation of the state of Delaware, Defendants Below, Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. Donald H. BRYERTON and Ethel B. Bryerton.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 83

193 A.2d 83

6 Storey 222, 56 Del. 222

William G. MATTHEWS and David C. Harrison Post No. 14 American Legion, Inc., a corporation of the state of Delaware, Defendants Below Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. Donald H. BRYERTON and Ethel B. Bryerton.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

July 10, 1963.

Cross-appeals from summary judgments entered in the Superior Court of New Castle County.

F. Alton Tybout, Wilmington, for defendants below, appellants and cross-appellees.

Joseph H. Geoghegan, of Berl, Potter & Anderson, and Donald C. Taylor and H. Alfred Tarrant, Jr., of Cooch & Taylor, Wilmington, for plaintiffs below, appellees and cross-appellants.

TERRY, Chief Justice, and WOLCOTT and CAREY, JJ., sitting.

CAREY, Justice.

This case arose from a collision between an automobile driven by Donald H. Bryerton, herein called the plaintiff, and a private ambulance owned by the American Legion Post and driven by William G. Matthews, herein called the defendant. The Court below entered summary judgment against the plaintiff on his claim, and in his favor on the counterclaim, upon a finding of negligence proximately causing the accident on the part of both drivers. These cross-appeals attack that finding. The fundamental question, presented to this Court for the first time, is whether an ambulance driver is excused under certain conditions from observing the provisions of 21 Del.C. § 4143 and § 4142(c)(1), hereinafter quoted, requiring vehicles to stop at intersections controlled by stop signs or flashing red traffic lights.

The facts are these: the collision occurred in the early afternoon of April 17, 1960 at the intersection of State Route 896 and County Route 25. The weather was clear and the road was dry. Plaintiff, accompanied by his wife, was driving south on Route 896. Defendant was traveling east on Route 25 carrying two injured persons to the hospital. No doctor had seen those persons and no one knew how seriously they were injured; there was some reason to think that one might have severe injuries. Several special lights were lighted on the ambulance, including a revolving light on the top. The siren started blowing a distance of two or three telephone poles west of the intersection and about the same time, defendant reduced his speed to 25 miles per hour, the posted speed limit. Because of some buildings, gas pumps and trees, each driver's possible view of the other was limited, the estimates thereof varying from 50 to 100 feet. Precisely when Matthews first actually saw the plaintiff is unknown, because he remembers nothing about the accident.

The plaintiff was traveling about 35 miles per hour, the posted speed limit on Route 896 being 50 miles per hour. He and his wife testified that his car windows were open and his radio was playing. Neither he nor his wife saw the ambulance or its lights or heard the siren until they actually entered the intersection. He says he first looked to his right when he was some distance back, where he had a partial view of Route 25 between some trees. He says he again looked to his right when he was about 50 feet from the intersection. He first actually saw the ambulance when it was less than 25 feet from him. The impact between the two cars occurred near the center of the intersection. The investigating officer found no skid marks leading to either car.

The intersection is controlled by a blinking light, yellow facing north from which direction plaintiff approached and red facing west from which direction defendant approached. There was also a stop sign against traffic coming from the west on Route 25.

The Court below found the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence in failing to keep a proper lookout. It also found the defendant guilty of contributory negligence in failing to stop according to the mandate of § 4143 and § 4142(c)(1).

Consideration of the respective rights and duties of the drivers requires a discussion of several 'rules of the road'. These are the following:

' § 4143. (a) Whenever a stop sign, notifying drivers to come to a full stop, has been erected by the proper State or local authorities as provided in this title, it shall be unlawful for the driver of any vehicle to fail to stop in obedience thereto.

'(b) The operator of any vehicle who has come to a full stop as provided in subsection (a) of this section, shall not enter into, upon or across, such highway or street until such movement can be made in safety'.

' § 4142. (c) Whenever flashing red or yellow signals are used at the intersection of two highways, they shall require obedience by vehicular traffic as follows----

'(1) When a red lens is illuminated by rapid intermittent flashes, drivers of vehicles approaching the flashing signal shall stop before entering the nearest crosswalk at an intersection or at a limit line when marked, and the right to proceed shall be subject to the rules applicable after making a stop at a stop sign as contained in subsection (b) of section 4143 of this title;

'(2) When a yellow lens is illuminated with rapid intermittent flashes, drivers of vehicles may proceed through the intersection or past such signals only with caution.'

' § 4139. (b) The driver of a vehicle upon a highway shall yield the right of way to police and fire department vehicles and public and private ambulances, when they are operated upon official business and the drivers thereof sound audible signal by bell, siren or exhaust whistle. This provision shall not operate to relieve the driver of a police or fire department vehicle or an ambulance from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway and it shall not protect the driver of any such vehicle from the consequences of an arbitrary exercise of such right of way.'

' § 4141. Upon the approach of any police or fire department vehicle or public or private ambulance giving audible signal by bell, siren or exhaust whistle, the driver of every other vehicle shall immediately drive such vehicle to a position as near as possible and parallel to the right-hand edge or curb of the highway, clear of any intersection of highways, and shall stop and remain in such position, unless otherwise directed by a police or traffic officer, until the police or fire department vehicle or the ambulance has passed.'

All these sections pertain to the question of which driver has the 'right of way', a term defined in 21 Del.C. § 101 as 'the privilege of the immediate use of the highway.' Obviously, in interpreting the various right of way rules, we must presume that the Legislature intended to lay down rules of conduct which are consistent with one another, and we must consider the above quoted sections with that presumption in mind.

Parenthetically, it is to be noted that the Legislature has made no distinction between police and fire department vehicles, on the one hand, and public and private ambulances, on the other, either in these quoted right of way sections or in § 4129 which exempts them from certain speed...