Mayberry v. Hardwoods

Decision Date08 November 2022
Docket Number2021-CA-00246-COA
PartiesALEXIS MAYBERRY, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ALEX MAYBERRY, DECEASED APPELLANT v. COTTONPORT HARDWOODS AND ERNEST MOORE APPELLEES
CourtMississippi Court of Appeals

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/12/2021

WARREN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT HON. M. JAMES CHANEY JR., TRIAL JUDGE

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: RAYNETRA LASHELL GUSTAVIS

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: MELTON JAMES WEEMS NICOLE ALISE BROUSSARD

EN BANC.

EMFINGER, J.

¶1. Alex Mayberry filed a civil action against Cottonport Hardwoods LLC, BLC Trucking Inc.,[1] and Ernest Moore. The complaint alleged that while Moore, an employee of Cottonport, was loading logs onto a trailer attached to his tractor, a log fell from a "knuckleboom loader" and struck Mayberry, causing him severe and debilitating injuries. The Circuit Court of Warren County, Mississippi granted Cottonport Hardwoods and Ernest Moore's "Renewed Joint Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively Motion for Summary Judgment," finding that under the facts of this case, the exclusive remedy provision of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Law barred any recovery by Mayberry against Cottonport and Moore. Aggrieved by this decision, Mayberry appealed.[2]

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On September 14, 2015, Diamond Barge Company LLC, as grantor, conveyed all timber owned by the grantor, located and standing on the real property described therein, located in Warren County, Mississippi, to Cottonport by a "Special Warranty Timber Deed." This deed described the timber as having been acquired by Diamond Barge via a "Transfer of Timber" from Diamond Point Land Company LLC and specifically stated that it was the intent of Diamond Barge to transfer and convey to Cottonport all timber acquired from Diamond Point. The Special Warranty Timber Deed also stated that the conveyance was "specifically subject to the terms and conditions" of three specifically identified instruments recorded in Warren County, Mississippi. However, none of those three instruments were included in the record on appeal.

¶3. On February 3, 2017, MB & LB Investments LLC, as seller and/or grantor, conveyed by Warranty Timber Deed to Cottonport, as purchaser and/or grantee, with full warranty of title to certain timber "located, growing, and standing" on the real property described therein. This deed provided, however, that Cottonport would have the right to enter upon the real property and harvest the timber conveyed only until December 31, 2021.

¶4. After purchasing the timber on Davis Island from the two entities named above, Cottonport contracted with BLC Trucking "to cut and haul timber to yard or to mill from yard to mill." BLC Trucking then entered into a subcontract with Kettley Trucking, Inc. to haul logs from Davis Island to lumber mills. Kettley Trucking subcontracted with Joseph West, doing business as 747 Trucking, to assist in hauling the logs. West then hired Mayberry to drive West's log truck and haul logs from Davis Island. Mayberry was injured while his truck was being loaded with logs on May 10, 2017.

¶5. Mayberry filed for workers' compensation benefits, naming three different employers: Kettley Trucking, BLC Trucking, and Cottonport.[3] According to the administrative judge's decision, all three employers "denied the existence of a direct or statutory employment relationship" with Mayberry and thus denied liability to pay him workers' compensation benefits. Ultimately, Cottonport and BLC Trucking were voluntarily dismissed "without prejudice and without waiver of any claims, defenses or jurisdictional objections." However, the Commission found that Kettley Trucking was Mayberry's "statutory employer" and was required to pay him workers' compensation benefits under the Workers' Compensation Law.

