May v. Leneair

• Decision Date: 11 August 1980
• Docket Number: Docket No. 78-2766
• Citation: 99 Mich.App. 209,297 N.W.2d 882
• Parties: Alan A. MAY, Guardian of the Estate of Lucille Leneair, an adjudged mentally incompetent person, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lucille LENEAIR, an adjudged mentally incompetent person, and Joseph Andree Rice, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 882

297 N.W.2d 882

99 Mich.App. 209

Alan A. MAY, Guardian of the Estate of Lucille Leneair, an adjudged mentally incompetent person, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lucille LENEAIR, an adjudged mentally incompetent person and Joseph Andree Rice, jointly and severally Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 78-2766.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Aug. 11, 1980.

Released for Publication Nov. 5, 1980.

George E. Lee, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant; Charles Alpert, Lansing, of counsel.

Elbert E. Cooper, Detroit, for defendants-appellees.

Before J. H. GILLIS, P. J., and ALLEN and BEASLEY, JJ.

J. H. GILLIS, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff, as guardian of the estate of Lucille Leneair, commenced the present action seeking a judicial declaration as to the validity or invalidity of the defendants' marriage.

Plaintiff's complaint alleged the following relevant facts:

That on November 9, 1970, Ms. Leneair was adjudicated to be a mentally incompetent person in an order of the Wayne County Probate Court,

That on July 15, 1975, Ms. Leneair filed a petition in Wayne County Probate Court seeking restoration of her competency,

That on July 18, 1975, the defendants were married,

That on July 16, 1976, at the conclusion of a jury trial held pursuant to Ms. Leneair's petition, she was found to be then and there mentally incompetent to handle her own affairs, and

That plaintiff believes that the marriage was invalid ab initio and, therefore, seeks a determination of validity or invalidity of the marriage.

On March 17, 1977, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, GCR 1963, 117.2. The motion failed to state which subsection of the rule it was brought under. The motion was granted, the lower court ruling that as a matter of law Ms. Leneair had competency to marry. Plaintiff appeals from the order entered pursuant to that ruling.

An examination of the order granting defendants' motion shows that the motion was granted because plaintiff failed to state a cause of action. That is the reason set forth in GCR 1963, 117.2(1). Accordingly, we shall review the grant of summary judgment under that subrule.

The standard governing this Court's review of a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment based on GCR 1963, 117.2(1) is well settled. The motion is to be tested by the pleadings alone. Todd v. Biglow, 51 Mich.App. 346, 214 N.W.2d 733 (1974), lv. den., 391 Mich. 816 (1974). The motion tests the legal basis of the complaint, not whether it can be factually supported. Bormans, Inc. v. Lake State Development Co., 60 Mich.App. 175, 230 N.W.2d 363 (1975). The factual allegations of the complaint are taken as true, along with any inferences or conclusions which may fairly be drawn from the facts alleged. Unless the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possibly justify a right to recover, the motion under this subrule should be denied. Crowther v. Ross Chemical & Manufacturing Co., 42 Mich.App. 426, 202 N.W.2d 577 (1972); Partrich v. Muscat, 84 Mich.App. 724, 729-730, 270 N.W.2d 506 (1978).

M.C.L. § 551.6; M.S.A. § 25.6 provides in relevant part:

"No person * * * who has been adjudged insane, feeble-minded or an imbecile by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be capable of contracting marriage without, before the issuance by the county clerk of the license to marry, filing in the office of the county clerk a verified certificate from 2 regularly licensed physicians of this state that such person has been cured of such insanity, imbecility or feeble-mindedness * * *."

It is undisputed that Ms. Leneair never filed the required certificate. It is also undisputed that she had been adjudicated a mental incompetent prior to her marriage. The question becomes whether one who has been adjudicated a mental incompetent falls within the statutory marriage prohibition. The answer is that such a person does.

A mentally incompetent person is one who is so affected mentally as to be deprived of sane and normal action or who lacks sufficient capacity to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and effect of the act he is performing. Dayiantis v. Blackhawk, Inc., 33 Mich.App. 201, 203, 189 N.W.2d 808 (1971), citing In re Johnson's Estate, 286 Mich. 213, 281 N.W. 597 (1938). ¹ Feeble-mindedness is defined as the least severe grade of mental deficiency, Stedman's Medical Dictionary (Unabridged Lawyers' Edition 1961), and as a condition of incomplete development of mind of such degree or kind as to render the individual incapable of adjusting himself to his social environment in a reasonably efficient and harmonious manner and to necessitate external care, supervision, or control. 41 Am.Jur.2d, Incompetent Persons, § 2, p. 542.

