Matthews v. NAGY BROS. CONST. CO., INC.
Decision Date | 10 May 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 24560.,24560. |
Citation | 88 Conn.App. 787,871 A.2d 1067 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Marilyn S. MATTHEWS v. NAGY BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. |
Paul E. Pollock, Bridgeport, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Kevin J. Gumpper, Fairfield, with whom was Dirk D. Bender, for the appellee (defendant).
LAVERY, C.J., and McLACHLAN and HENNESSY, Js.
This appeal involves a boundary dispute between two landowners. The plaintiff, Marilyn S. Matthews, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a trial to the court, in this action to quiet title to certain real property located on Bryan Lane in Newtown. The court quieted title to the disputed area in the defendant, Nagy Brothers Construction Company, Inc. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the judgment was void because she had revoked her waiver of the 120 day time limit set forth in General Statutes § 51-183b and had filed a motion for a mistrial before the judgment was rendered and (2) the judgment was not supported by the evidence. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The plaintiff brought this action to quiet title claiming title to approximately seven and one-half acres of undeveloped, wooded land. The defendant filed an answer, three special defenses and a counterclaim.1 The case was tried to the court on August 2, August 6 and October 22, 2001. Pursuant to § 51-183b, both parties unconditionally waived the 120 day time limit for the rendering of a decision. The parties sent a letter dated August 9, 2002, to the court regarding the fact that a decision had not been rendered. In November, 2002, the parties sent a letter to the administrative judge for the judicial district of Danbury, asking him if the parties could do anything to bring the case to judgment. On January 23, 2003, the plaintiff filed a "Revocation of Waiver" and a motion for a mistrial. The defendant filed an objection to the motion. Neither the motion nor the objection was ruled on. The plaintiff sent another letter to the administrative judge, dated July 25, 2003, in which she discussed the situation and asked for a resolution of the case. On August 12, 2003, the court issued its memorandum of decision. The court ruled in favor of the defendant on the complaint and on the counterclaim and quieted title to the disputed land in the defendant. This appeal followed.
The plaintiff first claims that the judgment is void because she had revoked her waiver of the 120 day time limit of § 51-183b and had filed a motion for a mistrial before the court rendered judgment. Section 51-183b provides: (Emphasis added.) Waiver of this statute may be made by express consent or consent may be implied. See Gordon v. Feldman, 164 Conn. 554, 556-57, 325 A.2d 247 (1973). In this case, both parties expressly and unconditionally waived the time limitation. On January 23, 2003, the plaintiff attempted to revoke her waiver and filed a motion for a mistrial. The plaintiff maintains that her revocation of the waiver deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the action.
The plaintiff's argument relies on Waterman v. United Caribbean, Inc., 215 Conn. 688, 692-94, 577 A.2d 1047 (1990), in which our Supreme Court stated that a party can waive or refuse to waive the 120 day time limit and that a party can revoke a refusal to waive the statutory limit at any time before, but not after, the judgment is rendered. The plaintiff contends that if a party can revoke a refusal to waive her right to obtain a judgment within 120 days from the date of the trial, then a party also must be able to revoke a waiver of the same right. We disagree. A party that refuses to waive the time limit requirement has retained the right to obtain a judgment within 120 days from the date of the trial, a right that she can later relinquish through a waiver. In this case, the plaintiff's waiver constituted a relinquishment of the right to a timely judgment, and as a general rule, once a right is waived, it cannot be regained.
(Emphasis added.) 92 C.J.S. 1069, Waiver (1955); see also First Hartford Realty Corp. v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 165 Conn. 533, 540, 338 A.2d 490 (1973) ( ).
This rule is similarly expressed in 28 Am.Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 156 (1966), which states in relevant part: (Emphasis added.) See also Hendsey v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 128 Conn. 132, 135, 20 A.2d 722 (1941) ( . Therefore, as a general rule, a waiver cannot be revoked, except when all parties agree that it should be. Here, the parties had waived their right to a judgment within a specified time frame, and the defendant objected to the plaintiff's revocation of that waiver. Thus, the waiver remained in effect, and the court retained subject matter jurisdiction over the action.
The plaintiff contends that this rule frustrates the public policy behind § 51-183b. (Citations omitted.) Gordon v. Feldman, supra, 164 Conn. at 556-57, 325 A.2d 247. Although the plaintiff may be correct that the unfettered amount of time that a waiver gives to a court in which to render judgment can be abused and, therefore, can frustrate the public policy underlying § 51-183b, revising the statute must be done by the legislature, not by this court. See State v. Hanson, 210 Conn. 519, 529, 556 A.2d 1007 (1989) (...
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