Mau v. Stoner

• Decision Date: 25 April 1904
• Citation: 12 Wyo. 478,76 P. 584
• Parties: MAU v. STONER ET AL
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

76 P. 584

12 Wyo. 478

MAU v. STONER ET AL

Supreme Court of Wyoming

April 25, 1904

ERROR to the District Court, Uinta County, HON. RICHARD H. SCOTT Judge of the First Judicial District, presiding.

Frank A. Mau was proceeded against for contempt in interfering with a water distributer appointed in a proceeding pending in the District Court of Uinta County. Process for his arrest was issued by the District Court Commissioner, before whom he was brought and tried, and by whom he was adjudged guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of $ 25. On review of the commissioner's proceedings, the court approved them, and expressly adjudged the respondent guilty and ordered him to pay a fine of $ 25. The respondent complained on error of the said judgment. The other material facts are stated in the opinion.

Reversed.

J. H Ryckman, for plaintiff in error.

The District Court Commissioner has no power to punish for contempt except as conferred by statute, and the only authority is contained in subdivision 7, Section 3334 Revised Statutes. That authority is confined to contempts committed in the presence of the commissioner. (Const., Art. 5, Sec. 2; R. S., Sec. 3329 et seq.; In re Remington, 7 Wis., 541; Haight v. Lucia, 36 Wis. 355.) Courts created by the Legislature, or whose duties are to be prescribed by the Legislature under the constitution, have such powers only as are especially given them. (Stuart v. People, 3 Ill., 395; State v. Galloway, 5 Cold., 326; Rutherford v. Holmes, 66 N.Y. 372; Newton v. Lacklin, 77 Ill. 103; Morrison v. McDonald, 21 Me. 555; Brooker v. Co., 12 S. & R., 175; Piper v. Pearson, 61 Am. Dec., 442; Clark v. People, 12 id., 175.)

A contempt of court is of a criminal nature and must be governed by the rules of construction applicable to criminal cases. The purpose of the proceeding is to vindicate the authority and dignity of the court, and hence jurisdiction must be clear. (Kirk v. Milwaukee D. Co., 26 F. 501; Ex parte Edwards, 11 Fla. 184; Ex parte Hickey, 4 Sm. & M., 751; Ex parte Schenck, 65 N. Car., 353; Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall., 510; 3 Phil. Ev., 987; Townshend v. Brooke, 9 Gill., 90; State v. Warren, 28 Md. 338; Snyder's App., 36 Pa. St., 166.) If the District Court Commissioner had no jurisdiction then the District Court was without power to approve the proceedings. (Gregory v. Williams, 24 Ark. 177; Thompson v. Colony, 6 Vt., 91; Breckinridge v. Johnson, 57 Miss. 371; Haight v. Lucia, supra.)

The constitution does not vest the commissioner with any judicial power; it designates the courts in which shall be vested the judicial power of the State. (Const., Art. 5, Sec. 1.) District Court Commissioner is not there named. The Legislature, under the power given by Section 14, Article 5, of the constitution, made provision for the appointment of District Court Commissioners, giving them authority to perform certain chamber business and certain other duties. Their judicial powers are all conferred by act of the Legislature. Such a court, therefore, is not a constitutional court in the sense that its powers may not be limited by the Legislature. (Hovey v. Elliott, 39 N. E., 841.) But if the Commissioner's Court be called a constitutional court the commissioner was not empowered to make the order complained of in the case at bar, for the reason that the District Judge has no power to punish for contempt in chambers. (4 Ency. Pl. & Pr., 340, and cases cited; R. R. Co. v. Sloan, 31 O. St., 1; In re Remington, 7 Wis., 643.) There must be express authority of law to authorize the transaction of any judicial business in chambers, and no authority for the District Judge to try a contempt case in chambers exists. (R. S., Secs. 3610-3612; Sess. Laws 1901, p. 27; 4 Ency. Pl. & Pr., 337.) Contempt statutes must be strictly construed. (4 Ency. Pl. & Pr., 77; Batchelder v. Moore, 42 Cal. 412; In re Shannon, 11 Mont. 67.) A decree not within the powers granted to the court, although it has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter, is void. (U. S. v. Walker, 109 U.S. 258; Morrill v. Morrill, 11 L. R. A., 155, note.)

