Mauldin v. American Liberty Pipe Line Co.
Decision Date | 03 November 1944 |
Docket Number | No. 13537.,13537. |
Citation | 185 S.W.2d 158 |
Parties | MAULDIN et al. v. AMERICAN LIBERTY PIPE LINE CO. et al. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; Wm. M. Cramer, Judge.
Bill of review by H. C. Mauldin and another against American Liberty Pipe Line Company and others, to set aside a judgment, wherein F. A. Perrenot and others intervened and filed a cross-action adopting all allegations in plaintiffs' petition. From a judgment granting defendants' motion to dismiss, plaintiffs appeal.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
A. C. Scurlock, of Dallas, representing H. C. Mauldin and Buda Mauldin, appellants.
Lester Whipple, of San Antonio, representing Mary Perrenot et al., defendants claiming under F. G. Perrenot, deceased.
Watkins & Mays and Alvin H. Lane, all of Dallas, and William L. Evans, of Fort Worth, for appellees.
This suit is a bill of review to set aside by direct attack a judgment entered in a district court of Dallas County, Texas, on September 19, 1936; in alternative to recover certain proportional title and possession of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) interest in an oil and gas lease and profits therefrom; and, incidentally, to establish an accounting and an appointment of a receiver. This bill was originally instituted on January 17, 1939, by H. C. Mauldin and wife, Buda Mauldin, in collaboration with F. A. Perrenot, Lester Whipple, Fannie G. Morgan, Nancy Fritz Moon and husband, A. L. Moon, who were made defendants (afterward intervening), setting up their respective interests in the lease, and, in cross action, adopted all allegations in plaintiffs' petition. During the pendency of the suit, F. A. Perrenot died, and his heirs were substituted parties to the action. The defendants, Whipple, Morgan and the Moons, claim under assignments from Perrenot; the other defendants (appellees herein) claim under the judgment sought to be set aside. In limine, appellees filed motion to dismiss the bill, directing the motion to plaintiffs' pleadings as well as the pleadings of the intervening defendants claiming under Perrenot, alleging that all such pleadings are insufficient to set aside the judgment, and that the defendants (appellees), being the owners of the lease under regular chain of title, were entitled as a matter of law to have the judgment sustained. The court granted appellees' motion, dismissed the suit, and refused appellants' request to further amend their petition.
In sustaining motions to dismiss on demurrers or exceptions, the rule is settled in this state that pleadings are taken as true, except as they are negatived by the unquestioned records in prior suits, or by records of unquestioned facts of which the court may take judicial cognizance. Pleadings contrary to uncontroverted records are taken as mere conclusions of the pleader. Thus it will be seen that the question here presented for decision is whether all of appellants' and intervenors' allegations, when taken together and not negatived by uncontroverted records, state a cause of action. Before detailing plaintiffs' and intervenors' pleadings, the surrounding uncontroverted records pertaining to this controversy, and of which the trial court may well have taken judicial notice in passing on the motion to dismiss, should be related. Such records show:
In 1930, Mesdames Virginia Sanders, J. M. Stinnette and Geo. E. Light entered into a verbal agreement to purchase for their joint use and benefit the oil and gas lease involved in this suit; each agreeing to pay $50 on the purchase price and have an equal proportional interest therein; Mrs. Sanders was to negotiate and consummate the transaction, pay the purchase price, take title in her name as a matter of convenience, and, after the consummation, the two other ladies were to pay their proportionate part of the consideration. This agreement was carried out as contemplated, consideration paid as agreed, and title to the leasehold taken in name of Mrs. Sanders. At that time the real estate involved was in nonproducing oil territory of the afterwards known Great East Texas Oil Field, designated in the records as "wild cat".
On April 17, 1931, Mrs. Virginia Sanders, joined by her husband, J. A. Sanders, made and entered into a written agreement with F. A. Perrenot, H. C. Mauldin and wife, Buda Mauldin, for development of the leasehold for oil and gas. In that agreement Mrs. Sanders and her husband conveyed title in the lease to Perrenot and the Mauldins upon condition that the grantees would drill an oil well on the leasehold premises without cost or expense to the grantors; and, in event oil and gas, or either of them be produced therefrom in paying quantities, the grantees would pay to the grantors $15,000 in cash, payable out of one fourth (1/4) of the first proceeds of oil and gas produced and sold from the lease premises, and one half (1/2) of all other profits derived from the operation of all wells drilled on said lease. Perrenot and the Mauldins entered into this agreement with Sanders without knowing of any trust estate held by them for the use and benefit of Stinnette and Light. The importance of this conditional conveyance makes it advisable to quote its salient terms. This instrument evidences:
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