Mattson v. American Petroleum Environmental Services, Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | 43735-0-II |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | RAYNA MATTSON, Appellant, v. AMERICAN PETROLEUM ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC.; BERND STADTHERR and JANE DOE STADTHERR, Respondents. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Rayna Mattson sued American Petroleum Environmental Services (APES) and Bernd Stadtherr, an APES employee, claiming that they negligently caused her car accident by spilling oil on an interstate freeway. Ultimately, a jury found no negligence by Stadtherr or APES. Mattson appeals, arguing (1) that the trial court erred in denying her motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on liability because there was "undisputed" evidence as to APES's negligence and (2) mat other irregularities require a new trial including (a) the trial court's refusal to apply res judicata or various forms of estoppel to prevent APES from litigating causation during the trial on APES's and Stadtherr's liability, (b) multiple instructional errors (c) misconduct by APES's counsel, (d) juror misconduct and (e) cumulative error. We disagree and affirm.
APES collects and reprocesses waste oil for reuse. Its operators, like Stadtherr, drive tanker trucks to sites where used oil is located, collect the oil, and then return it to APES's facility for recycling.
In July 2003, APES assigned Stadtherr to return a shipment of waste oil from Canada. Before setting out, Stadtherr followed his normal pre-trip routine and performed a federally mandated pre-trip inspection to ensure that everything on the truck was in proper working condition. As part of his inspection, Stadtherr verified that properly functioning bungee cords secured the vacuum hoses used to collect the oil in their housings.
After finishing his inspection, Stadtherr left APES's facility near the Port of Tacoma and proceeded north on Interstate .5 (1-5). Before Stadtherr reached Federal Way, he noticed that one of the vacuum hoses had come loose and was dragging behind the truck. The hose had not dragged for very long; truck drivers must check their rear view mirrors every 15 to 20 seconds and Stadtherr had not seen the hose in his last check in the mirror. Stadtherr pulled over to the side of the road and discovered that contact with the road and the truck's tires had split the hose open.
Mattson was also driving northbound on 1-5 just after Stadtherr. A slick substance on the freeway caused Mattson's tires to lose their grip, and she lost control of her car. She spun around several times, careened off the interstate, and rolled down the embankment at the side of the road, flipping several times before stopping.
A Washington State Patrol trooper responded to the scene of Mattson's accident and noticed a significant amount of liquid on the roadway. The trooper summoned the Department of Transportation to clean up the slick, which was made of a "slippery kind of substance" and extended "[m]ore than a football field" on 1-5. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1572, 1578. The trooper also summoned another state patrol unit to contact Stadtherr, who had stopped his truck on the side of the road a short distance away, on the assumption that Stadtherr's truck had a connection to the accident. The troopers later cited Stadtherr for causing the accident.
Mattson sued APES and Stadtherr and his marital community, alleging that they had negligently allowed oil to spill onto the freeway, causing the accident and her resulting injuries.
The parties exchanged cross motions for summary judgment before trial. Mattson first sought judgment that APES and Stadtherr had negligently caused her accident. Mattson's second motion sought judgment that her accident had proximately caused her injuries and that her claims of damages from those injuries were reasonable. APES sought summary judgment on the ground that it had not breached its duty of care. For purposes of deciding these various motions, APES asked the court to consider as true Mattson's argument that APES had spilled the oil that caused her accident.
The trial court granted Mattson's motions for summary judgment. The court found APES and Stadtherr jointly and severally liable for the automobile accident based on common law negligence and for all Mattson's injuries proximately caused "by the accident. The trial court also found that the collision caused Mattson's injuries, that she bore no comparative fault for the accident, and that her damages claims were reasonable. The trial court ordered a trial "solely on the issue of the nature and extent of the damages proximately caused to the Plaintiff as a result of the Defendants' negligence" and instructed the jury that, regardless of their verdict on other damages, the court had determined she had suffered $109, 645.40 in medical costs, lost wages, and other expenses. CP at 570, 574. After the. trial on damages, the jury returned a verdict for Mattson in excess of $500, 000.00.
APES appealed. It assigned error to the trial court's order "granting Respondent Rayna Mattson's motion for partial summary judgment on liability." CP at 671. APES contended that "material issues of fact remain regarding APES's negligence and the proximate cause of this accident" and that the trial court erred by determining that APES was negligent under traditional or res ipsa loquitor theories of negligence. CP at 671.
On appeal, we agreed with APES and reversed summary judgment on liability, "because ... genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether [APES and Stadtherr] breached a duty of care and, if so, whether that breach proximately caused the accident." CP at 589.. Consequently, we remanded for trial on the issue of APES's and Stadtherr's liability.
On remand, the parties tried the issue of liability before a jury.[1] The jury found that APES and Stadtherr had not acted negligently and therefore returned no verdict with regard to causation. Mattson sought post-verdict relief, including judgment as a matter of law under CR 50 and the grant of a new trial under CR 59, but the trial court denied these motions. Mattson now appeals.
At the close of evidence and after the verdict, Mattson moved for judgment as a matter of law and, alternatively, for a new trial, based on the "unrebutted and undisputed evidence [of APES's and Stadtherr's negligence]... presented at [the] time of trial." Br. of Appellant at 48; CP at 2595-2606, 2716-62. The trial court denied these motions.[2] Despite Mattson's characterization, the record contains conflicting evidence that created material issues of fact. Consequently, the trial court did not err when it sent the negligence question to the jury and denied Mattson's post-verdict motions for relief.
We review de novo a trial court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law under CR 50. Davis v. Microsoft Corp., 149 Wn.2d 521, 530-31, 70 P.3d 126 (2003). Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if, after '"viewing the evidence most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court can say, as a matter of law, there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inference to sustain a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Davis, 149 Wn.2d at 531 (quoting Sing v. John L. Scott, Inc., 134 Wn.2d 24, 29, 948 P.2d 816 (1997)). Mattson must • accept as true all evidence APES offered and any inferences reasonably drawn from that evidence for purposes of searching for this substantial supporting evidence. Goodman v. Goodman, 128 Wn.2d 366, 371, 907 P.2d 290 (1995). Substantial evidence in support of the jury's verdict is "evidence 'sufficient... to persuade a fair-minded, rational person'" that APES and Stadtherr did not breach their duty of care. Davis, 149 Wn.2d at 531 (quoting Helman v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 62 Wn.2d 136, 147, 381 P.2d 605 (1963)) (alteration in original).
We review a trial court's decision to deny a motion for a new trial under CR 59(a) for an abuse of discretion. Brundridge v. Fluor Fed. Servs., Inc., 164 Wn.2d 432, 454, 191 P.3d 879 (2008). A trial court abuses its discretion if it denies a motion for a new trial where the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the verdict. Palmer v. Jensen, 132 Wn.2d 193, 197-98, 937 P.2d 597 (1997). We again considerthe facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party when reviewing the record for substantial evidence to support a trial court's decision on a CR 59 motion for a new trial. Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wn.2d 251, 271-72, 830 P.2d 646 (1992).
A person acts negligently by failing "to exercise such care as a reasonable person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances." Mathis v. Ammon, 84 Wn.App. 411, 416, 928 P.2d 431 (1997). To prove negligence, a plaintiff must show the existence of a legal duty to exercise ordinary care, breach of that duty, and that the breach proximately caused damages to the plaintiff. Mathis, 84 Wn.App. at 415-16. A duty of care may exist by virtue of the common law or a statute. Mathis, 84 Wn.App. at 416-17.
To continue reading
Request your trial