Matysyuk v. Pantyukhin

• Citation: 595 S.W.3d 543
• Decision Date: 25 February 2020
• Docket Number: WD 82414
• Parties: Yuriy MATYSYUK, Appellant, v. Viktor PANTYUKHIN and Lyubov Pantyukhin, Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

595 S.W.3d 543

Yuriy MATYSYUK, Appellant,

v.Viktor PANTYUKHIN and Lyubov Pantyukhin, Respondents.

WD 82414

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Filed: February 25, 2020

Matthew B. Uhrig, Ashland for appellant.

Bradley R. Hansmann, St. Louis for respondent.

Before Division Three: Lisa White Hardwick, P.J., and Alok Ahuja and Anthony Rex Gabbert, JJ.

Alok Ahuja, Judge

Yuriy Matysyuk was injured in an automobile accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by Igor Pantyukhin.¹ The vehicle was owned by Igor’s father. Matysyuk sued Igor’s parents, Viktor and Lyubov Pantyukhin (collectively, the "Pantyukhins") in the Circuit Court of Pettis County, alleging that they had negligently entrusted the accident vehicle to their son. The circuit court granted the Pantyukhins’ motion for summary judgment. It found that the uncontroverted facts failed to establish that Igor was incompetent to drive due to habitual recklessness, and that Matysyuk would therefore not be able to prove an essential element of his negligent entrustment claim. Matysyuk appeals. He argues that the circuit court should have stayed proceedings on the Pantyukhins’ summary judgment motion to permit him to conduct further discovery, and that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Igor was incompetent to drive. We affirm.

Factual Background

On October 7, 2014, Igor was driving Matysyuk, his co-employee, to the jobsite of a pipeline project in Muskingum County in central Ohio, on which they were both working for their employer, ProEnergy Services. Igor was driving a 1999 Honda Accord owned by his father Viktor Pantyukhin. On the way to the jobsite, Igor drove off the right side of the roadway while attempting to negotiate a left-hand curve. The vehicle struck a tree. Matysyuk was seriously injured in the accident, was hospitalized for several weeks, and incurred medical expenses exceeding $400,000. Igor was issued a citation for failure to control his vehicle. He pleaded guilty to the offense, and was assessed fines and court costs totaling $120.

Igor was twenty years old at the time of the 2014 accident. He was residing at home in Sedalia with his parents, the Pantyukhins, at the time.

Igor had been involved in a prior car accident in September 2011, when he was seventeen years old, and three years prior to the accident involving Matysyuk. In the 2011 incident, Igor failed to stop at a stop sign and collided with another vehicle which was traveling on a cross-street. The driver of the other vehicle and two passengers in Igor’s vehicle were injured. Igor was driving a 2000 Suzuki Swift owned by Viktor Pantyukhin in the 2011 accident. In connection with the 2011 accident, Igor was cited for failure to yield, and for failing to properly secure a minor passenger.

Igor had one other motor-vehicle-related citation prior to the 2014 accident involving Matysyuk. In June 2012, Igor pleaded guilty to failing to wear a seatbelt and for failing to secure two minor children in seatbelts.

On September 26, 2014, Igor was listed as an "Excluded Driver" in the automobile insurance policy purchased by the Pantyukhins to insure the 1999 Honda Accord. Although Matysyuk’s Brief contends that Igor was excluded from the policy because he had become "too costly to insure" and was "an unreasonable risk," nothing in the record suggests any reason for Igor’s exclusion from the Pantyukhins’ automobile insurance policy. There is also no support in the record for the assertion (made for the first time in the "Conclusion" of Matysyuk’s Brief) that the Pantyukhins’ were "told by the insurance agent not to let [Igor] drive their cars."

On September 12, 2016, Matysyuk filed a Petition against Igor, their joint employer, and the Pantyukhins. The petition alleged that the Pantyukhins negligently entrusted their 1999 Honda to Igor, when he was incompetent to drive it due to his habitual recklessness. The Petition also alleged a claim against the Pantyukhins for negligent supervision, although that claim is not at issue in this appeal.

On March 9, 2017, the Pantyukhins moved for summary judgment. They argued that Matysyuk could not establish a necessary element of his negligent entrustment claim: that Igor was incompetent to drive by reason of habitual recklessness.

