Thomas v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 January 2017
• Docket Number: NO. 2016–CA–00101–SCT,2016–CA–00101–SCT
• Citation: 212 So.3d 58
• Parties: Quindon D. THOMAS and Latara S.J. Thomas v. CHEVRON U.S.A., INC. and Dwayne Haisch
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

212 So.3d 58

Quindon D. THOMAS and Latara S.J. Thomas

v.CHEVRON U.S.A., INC. and Dwayne Haisch

NO. 2016–CA–00101–SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

January 26, 2017

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: JAMES R. REEVES, JR., MATTHEW G. MESTAYER

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: MICHAEL JAMES BENTLEY, PATRICK R. BUCHANAN

EN BANC.

WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. Quindon D. Thomas, an employee of a contractor at Chevron's petroleum refinery plant in Pascagoula, Mississippi, was injured on the job. Thomas accepted workers' compensation benefits provided by Chevron for his injuries. Thomas then sued Chevron and one of its employees for the same injuries. Chevron asserted the exclusive-remedy defense under the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act and the circuit court granted summary judgment to Chevron. Thomas now appeals. We reverse and remand for a trial on the merits.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. The facts in this case are largely undisputed. Quindon D. Thomas was injured while working at Chevron's petroleum refinery in Pascagoula, Mississippi, on October 13, 2012. Thomas was employed with Bragg Investment Co., d/b/a American Plant Services, Inc. (APS), as a maintenance worker for the refinery. At the time of the injury, Thomas was working near Dwayne Haisch, a Chevron employee, who opened a valve that expelled hot steam, coke, and water onto Thomas, burning most of his body.

¶ 3. Chevron had contracted with APS since 2004, to perform maintenance and other specialized services at its refinery. As part of this initial contract, Chevron required APS to provide workers' compensation benefits for its employees. In June 2010, Chevron and APS amended their contract to acknowledge that Chevron would provide workers' compensation insurance for all APS employees working at the refinery through Chevron's Owner Controlled Insurance Program (OCIP).

¶ 4. Following the incident, Thomas immediately began receiving workers' compensation benefits. Chevron paid $350,000 to Thomas, fully exhausting the policy's self-insured retention. Following that, Indemnity Insurance began paying wages and benefits pursuant to the workers' compensation coverage under the OCIP. In addition to Chevron's payment, Indemnity Insurance had paid Thomas $628,734 in workers' compensation benefits.

¶ 5. Thomas and his wife (hereafter collectively referred to as "Thomas") sued Chevron and its employee, Dwayne Haisch, in the Circuit Court of Jackson County for the injuries Thomas sustained while working at Chevron's refinery. The complaint asserted negligence and premises liability claims against Chevron. In its reply, Chevron raised affirmative defenses, including its immunity from tort liability under the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act (MWCA). Indemnity Insurance Company of North America (Indemnity Insurance) intervened in the suit. It sought reimbursement for more than $600,000 it had paid to Thomas, in the event Thomas succeeded in the suit against Chevron.

¶ 6. Following Indemnity Insurance's motion to intervene, Chevron and Haisch moved for summary judgment on the issue of "Whether Chevron was a statutory employer entitled to immunity from suit under the MWCA's exclusive remedy provision." Thomas filed a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking a ruling that Chevron was not entitled to immunity because Chevron was not his statutory employer. On December 22, 2015, the circuit court entered a final judgment in favor of Chevron's motion for summary judgment, dismissing Thomas's cross-motion, and dismissing with prejudice all claims against Chevron. Thomas timely appealed to this Court on January 19, 2016.

DISCUSSION

¶ 7. The standard of review of a trial court's grant of a summary judgment motion is de novo. Miller v. Meeks , 762 So.2d 302, 304 (Miss. 2000) (citing Short v. Columbus Rubber & Gasket Co. , 535 So.2d 61, 63 (Miss. 1988) ). Accordingly, this Court will review all the evidentiary matters, admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Berry , 669 So.2d 56, 70 (Miss. 1996). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. If, in this view, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should be entered forthwith for the movant. Otherwise, the motion should be denied. Heigle v. Heigle , 771 So.2d 341, 345 (Miss. 2000).