Since the Legislature intended to bar one found to be suffering from the least severe grade of mental deficiency, an adjudged feeble-minded person, from marriage, it is reasonable to conclude that they intended to bar those suffering from more severe grades of mental deficiency from marriage. An examination of the definition of a mentally incompetent person above cited indicates that such a person necessarily falls within the latter class. Accordingly we hold that an adjudication of mental incompetency is a bar to a subsequent marriage under M.C.L. § 551.6; M.S.A. § 25.6.

Furthermore, the same result, that an adjudication of mental incompetency bars a subsequent marriage, obtains independently of the statute.

In Acacia Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Jago, 280 Mich. 360, 362, 273 N.W. 599 (1937), the Supreme Court stated:

"(W)hile an * * * incompetent is under actual and subsisting guardianship of estate, he is conclusively presumed incompetent to make a valid contract * * *." (Emphasis supplied.)

Marriage is a civil contract to which the consent of parties capable in law of contracting is essential. Yanoff v. Yanoff, 237 Mich. 383, 387, 211 N.W. 735 (1927), overruled on other grounds in Serafin v. Serafin, 401 Mich. 629, 258 N.W.2d 461 (1977), M.C.L. § 551.2; M.S.A. § 25.2, 16 Michigan Law & Practice, Marriage, § 4, p. 100. Therefore, an adjudicated mental incompetent cannot enter a valid marriage.

The question becomes whether the marriage here, which is prohibited by statute and deemed invalid by case law, is voidable or void. The answer is that it is void.

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. Melia v. Employment Security Comm., 346 Mich. 544, 562, 78 N.W.2d 273 (1956). M.C.L. § 551.6; M.S.A. § 25.6 further provides:

"Any person of sound mind who shall intermarry with such * * * person * * * who has been so adjudged * * * feeble-minded * * * except upon the filing of certificate as herein provided, with knowledge of the disability of such person, or who shall advise, aid, abet, cause, procure or assist in procuring any such marriage contrary to the provisions of this section is guilty of a felony * * *."

It is apparent that the objective of the statute is to absolutely prohibit a marriage such as that in the instant case. Thus, in order to best effect that statutory purpose, Lake Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan, 91 Mich.App. 357, 366, 282 N.W.2d 486 (1979), we hold that the marriage here is void.

In the present case, plaintiff properly alleged the prior adjudication of mental incompetency of Ms. Leneair and her subsequent marriage. He, thus, stated a claim upon which relief, a declaration of the invalidity of the marriage, could be granted. GCR 1963, 117.2(1). The grant of summary judgment was erroneous. The case is remanded to the lower court for a trial on the merits.

The parties attempt to raise additional issues which were presented to the lower court but, due to the granting of summary judgment, were not decided. The Court of Appeals is limited on review to issues decided by the lower court. Norton Shores v. Carr, 81 Mich.App. 715, 723, 265 N.W.2d 802 (1978); Hernandez v. Consumers Power Co., 51 Mich.App. 288, 214 N.W.2d 846 (1974).

Reversed and remanded.

BEASLEY, Judge (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent.

In this case, plaintiff, Alan A. May, as guardian of the estate of Lucille Leneair, an adjudged mentally incompetent person, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment to determine the validity of a claimed marriage between his ward, Lucille Leneair, at a time when she was allegedly adjudged a mentally incompetent person, and defendant Joseph Andree Rice. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the statutory remedy of declaratory judgment is not a proper way to test the validity of a marriage, that the question of the competency of the codefendant at the time of the attempted marriage cannot be properly raised in a motion for summary judgment so as to void the marriage, and that plaintiff, as guardian, is without standing to bring suit against his ward. After hearing oral argument and reviewing briefs filed by the parties, the trial judge held, as a matter of law, ¹ that defendant, Lucille Leneair, was competent to enter into the marriage and, therefore, granted the motion for summary judgment. He also stated:

"I just want to say as a footnote, although I am not ruling on this, I have some very serious question as to the standing of the guardian to bring this, but that is not necessary for decision, so I am not ruling on it, but I am ruling that she is capable of contracting marriage * * *."

On appeal, the majority holds that the statute prohibits a person adjudicated mentally incompetent from contracting a lawful marriage. ². The decision of the majority rests upon the premise that the parties' attempted marriage was void rather than voidable. The majority then states:

" * * * plaintiff properly alleged the prior adjudication of mental incompetency of Ms. Leneair and her subsequent marriage. He (plaintiff-guardian), thus, stated a claim upon which relief, a declaration of the invalidity of the marriage, could be granted. GCR 1963,...