On April 10, 2017, Matysyuk filed his response to the Pantyukhins’ motion. Matysyuk responded to the Pantyukhins’ statement of uncontroverted material facts, and alleged additional purportedly material facts. Matysyuk argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether Igor was a habitually reckless driver based on his 2011 accident, his 2012 citations, and his exclusion from the Pantyukhins’ automobile insurance policy. Matysyuk’s response did not contend that the Pantyukhins’ summary judgment motion was premature because he had propounded written discovery to which the Pantyukhins had not yet responded, or because he desired to take their depositions, or the depositions of other witnesses.

On April 24, 2017, the Pantyukhins filed a reply memorandum in support of their summary judgment motion, which responded to Matysyuk’s statement of additional facts.

Matysyuk filed a motion to strike some of the Pantyukhins’ responses to his statement of additional material facts; he also moved for leave to file a sur-reply memorandum. Once again, Matysyuk did not assert that proceedings on the Pantyukhins’ motion should be stayed to permit him to conduct additional discovery.

On May 18, 2017, the Pantyukhins noticed their summary judgment motion for hearing on July 17, 2017. At the conclusion of the July 17 hearing, the circuit court took the matter under advisement.

After the hearing concluded, Matysyuk filed a motion to stay proceedings on the Pantyukhins’ motion for summary judgment pending further discovery. In his motion, Matysyuk noted that the circuit court had asked during the July 17 hearing "why proceedings on the Motion for Summary Judgment had not been stayed." Matysyuk noted that besides his first round of interrogatories, no other discovery had been conducted between the parties. He requested that, before the court ruled on the summary judgment motion, he be permitted to depose the Pantyukhins, Igor, and the Pantyukhins’ insurance agent to learn why Igor was excluded from the Pantyukhins’ automobile insurance policy.

After conducting a further hearing, the circuit court denied Matysyuk’s motion for stay on July 20, 2017.

On August 2, 2017, the circuit court granted the Pantyukhins’ motion for summary judgment. In its judgment, the circuit court stated that the record showed that "Igor has had one accident prior to the fateful one in the present case." The court found that "[t]his [one accident] is not sufficient to establish habitual recklessness," as required to support a negligent entrustment claim against his parents. The judgment also found (in a ruling not challenged here) that the Pantyukhins were entitled to summary judgment on Matysyuk’s negligent supervision claim.

Matysyuk later voluntarily dismissed his claims against Igor, and against their employer, with prejudice. Matysyuk then filed this appeal.

Analysis

I.

We examine Matysyuk’s Points in reverse order. In his second Point, Matysyuk argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to stay proceedings on the Pantyukhins’ motion for summary judgment.

"The trial court has discretion to grant or deny additional time to conduct discovery before ruling on a pending summary judgment motion." Brooks v. City of Sugar Creek , 340 S.W.3d 201, 209 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (citation omitted). "A trial court abuses its discretion only when its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration." Holm v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. , 514 S.W.3d 590, 596 (Mo. 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Under Rule 74.04(b), a party defending a claim may move for summary judgment "[a]t any time." See also Farrow v. Saint Francis Med. Ctr. , 407 S.W.3d 579, 587 n.4 (Mo. 2013). "When a motion for summary judgment is filed, the party against whom it is directed may not stand idly by doing nothing." Duncan v. Dempsey , 547 S.W.3d 815, 821 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If the non-movant wishes to conduct further discovery before the court rules on the summary judgment motion, it may move for a continuance under Rule 74.04(f). Rule 74.04(f) provides:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that for reasons stated in the affidavits facts essential to justify opposition to the motion cannot be presented in the affidavits, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.

"Rule 74.04(f) allows the trial court to postpone any ruling on a pending summary judgment motion to accommodate further discovery." Brooks , 340 S.W.3d at 209 (footnote omitted).

The Pantyukhins moved for summary judgment on Matysyuk’s negligent entrustment claim on March 9, 2017. Instead of filing a motion for a continuance under Rule 74.04(f) so that he could conduct further discovery, Matysyuk responded to the Pantyukhins’ motion on the merits on April 10, 2017. In his response, Matysyuk alleged additional facts, which he argued created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Igor was incompetent to drive. Matysyuk’s opposition to the summary judgment motion relied on the discovery which had been completed to date. The Pantyukhins filed a reply memorandum, and Matysyuk then filed a motion to strike some of the Pantyukhins’ responses to his additional facts, and a motion requesting leave to file a sur-reply to correct one of his additional facts. After the parties completed their motions practice, the...