State v. Hanson

• Decision Date: 28 March 1989
• Docket Number: No. 13264,13264
• Citation: 556 A.2d 1007,210 Conn. 519
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Gary L. HANSON.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 1007

556 A.2d 1007

210 Conn. 519

STATE of Connecticut v. Gary L. HANSON.

No. 13264.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 14, 1988.

Decided March 28, 1989.

Vincent J. Giedraitis, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Harry Weller, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Donald Caldwell, State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, CALLAHAN, HULL and SANTANIELLO, JJ.

SANTANIELLO, Justice.

The defendant was found guilty of the crime of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111. ¹ Upon conviction, he was sentenced to a definite term in prison and transferred to the Whiting Forensic Institute, the trial court having found that the defendant was mentally ill and dangerous to himself and others. After commitment and confinement from January 9, 1985, to January 7, 1986, the defendant was presented in court, in accordance with General Statutes § 17-251(b), ² to determine whether he was eligible for discharge from Whiting and to determine his disposition if discharged. As a consequence, he was returned to the custody of the commissioner of correction to serve the balance of his sentence.

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court, Kelly, J., erred in determining that it had no discretion to release the defendant from incarceration pursuant to § 17-251. The Appellate Court concluded, however, that the trial court had no discretion to release the defendant because he was not otherwise eligible for release under the penal code. State v. Hanson, 12 Conn.App. 32, 45, 529 A.2d 720 (1987). This court granted the defendant's petition for certification to determine whether the Appellate Court erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court. We reverse the decision of the Appellate Court and remand the case with direction.

Although the facts that the trial court could reasonably have found are set forth in State v. Hanson, supra, we summarize those facts pertinent to the issues in this appeal. The defendant was charged with two counts of attempted murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-54a and 53a-49 and one count of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111. He was tried to the court, Hale, J., and acquitted of the two counts of attempted murder, but found guilty of the count of arson in the first degree. During the course of the trial, the court heard psychiatric testimony from two physicians regarding the defendant's mental state. On January 9, 1985, after considering a report from the Whiting Forensic Institute, the testimony presented and the arguments of both counsel, the trial court sentenced the defendant to the custody of the commissioner of correction for a term of fifteen years. Because the court also found that Hanson was dangerous to himself and to others, it ordered him confined to the Whiting Forensic Institute for custody, care and treatment in accordance with General Statutes § 17-245. ³ The court stated: "If the Director should find that the defendant is sufficiently improved to be discharged from the institute, it is the strong recommendation to the Court hearing the matter under [General Statutes § 17-251] that the defendant serve at least a portion of this sentence."

On January 7, 1989, the defendant appeared before the trial court, pursuant to General Statutes § 17-251 and asked the court to enter an order transferring him to another institution, such as Connecticut Valley Hospital, or in the alternative to heed Judge Hale's recommendation at sentencing and require him to serve some lesser portion of his fifteen year sentence. Judge Kelly, however, discharged the defendant from Whiting and transferred him to the commissioner of correction to serve the remainder of his fifteen year sentence, stating that he could not resentence the defendant because "[h]e has already been sentenced." The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court claiming that the trial court erred in finding that it lacked the authority to release the defendant before he was eligible for release under his original fifteen year sentence. The Appellate Court sustained the trial court ruling and concluded that the trial court had no discretion to release the defendant because he was not otherwise eligible for release under the penal code. State v. Hanson, supra, at 45, 529 A.2d 720.

The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the Appellate Court erred in concluding that in a proceeding pursuant to § 17-251, the court may not modify the sentence previously imposed if modification is otherwise prohibited under the penal code.

