Maxfield v. Maxfield

Decision Date19 January 1990
Docket NumberNo. C3-88-2343,C3-88-2343
Citation452 N.W.2d 219
PartiesIn re the Marriage of Steven MAXFIELD, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Diane MAXFIELD, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

In this case, the best interests analysis directs custody of the three youngest children to the mother. Determination of custody of the oldest child is remanded to the trial court.

Jeffrey D. Pederson, Wadena, for appellant.

Cheryl Schrenk, Northwest Minnesota Legal Services, Moorhead, for respondent.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

SIMONETT, Justice.

The trial court awarded custody of the four children to the father. The court of appeals reversed, awarding custody of the three youngest children to the mother and remanding the issue of the oldest child's custody to the trial court for reconsideration. We affirm.

In April 1987, after 10 years of marriage and four children, Steven and Diane Maxfield separated. The couple had then been living in Verndale, Minnesota, Steven's hometown, for 3 years. Two months after separating, in June, Diane and the four children returned to Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, Diane's hometown, ostensibly for a visit, but actually because Diane had decided to end the marriage.

Unable to persuade Diane to return to Verndale, Steven filed a separation action requesting custody of the four children. Diane countered with a dissolution petition and requested custody of the children. A year later, in July 1988, the case was called for trial. During that year the children were with their mother in Pennsylvania. At the time of trial Steven and Diane were both 34 years old. The three youngest children, Jacinta, Therese, and Aleshia, were 2, 4, and 8 years, respectively. The oldest child, Jeremiah, was 10.

The trial judge heard the testimony of the parties and their witnesses and received in evidence reports from the social services personnel of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, and Wadena County, Minnesota. The court made the following (here abbreviated) findings of fact:

1. While the family was together in Verndale, Steven was away at trade school and at work, and the care of the four children, for the most part, fell to Diane.

2. Diane was home alone with the children most of the time. She had no car, no phone, few friends, and little money. She felt isolated in the small rural community and became depressed. Her housekeeping was seriously substandard. Diane sought counseling from Wadena County Social Services for her loss of self-esteem and self-confidence. In April 1987, at Diane's request, Steven moved out of the house and lived in a pickup camper in a woods on a friend's property. Steven spent time with the family, however, virtually every weekend.

3. About the end of June, Diane returned to Pennsylvania with the four children. She told Steven it was only for a visit, and Steven along with Diane's mother paid for the air fare; in fact, Diane intended to stay in Pennsylvania. Diane kept her residence a secret and Steven was almost totally cut off from contact with his family. Steven did, however, visit with the children in Pennsylvania over the Thanksgiving weekend, and in June 1988 for a few weeks prior to and during trial, the children lived in Steven's home.

4. Diane appeared to be doing a satisfactory job of homemaking and housekeeping in her subsidized housing apartment in Pennsylvania, as reported by the social worker. The two oldest children did well in school but Jeremiah felt picked on.

5. Steven and Diane had met and were married while Steven was in the Army. When Diane returned to Pennsylvania she met a much older man, through an advertisement, and planned to marry him. (This man testified at trial.) There was some evidence that Jeremiah did not like this proposed marriage. The proposed marriage would introduce an element of "disequilibrium" into the family setting, as the children would move once again. (Since the trial these marriage plans have been abandoned.)

6. Jeremiah and Aleshia, the two oldest children, were interviewed by Dr. Ralph Scheer, a psychologist, who also serves in the Wadena County guardian ad litem program. This was pursuant to an arrangement made by counsel and the court. Jeremiah told Dr. Scheer the housing project was noisy, with much bad talk, and the children missed their pets on the farm. Dr. Scheer attempted to elicit the two children's custodial preference without asking them directly to choose between the parents. The two children expressed a preference for Verndale.

7. Dr. Scheer felt that Aleshia, then 8, was not mature enough to express a valid preference. He did feel that Jeremiah definitely preferred a small-town environment and life style, which could be interpreted as the boy's preference to live with his father. Even though Jeremiah had done well in school in Pennsylvania, he felt more "at home" in Verndale.