I. Whether the circuit court erred in granting Chevron's motion for summary judgment.

¶ 8. In its motion for summary judgment, Chevron argued that Mississippi Code Section 71–3–9¹ would afford it immunity from tort liability since it had acted as its own general contractor and had provided compensation benefits to Thomas. See Miss. Code Ann. § 71–3–9 (Rev. 2011). Chevron also argued that this Court had recognized a flexible definition of contractor such that Mississippi Code Section 71–3–7(6) would make Chevron the statutory employer of APS and its employees. Nash v. Damson Oil Corp. , 480 So.2d 1095, 1100 (Miss. 1985) ; see Miss. Code Ann. § 71–3–7(6) (Rev. 2011). Under Mississippi Code Section 71–3–7(6),² a contractor shall be liable for workers' compensation benefits for a subcontractor's employees if the subcontractor has not provided for such benefits. Id. When this statute is applicable, the contractor who secures the benefits becomes a statutory employer of the subcontractor's employees and may receive immunity from tort liability.

¶ 9. Chevron also argues that, since no Mississippi case yet has dealt with a premises owner acting as a contractor, this Court should look to a recent Texas Supreme Court case, which determined that a premises owner would have tort immunity as a general contractor. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers , 282 S.W.3d 433, 438 (Tex. 2009). In Summers , Entergy contracted with International Maintenance Corporation (IMC) to provide certain maintenance and technical services on its various facilities. Summers , 282 S.W.3d at 435–36. The parties agreed that Entergy would provide workers' compensation benefits through its Owner Provided Insurance Program (OPIP). Id. After John Summers, an IMC employee, was injured at Entergy's Sabine Station plant, he applied for and received benefits under Entergy's policy. Id. Summers then sued Entergy for negligence. Id. The Texas Supreme Court faced the issue of whether a premises owner also could act as a general contractor and receive immunity under the workers' compensation act.

¶ 10. The Workers' Compensation Act in Texas provides immunity for a general contractor who qualifies under the act. To qualify, the general contractor and subcontractor must enter into a written agreement under which the general contractor agrees to provide the subcontractor with compensation benefits. Id. at 436. Further, the Texas Labor Code defines a general contractor as "a person who undertakes to procure the performance of work or a service, either separately or through the use of subcontractors." Tex. Lab. Code § 406.121(1). That Court decided that Entergy clearly was a general contractor under the statute and, despite also being a premise owner, was entitled to immunity.³ Id. at 438.

¶ 11. Chevron also argues that, since it voluntarily provided compensation benefits to APS's employees, it was acting as any other general contractor would. Thus, rather than using contractors to avoid liability and defeat the purposes of the Act, Chevron sought to provide maximum coverage for all employees working on its premises. Chevron argued that this was what the Legislature had intended under the Act.

¶ 12. In his cross-motion for summary judgment, Thomas argued that Chevron was not a traditional prime or general contractor of APS, as defined by caselaw, and was in fact the owner of the premises; therefore Chevron was not a statutory employer of Thomas, such that Mississippi Code Section 71–3–9 would apply. Additionally, the contract between Chevron and APS clearly labels APS as a contractor. Thomas argues that, even though Chevron provided compensation for Thomas's injuries, it cannot seek immunity from tort liability where it was not required by statute to provide the coverage in the first place and where it was not a statutory employer of Thomas.

¶ 13. The Court has dealt with similar situations before, though none in which a premises owner contractually agreed to provide workers' compensation benefits to a contractor's employees. First, in Doubleday v. Boyd Construction , Boyd contracted with the Mississippi Highway Department to complete a project and in turn hired W.T. Ratliff Co. as a subcontractor. Doubleday v. Boyd Constr. , 418 So.2d 823 (Miss. 1982). In the subcontract, Boyd required Ratliff to provide workers' compensation insurance for its employees. Doubleday, an employee of Ratliff, was injured when a vehicle struck him while he was working on the project. Workers' compensation benefits were paid to Doubleday by Ratliff's workers' compensation carrier. Doubleday filed suit against Boyd, alleging that Boyd had failed to provide adequate traffic warnings. The Court held that when Boyd had contractually required workers' compensation insurance for the employees of Ratliff, its subcontractor, Boyd, had "secured" compensation insurance for the benefit of Doubleday within the meaning and purpose of the statute. Doubleday , 418 So.2d at 826 ; see also Miss. Code Ann. § 71–3–7(6) (Rev. 2011). That Court further concluded that it would be paradoxical for Boyd to face personal injury judgments while attempting to comply with the statute by contractually securing compensation insurance. Doubleday, 418 So.2d at 826. The Court stated that the "primary intention of the [workers' compensation] statute ... [is] for the protection of employees of independent contractors or subcontractors. " Id. at 825.

¶ 14. Next, in Falls v. Mississippi Power & Light Co. (MPL), the Court held Doubleday was not controlling, as MPL was...