¶6. Mayberry subsequently filed suit for damages in Warren County Circuit Court against Cottonport, BLC Trucking, and Moore. All the defendants first filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. After a hearing on these motions, the court denied the motions to dismiss "without prejudice to the Defendants to file such Summary Judgment motions as they deem appropriate." The trial court then allowed limited discovery on the issue of whether the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Law provides the plaintiff's exclusive remedy against the defendants. After discovery was complete, Cottonport filed a renewed motion in which it claimed that it was also Mayberry's statutory employer and that his claims were barred because workers' compensation coverage was his exclusive remedy against Cottonport and Moore. The trial court found the motion to be well taken and granted summary judgment in favor of Cottonport and Moore.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7. In Holcomb, Dunbar, Watts, Best, Masters & Golmon P.A. v. 400 South Lamar Oxford Mad Hatter Partners LLC, 335 So.3d 568, 572 (¶7) (Miss. 2022), the supreme court repeated the familiar standard of review for summary judgment:

A trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Hubbard v. Wansley, 954 So.2d 951, 956 [(¶9)] (Miss. 2007). Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." M.R.C.P. 56(c). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. "The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that [no] genuine issue of material fact[] exists, and the non-moving party must be given the benefit of the doubt concerning the existence of a material fact." One S. Inc. v. Hollowell, 963 So.2d 1156, 1160 [(¶6)] (Miss. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Green v. Allendale Planting Co., 954 So.2d 1032, 1037 [(¶9)] (Miss. 2007)).
DISCUSSION

¶8. The general purpose and effect of Mississippi's Workers' Compensation Law, Miss. Code Ann. §§ 71-3-1 to -139 (Rev. 2021), is succinctly described in Doubleday v. Boyd Construction Co., 418 So.2d 823, 825-26 (Miss. 1982):

In all states, workmen's compensation laws are in derogation of the common law in that they replace traditional negligence actions for a no-fault system of payment to employees and their families for job-related injuries. By the exchange, the remedy of workmen's compensation benefits, insofar as the right of the employee against certain classes of persons are concerned, is exclusive and the common law remedy is abrogated.

The Workers' Compensation Law applies to employers who have five or more workers regularly employed in their business. Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-5. For employers who provide workers' compensation insurance coverage for their workers who are injured on the job, "the liability of an employer to pay compensation shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee." Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-9.

¶9. The law also provides workers protection in the event that their immediate employer fails to provide workers' compensation coverage. Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-7(6) reads as follows:

In the case of an employer who is a subcontractor, the contractor shall be liable for and shall secure the payment of such compensation to employees of the subcontractor, unless the subcontractor has secured such payment.

In interpreting and applying this statutory provision, the supreme court stated in Rollins v. Hinds County Sheriff's Department, 306 So.3d 702, 703-04 (¶7) (Miss. 2020):

Mississippi Code Section 71-3-7(6) (Supp. 2019) provides: "[i]n the case of an employer who is a subcontractor, the contractor shall be liable for and shall secure the payment of such compensation to employees of the subcontractor, unless the subcontractor has secured such payment." The "contractor" is considered the "statutory employer of the subcontractor's employees . . . ." Thomas [v. Chevron], 212 So.3d [58,] 61 [(¶8) (Miss. 2017)].

¶10. In the present case, Mayberry's immediate employer, Joseph West, doing business as 747 Trucking, did not provide workers' compensation coverage. However, Mayberry made an election to pursue workers' compensation coverage from his "statutory employer." This election is described in Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-9 as follows:

(1) Except as provided under subsection (2) of this section, the liability of an employer to pay compensation shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages at common law or otherwise from such employer on account of such injury or death, except that if an employer fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this chapter, an injured employee, or his legal representative in case death results from the injury, may elect to claim compensation under this chapter, or to maintain an action at law for damages on account of such injury or death. In such action the defendant may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, nor that the employee assumed the risk of his employment, nor that the injury was due to the contributory negligence of the employee.

(Emphasis added). Therefore, Mayberry may not maintain a separate action for damages against a statutory employer that provided him with workers' compensation coverage.[4] However, this "election" by Mayberry does not prevent him from seeking damages from third parties who may be responsible for his injuries. Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-71.

¶11. The decision as to whether Cottonport was Mayberry's "statutory employer"...

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