Maupin v. Pulaski County Sheriff's Office

Decision Date16 February 2005
Docket NumberNo. CA 04-727.,CA 04-727.
Citation90 Ark. App. 1,203 S.W.3d 668
PartiesThomas MAUPIN v. PULASKI COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al.
CourtArkansas Court of Appeals

The Whetstone Law Firm, by: Kevin Mark Odum, Little Rock, for appellant.

Matthews, Sanders & Sayes, by: Gail O. Matthews, Little Rock, for appellees.

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Chief Judge.

The appellant in this workers' compensation case, a sheriff's deputy in Pulaski County, was injured in a traffic accident in Perry County while commuting to work. He filed a claim for benefits that was denied by the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission on the strength of its finding that appellant was not performing employment services when he was injured. On appeal, appellant contends that the Commission erred in determining that he was not carrying out his employer's purpose or advancing the employer's interests when he was injured. We do not agree, and we affirm.

The factual issue in this case is framed by Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) (Supp.2003), which excludes from the definition of compensable injury any injury sustained by the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed. We use the same test to determine whether an employee was performing "employment services" as we do when determining whether an employee was acting within "the course of employment." Pifer v. Single Source Transportation, 347 Ark. 851, 69 S.W.3d 1 (2002). The test is whether the injury occurred within the time and space boundaries of the employment, when the employee was carrying out the employer's purpose or advancing the employer's interest, directly or indirectly. Id.

In reviewing decisions from the Workers' Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings, and we affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sands, 80 Ark.App. 51, 91 S.W.3d 93 (2002). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997). Determining the credibility and weight to be given a witness's testimony is a question within the sole province of the Commission. Smith v. City of Fort Smith, 84 Ark.App. 430, 143 S.W.3d 593 (2004).

Appellant initially cites the correct standard of review, but appears not to fully understand its import, arguing that:

Claimant contends that the decision of the Commission is clearly erroneous. Claimant contends he sustained on-the-job injuries on November 13, 2001 and, based on a de novo review of the evidence presented to the Workers' Compensation Commission, respectfully requests that the Commission's decision be reversed.

The clearly erroneous standard of review is not applicable to appeals from the factual findings of the Workers' Compensation Commission. The substantial-evidence standard of review, which is mandated by statute,1 is much more limited. We do not weigh the evidence presented to the Commission; instead, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings. The question on appeal is not whether we would have reached the same conclusion as the Commission did had we been charged with the duty of finding the facts. There may be substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision even though we might have reached a different conclusion if we sat as the trier of fact or heard the case de novo. Wright v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 28 Ark.App. 261, 773 S.W.2d 110 (1989)

. Instead, we will reverse the Commission's decision only if we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the findings arrived at by the Commission. White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. 474, 6 S.W.3d 98 (1999).

The facts relevant to the issue before us can be briefly stated. Appellant was employed by the Pulaski County Sheriff's Department as a deputy. His duties involved physical patrol of Pulaski County in his squad car. Appellant resided in Perry County and commuted to work in Pulaski County in his private vehicle. Appellant was not paid for travel time. H...

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9 cases
  • Hernandez v. Wal–mart Associates Inc.
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • July 1, 2009
    ...the sole province of the Commission, and questions of weight are beyond the scope of appellate review. Maupin v. Pulaski County Sheriff's Office, 90 Ark.App. 1, 203 S.W.3d 668 (2005).4 The Arkansas Supreme Court has, since the inception of the workers' compensation [Ark. App. 10] law, maint......
  • Lonoke Exceptional Sch., Inc. v. Coffman
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • February 13, 2019
    ...reached the same conclusion as the Commission had we been charged with the duty of finding the facts. Maupin v. Pulaski Cty. Sheriff's Office , 90 Ark. App. 1, 203 S.W.3d 668 (2005). There may be substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision even though we might have reached a d......
  • Pyle v. Woodfield, Inc.
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • April 8, 2009
    ...examples given above. See, e.g., Woodall v. Hunnicutt Construction, 340 Ark. 377, 12 S.W.3d 630 (2000); Maupin v. Pulaski County Sheriff's Office, 90 Ark.App. 1, 203 S.W.3d 668 (2005); K II Construction Company v. Crabtree, 78 Ark.App. 222, 79 S.W.3d 414 (2002); Hardin v. Southern Compress ......
  • Jones v. Xtreme Pizza
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • December 20, 2006
    ... ... In Maupin v. Pulaski County Sheriff's Office, 90 Ark.App. 1, 203 ... ...
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