Under § 17-251(b), a hearing is held to determine whether a defendant who is confined to Whiting for psychiatric care under General Statutes §§ 17-244 ⁴ and 17-245 should be discharged from the institute. If the court determines that the patient should be discharged, it must then determine whether the patient should be released, granted parole or returned to the custody of the commissioner of correction. The Appellate Court concluded that the word "release" in § 17-251(b) was to be read in conjunction with its use in the penal code, and therefore "to vest the court with discretion, upon its determination that the defendant should be discharged from the institute, to modify the original sentence of the defendant if he would otherwise be eligible for release under the penal code." State v. Hanson, supra, at 45, 529 A.2d 720. The Appellate Court upheld the denial of relief to the defendant under § 17-251(b) by concluding that the defendant was ineligible for release under the penal code for two reasons. We find error in both reasons offered by the Appellate Court and disagree in its reading of the word "release" in § 17-251(b).

The first ground relied upon by the Appellate Court was that the defendant's conviction of a class A felony made him ineligible for conditional or unconditional release under General Statutes §§ 53a-28 ⁵ and 53a-29. ⁶ The Appellate Court did not consider the possibility of a suspended sentence and probation, apparently assuming that such a sentence would be contrary to General Statutes §§ 53a-35a ⁷ and 53a-29(a). This court, however, in State v. O'Neill, 200 Conn. 268, 511 A.2d 321 (1986), held that a sentencing court has discretion to enter a suspended sentence for a first degree arson conviction. In O'Neill, we found that the trial court's failure to exercise its discretion to consider any suspension of a sentence for first degree arson was a violation of the defendant's equal protection rights. ⁸ Because the defendant was convicted for first degree arson, he could have received a suspended sentence. Therefore, the Appellate Court erred in concluding that General Statutes §§ 53a-28 and 53a-29 prohibited the defendant's release under § 17-251(b).

The second ground relied upon by the Appellate Court was that General Statutes § 53a-39 ⁹ prohibits the early release of a defendant who has been sentenced to a definite term exceeding three years. Noting that the defendant had been convicted and sentenced under the penal code to a definite sentence of fifteen years, the Appellate Court concluded that the defendant was therefore ineligible for discharge or intensive probation under § 53a-39. While the Appellate Court accepted that the court could grant parole to an eligible defendant, or order him to be returned to the custody of the commissioner of correction pursuant to § 17-251(b), it concluded that the word "release" in the statute must be construed in accordance with the statutes regarding sentencing and punishment, for "[t]o hold otherwise would lead to the bizarre and irrational result that persons who are criminally responsible for their actions, who have been convicted and sentenced and who would not be otherwise eligible for discharge from the custody of the commissioner of correction, might serve only six months in a psychiatric institute, and then upon reexamination and a hearing, be released from any further confinement." State v. Hanson, supra, 12 Conn.App. at 46, 529 A.2d 720. The Appellate Court concluded, therefore, that § 53a-39 served to limit the discretion of the trial court to order release under § 17-251(b).

We find our decision in Murray v. Lopes, 205 Conn. 27, 529 A.2d 1302 (1987), dispositive on the issue of the correct interpretation of the word "release" in § 17-251(b). While Murray v. Lopes dealt with the application of statutory sentence reduction credit to individuals sentenced and confined at Whiting for custody, care and treatment pursuant to General Statutes § 17-245(c), we noted that "the benefit of early release under § 17-251 is in addition to, not in lieu of, the statutory sentence reduction credit that automatically accrues to all prisoners," and "the fact that there are two different statutory release systems does not compel the conclusion that they are inconsistent or conflict with each other." (Emphasis added.) Murray v. Lopes, supra, 205 Conn. at 35-36, 529 A.2d 1302. The possibility of release through sentence modification under § 53a-39 is distinct from the possibility of release under § 17-251(b). Although both statutes operate similarly by giving the court discretion to order release, they are different mechanisms for release.

The word "release" as used in § 17-251(b) is clear and unambiguous. To find support for the Appellate Court's position, this court would have to ignore its previous decisions that have held that if the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts cannot, by construction, read into statutes provisions that are not clearly stated. See State v. James, 197 Conn. 358, 363, 497 A.2d 402 (1985); Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 314, 493 A.2d 846 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063, 106 S.Ct. 813, 88 L.Ed.2d 787 (1986); Moscone v. Manson, 185 Conn. 124, 128, 440 A.2d 848 (1981).

We acknowledge the Appellate Court's concern that reading "rel...