Maybee v. Moore

• Decision Date: 20 December 1886
• Citation: 2 S.W. 471,90 Mo. 340
• Parties: Maybee v. Moore et al., Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

2 S.W. 471

90 Mo. 340

Maybee v. Moore et al., Appellants

Supreme Court of Missouri

December 20, 1886

Appeal from Linn Circuit Court. -- Hon. G. D. Burgess, Judge.

Affirmed.

W. H Brownlee for appellants.

(1) There being no written contract between Jordan and Maybee and no possession taken under the verbal arrangement made with Jordan's agent, there was no valid and binding contract. Adair v. Adair, 68 Mo. 630, and cases cited. And even if defendant, Moore, knew of the condition of the transaction as it then stood, he had a right to buy the land if he could first complete his purchase and procure a conveyance. The fact that Maybee was treating for the land would not prohibit another party from buying if he could. There is nothing in the evidence to show that Maybee was in any manner bound by the contract he, as plaintiff, is trying to enforce. He had deposited forty dollars, to be applied on the land conditionally. The contract must be mutual. Mastin v. Haller, 61 Mo. 196; Paris v Haley, 61 Mo. 453. Must have been partly executed and something done besides paying money. Foster v. Kemmons, 57 Mo. 488; Sitton v. Shipp, 65 Mo. 297; Price v. Hurd, 29 Mo. 173. (2) This contract being made on condition that the vendee should have possession as part of the contract, will not be enforced. Lourthan v. Stilwell, 73 Mo. 495; Taylor v. Williams, 45 Mo. 80. (3) Deed made and placed in the hands of a third party to be delivered on condition, will not make a valid contract, and take the case out of the statute. Townsend v. Hawkins, 45 Mo. 286. (4) When the vendor has conveyed to a third party (as in this case), and put it out of his power to convey, the court will not decree a specific performance, but will leave the vendee to his action for damages. Gupton v. Gupton, 47 Mo. 37; Lee v. Howe, 27 Mo. 521. Of course, if there had been part performance, and the purchaser had notice, the rule might be otherwise.

A. W. Mullins for respondent.

(1) The question as to the statute of frauds, sought to be raised in appellants' brief, is not open for consideration by this court. The petition alleges a valid contract, and the answer admits it, and the statute of frauds is not set up as a defence. It, therefore, follows that even if the facts had justified such defence (which they did not), it was waived by the pleadings. Sherwood v. Saxton, 63 Mo. 78, 84; Graff v. Foster, 67 Mo. 512, 521; Rabsuhl v. Lack, 35 Mo. 316; Gardner v. Armstrong, 31 Mo. 535. (2) The contract between the defendant, Jordan, and the plaintiff, was sufficiently evidenced by memoranda in writing to take it out of the statute of frauds, even if such defence had been interposed by answer. This is shown by the authority from Jordan to his agents to sell the land, the receipt given by them to plaintiff, and by the various letters in evidence from Jordan to his agents who sold the land to plaintiff, aside from any consideration of the deed executed to plaintiff by defendant, Jordan, and sent to his agents. Browne on the Statute of Frauds, secs. 346, 365; Ivory v. Murphy, 36 Mo. 534; Ellis v. Bray, 79 Mo. 227; Lash v. Parlin, 78 Mo. 391; O'Neil v. Crain, 67 Mo. 250; Moore v. Mountcastle, 61 Mo. 424. (3) The defendant, Moore, having purchased with notice and knowledge of the prior sale of the land to the plaintiff, was not a purchaser in good faith. Having so purchased he stands precisely in the same situation that the defendant, Jordan, would have occupied if he had not conveyed to Moore and yet refused to convey to plaintiff. Farrar v. Patton, 20 Mo. 81; Truesdale v. Callaway, 6 Mo. 605, 621; 1 Story's Eq. Jurisp. [7 Ed.] secs. 395, 396; Fellows v. Wise, 55 Mo. 413. (4) By the failure of the defendant, Jordan, to answer plaintiff's petition, or make any defence in the cause, aside from furnishing his deposition on behalf of his co-defendant, Moore, the case against said defendant, Jordan, stands admitted; and the defendant, Moore, could not question the validity of the contract between Jordan and plaintiff on the ground that such contract fell within the operation of the statute of frauds. Truesdale v. Callaway, 6 Mo. 621.

OPINION

Black, J.

This is a suit against Moore and Jordan, and has for its object the specific performance of a contract whereby defendant Jordan through his authorized agents, sold the land in question to the plaintiff. By the contract of sale plaintiff was to have a warranty deed, and was to pay four hundred dollars therefor, one hundred dollars on obtaining the deed and possession, and the remainder in deferred payments secured by deed of trust on the land. Besides a deed made by Jordan to pl...