Matthews v. Morales
| Decision Date | 21 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-4907,93-4907 |
| Citation | 23 F.3d 118 |
| Parties | Kevin Deon MATTHEWS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dan MORALES, Attorney General of the State of Texas, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Kevin Deon Matthew, pro se.
Theresa Ann Kraatz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dan Morales, Atty. Gen., Austin, TX, for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
Before WISDOM, DAVIS and DUHE, Circuit Judges.
Kevin Deon Matthews appeals the district court's dismissal of his suit alleging that Sec. 32.22 of the Texas Family Code violates his free exercise of religion. Because we find that Sec. 32.22 is logically connected to legitimate state penological concerns, we affirm.
Kevin Deon Matthews, an inmate incarcerated in the Texas state penitentiary, filed a pro se civil rights suit in federal district court. He argues that Sec. 32.22 of the Texas Family Code 1 infringes his freedom of religion, equal protection and due process by restricting his ability to change his name. Matthews is an African-American Muslim and contends that:
according to the Muslim religion, once you come under the Islamic faith, you are required to have your name changed. The reason you have your name changed is because it ties you into the "attributes of God." It's symbolic of a spiritual change. If I am unable to change my name, I am not practicing my religion freely.
Matthews sought the grant of a petition for name change, and declaratory and injunctive relief.
Morales filed a motion to dismiss. The magistrate judge determined that the statute was religiously neutral and not directed at any particular religious group. He concluded that the statute was enacted for security reasons, namely so that a felon could not change his name and evade detection and to preserve a felon's criminal history. He concluded that Sec. 32.22 was not unconstitutional "even though it may incidentally burden plaintiff's right to freedom of religion." He also determined that Matthews failed to state a claim under equal protection or due process.
Although Matthews' motion to enlarge time to file written objections to the magistrate's report was granted, he failed to file objections. The district court issued a final judgment, adopting the magistrate's findings and recommendations, granting Morales' motion to dismiss.
Matthews argues that Sec. 32.22 is unconstitutional because it violates his right as a Muslim to the free exercise of religion. He also argues that the statute is overly broad.
Matthews relies on this circuit's decision in Felix v. Rolan, 833 F.2d 517 (5th Cir.1987), in which this court affirmed the district court's dismissal of a prisoner's Sec. 1983 complaint. We held that:
The adoption of Muslim names by inmates practicing that religion is generally recognized to be an exercise of both first amendment and religious freedom. Restrictions on these rights pass constitutional muster only if they are no greater than is necessary to further important or substantial state interests.
Id. at 518-519 (citations omitted). This court went on to determine that the state's legitimate interest of prison security justified requiring the prisoner to sign in under both his committed name and his legal Muslim name. See, also, Barrett v. Virginia, 689 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.1982) ().
In Felix, this court determined that prison regulations implicating free exercise "pass[es] constitutional muster only if they are no greater than is necessary to further important or substantial state interests." However, in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2405, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), the Supreme Court held that "prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a 'reasonableness' test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights."
In O'Lone, prisoners claimed that regulations barring them from returning to the main prison building where Friday Jumu'ah services were being held violated their free exercise. The Court found that the policy was based on security because returning prisoners had to pass through the main gate, which was...
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Caffey v. Johnson, 1:94-CV-98.
..."pass muster only if they are no greater than necessary to further important or substantial state interests." Matthews v. Morales, 23 F.3d 118, 119 (5th Cir.1994) (Texas prison regulation requiring Muslim inmates to sign legal names furthered a legitimate state interest and did not unnecess......
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Malik v. Brown
...prisoners' religiously motivated name changes when prison officials' conduct at issue in this case occurred. See Matthews v. Morales, 23 F.3d 118, 119 (5th Cir.1994) (declining to rely on Felix because of new test announced in O'Lone, and holding that under the new O'Lone test, prisoner's r......
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Williams v. Collier
...logical connection to a legitimate governmental interest and does not violate an inmate's free exercise of religion. Matthews v. Morales, 23 F.3d 118, 119-20 (5th Cir. 1994). As such, Plaintiff's First Amendment claims are frivolous and should be dismissed. 2. RLUIPA Plaintiff also alleges ......
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Chriceol v. Phillips
...regulations rationally related to penological goals and did not violate prisoner's right to exercise his religion); Matthews v. Morales, 23 F.3d 118 (5th Cir.1994) (statute prohibiting inmate from changing his name had logical connection to legitimate government interest and did not violate......