The commissioner was personally disqualified in this cause for the reason that he had been engaged as attorney for one of the parties and had given advice in reference to the subject matter of the suit. (R. S., Sec. 3139; Tootle v. Berkley, 56 P. 755; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 Comst., 547; Ins. Co. v. Price, 1 Hopk.'s Ch., 1; Garrett v. Gaines, 6 Tex., 435; Adams v. Minor, 53 P. 815; Meyer v. San Diego, id., 434; Moses v. Julian, 45 N. H., 52; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall., 388; Brown v. Byrne, Walker's Ch., 453; Heyn v. Farrar, 36 Mich. 258; Cooley's Const. Lim., 517; 1 Bl. Com., 91; Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 340; R. R. Co. v. Summers, 113 Ind. 10.)

When the plaintiff in error filed his affidavit alleging bias and prejudice of the Court Commissioner, the latter lost his jurisdiction. The statute is mandatory and left nothing to discretion. (Perkins v. McDowell, 19 P. 440; Barnes v. McMullins, 7 Mo., 260; Carpenny v. Sedalia, 57 Mo. 88; Runals v. Brown, 11 Wis. 185; People v. Compton, 123 Cal. 403; Paul v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 221; Ross v. State, 57 P. 924; McGoon v. Little, 7 Ill., 42; Sumner County v. Wellington, 39 Kan. 137; Gordon v. Conner, 51 P. 747; McGregor v. Crane, 98 Mass. 530; Richardson v. Welcome, 6 Cush., 332; Frevert v. Swift, 19 Nev. 363.)

John C. Hamm, for defendants in error.

District Court Commissioners are creatures of the constitution; and the Legislature is empowered to provide for their appointment. The constitution directs what their primary functions shall be. (Const., Art. 5, Sec. 14.) In providing for the appointment the Legislature designated certain powers, authorizing the commissioner to make any order which a Judge is authorized by law to make in chambers during the absence or disqualification of such Judge. (R. S., Sec. 3334.) The Commissioner's Court being a creature of the constitution, it cannot by legislative enactment be shorn of its inherent right to punish for contempt, although the Legislature may regulate the exercise of the power. (7 Ency. Law, 3233.)

POTTER, JUSTICE. CORN, C. J., and KNIGHT, J., concur.

OPINION

POTTER, JUSTICE.

Upon a petition filed in the District Court of Uinta County by the defendants in error for the appointment of some suitable person to distribute the water from an irrigating ditch alleged to be the joint ditch of the defendants and plaintiff in error, one H. J. Somsen was appointed by the District Court Commissioner to distribute the water in said ditch. Thereafter an affidavit of said Somsen was filed in said court, setting forth that the plaintiff in error had interfered with his discharge of the duties imposed upon him by the order of the Court Commissioner. Thereupon said Court Commissioner ordered that an attachment issue commanding the Sheriff to arrest the plaintiff in error and bring him before the commissioner at a time stated in the order, then and there to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court. The writ issued, and the Sheriff thereon arrested the plaintiff and brought him into the presence of the commissioner. A hearing was had, testimony taken, and the commissioner entered an order finding the plaintiff in error guilty of a wilful and intentional violation of the order of the court and of interfering with said water distributer in the performance of his duties, and adjudging that he be fined in the sum of twenty-five dollars and costs of the proceeding, but suspended execution until the proceedings could be submitted to the proper Judge for confirmation, if the same be necessary, or until the further order of the court.

The proceedings were thereafter brought before the District Judge, and submitted before him "upon the testimony, pleadings, affidavits, filings and findings of the Court Commissioner," whereupon the proceedings and findings of the commissioner were approved; and the court, upon the evidence, found and adjudged that the plaintiff in error had wilfully, intentionally and contumaciously interfered with an officer of the court, viz: said Somsen, who had been duly appointed to divide and distribute the water in the irrigating ditch aforesaid, and said plaintiff in error was ordered to pay a fine of twenty-five dollars and the costs of the proceeding, and execution therefor was awarded. The plaintiff in error complains in this proceeding in error of that judgment.

It is contended that the District Court Commissioner was without authority to entertain the contempt proceedings, or to make any orders or judgment therein, and that the alleged infirmity in the proceedings was not cured by an attempted approval thereof by the Judge or court, or the judgment thereon rendered adjudging guilt and imposing punishment.

It is also contended that the Court Commissioner was personally disqualified from acting by reason of his alleged professional relations to an action previously litigated between the parties. As to this point there is not sufficient proof, in our opinion, to sustain the charge, and it will not be further considered.

The chief contention that the judgment was rendered without any authority of law presents a serious question, and requires the most careful consideration. It may be conceded that the court would have had power to entertain and determine the proceedings, and, upon a trial of the accused before it, to have adjudged him guilty of a contempt and imposed a fine by way of punishment. But the important question is whether the commissioner possessed the power he assumed to exercise, and whether the subsequent action of the court or Judge cured the defect, if any, in the jurisdiction of the commissioner.

In the first place, we think it clear that the order of the court ...