Maupin v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 April 1919
• Docket Number: No. 12991.,12991.
• Parties: MAUPIN et al. v. MISSOURI STATE LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

214 S.W. 398

MAUPIN et al. v. MISSOURI STATE LIFE INS. CO.

No. 12991.

Kansas City Court of Appeals, Missouri.

April 7, 1919.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Gentry County; William C. Ellison, Judge.

"Not to be officially published."

Bill by Ayers P. Maupin and others against the Missouri State Life Insurance Company. Decree for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Affirmed as modified.

Jones, Hocker, Sullivan & Angert, of St. Louis, and W. F. Dalbey, of Albany, for appellant.

J. W. Peery, of Albany, and J. W. Sullinger, of King City, for respondents.

ELLISON, P. J.

Defendant was formerly incorporated and known as the "Safety Fund Life Association," but afterwards was incorporated under the present designation "Missouri State Life Insurance Company." While doing business under the first name such company, on the 15th of April, 1896, issued its policy of insurance to plaintiff, the husband, for $1,000, payable at his death to plaintiff, the wife. Seven years thereafter, in April, 1903, after reincorporating under the present name, defendant sent its agent to the plaintiff husband, who induced him to surrender the first policy for another of like amount, issued by the present defendant, which called for 20 yearly premium payments of $35.80 each, the policy to become paid up in April, 1916.

This proceeding was begun by plaintiffs filing a bill in equity whereby, for reasons therein stated, they seek to cancel the second policy and to reinstate the first, and also to cancel a certain loan contract therein described. The decree in the trial court was in their favor.

In making this surrender of the first policy and accepting the second policy it appears that plaintiff, in addition to signing an application for the second policy, also signed what is called a "Certificate of Loan," in the sum of $181.49, with 6 per cent. interest, which was made a lien on the policy, and which, if not paid before plaintiff's death as therein provided, should be deducted from the amount of the policy at his death. Plaintiff charged that his signature to this certificate was obtained by" fraud and that he had not intentionally signed it; that, in fact, he never knew anything of such certificate until he afterwards learned it was in defendant's possession.

It was conclusively shown that defendant issued a circular letter and mailed one to plaintiff and to each of several others in the same community with like policies in the Safety Fund Life Association. It reads as follows:

"Dear Sir: This company has decided to allow you to exchange your Safety Fund Life Association Certificate No. 781 to one of its registered policies, giving you all the advantages of a level premium contract, and also credit for the time you have paid under the old certificate. These new policies have cash values and return 50 per cent. of all premiums paid, in addition to their face value, in case of death. Our manager of the exchange department, Mr. H. G. Parr, will be in your city on December 16th, 17th, and 18th at the office of Ben Kessler where we wish you to call on him and being your old certificate with you. He will fully explain the conditions of the old certificate to you as well as those of the new policy. Don't forget the date or the old policy."

It was also shown that on the day appointed defendant's agent met plaintiff and the exchange of policies was made. The testimony of plaintiff and of this agent cannot be reconciled in many particulars, but some conceded facts and many circumstances make clear to us that the trial court reached the right conclusion in holding with the plaintiff.

The agent made his appearance at the time and place stated in the letter, and though everything else connected with the matter was talked about, no mention was made that a loan was to be a feature in the transaction. It will be noticed that the letter is silent as to such obligation on plaintiff's part being a consideration for the exchange. It seems too clear for dispute that the letter was so framed as not to lead any one to suspect such an obligation was to be a part of the transaction.

It was shown that at the time the transaction was consummated by making the exchange the agent made no reference to such a paper as now turns out to be a loan certificate. It was printed on a slip of paper of the same size, shape, color, and type as the application. There was nothing to show that the two papers were not one and the same, except at the end of one on the margin, was the word "Application," and on the other "Certificate of Loan." Considering the general similar appearance of the two papers, these words at the end of each were calculated more to deceive than to enlighten.

The inducement held out for the exchange was that at that time the first policy had run for 7 years and it called for payments through life, while the one proposed to be substituted was a 20-payment plan, that is, on an annual payment of $35.80 for 20 years the second would be a paid-up policy; that the policy had a cash value and that one-half the premiums paid would be returned at death. In addition to this, credit was to be given to plaintiff for the 7 years the first policy had run, leaving only 13 future payments.

But this was not all. At the request of one of the other policy holders to whom we have referred, defendant furnished an "illustration" of the new policy as compared with the old, in a letter in which is set forth many supposed advantages in a new policy; but there is a total absence of any suggestion that it involved a loan to be paid by plaintiff.

The business was transacted at a table in a village store and defendant's agent handled all the papers. He made certain statements to plaintiff in urging the exchange. He so manipulated the papers and so conducted the negotiation that plaintiff never knowingly saw, and never heard of, a loan certificate. Indeed, the whole transaction is so like that detailed in Green v. Life Ins. Co., 159 Mo. App. 277, 140 S. W. 325, that they cannot be distinguished.

In this connection we may remark that defendant claims the Green Case is practically overruled in the later case of Miller v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 194 Mo. App. 265, 186 S. W. 762. This is a misapprehension. The Miller Case was one at law on the second policy, while the present is one in equity to cancel that policy. See opinion on rehearing in Miller Case, 194 Mo. App. 281, 186 S. W. 768.

Realizing the force of the case made by plaintiffs, defendant calls to its aid a rule allowed against a party seeking relief from a situation in which he finds himself placed by his own negligence. This phase of the case also...