8. Steven now has a full-time, permanent job. For the time being, Steven's mother helps with the children in the morning before Steven goes to work and takes them to the babysitter for the day. At the end of the day, the grandmother picks up the children and takes them to Steven's home and waits until Steven gets home from work. Steven has demonstrated that he is able to provide for the needs of the children.

After making the foregoing findings of fact, the trial court then made the following (here summarized) conclusions of law:

(1) When the parties separated in April 1987, Diane was the primary parent as defined in Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn.1985). More than a year has gone by, however, between the time when the parties separated (April 1987) and the date of trial (July 1988), and, therefore, "it is appropriate for the Court to consider the events and developments which occurred in that intervening period * * *."

(2) The Pikula presumption of primary parent does not apply when a child is old enough and mature enough to express a meaningful custodial preference. Here, both Aleshia and Jeremiah expressed a preference, and Jeremiah at least was of an age and maturity to express a valid preference. "The presumption created by Pikula does not apply."

(3) In considering the best interests of the children under Minn.Stat. Sec. 518.17,

                subd. 1 (1988), a consideration of the evidence "points unmistakably toward an award of custody in favor of Steven."   In this connection
                

(a) Both of the older children prefer Verndale.

(b) One or more of the children have a particularly close relationship with the paternal grandmother.

(c) While the report cards of the two oldest children suggest "things out east were perhaps not as bad as described by the children," nevertheless the children expressed to Dr. Scheer concerns and difficulties in adjusting to home, school and the community in Pennsylvania.

(d) An award of custody to Diane (if she remarries) presents the prospect of another change and a lack of continuity with respect to their environment in Pennsylvania. Verndale appears to present a more permanent custodial home.

(e) The expressed preference of the two older children for Verndale (even after being gone for over a year) "makes clear the degree to which the children feel a strong emotional bond with their father. Thus * * * an award of custody to the father would be consistent with maintenance of continuity and stability for the children with respect to emotional and psychological attachment to the primary psychological parent."

(f) There is a strong likelihood that Diane, if awarded custody, would restrict Steven's contacts with the children, destroying any meaningful relationship the father might hope to have with the children.

As noted, the trial court awarded custody of the four children to the father. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, awarding the three youngest children to the mother and remanding the question of Jeremiah's custody to the trial court. Maxfield v. Maxfield, 439 N.W.2d 411 (Minn.App.1989). We granted the father's petition for further review.

The issue, as we see it, is whether the trial court's best interests analysis was correctly applied.

Discussion

Our concern here is not with the findings of fact but with the conclusions drawn from those facts. Particularly in cases of this kind, where the trial court is weighing statutory criteria in light of the found basic facts, the trial court's conclusions of law will include determination of mixed questions of law and fact, determination of "ultimate" facts, and legal conclusions. In such a blend, the appellate court may correct erroneous applications of the law. As to the trial court's conclusions on the ultimate issues, mindful of the discretion accorded the trial court in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, the reviewing court reviews under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Berndt v. Berndt, 292 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn.1980). When the trial court's treatment of mixed questions of law and fact and its treatment of the ultimate issues may involve a misapplication of the law, the appellate court should carefully review the trial court's "expla[nation of] how the factors led to its conclusions and to the determination of the best interests of the child." Minn.Stat. Sec. 518.17, subd. 1 (1989).

Here the trial court, quite correctly, concluded that Diane was the "primary parent" of the four children at the time the parties separated. Implicit in this conclusion was a finding that the children have a psychological and emotional intimacy with the parent who has been primarily responsible for their nurture and care. 1 The trial court also concluded, however, that the Pikula custodial preference for the primary parent was not applicable because the custody determination was being made some 15 months after the parents had separated. The trial court relied on Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 212 (Minn.1988), wherein we said, "Only if this [separation] date is Steven argues,...

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