Mayes v. Women's Health Ctr. of Shelton Conn.
Decision Date | 22 March 2021 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-1666 |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Parties | NOELLE MAYES and TARRAY GIBBS, Plaintiffs, v. WOMEN'S HEALTH CENTER OF SHELTON CONNECTICUT, DR. MICHAEL O'REILY, DR. XIAOLAN FEI, DR. REGINA FITZGERALD, and DR. LEALANI RODRIGUEZ, Defendants. |
RULING AND ORDER ON SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
On November 4, 2020, Plaintiffs Noelle Mayes ("Mayes") and Tarray Gibbs (collectively with Mayes, "Plaintiffs"), proceeding pro se, filed this action against Defendant Women's Health Center of Shelton Connecticut ("Women's Health Center"), as well as Defendants Dr. Michael O'Reily, Dr. Xiaolan Fei, Dr. Regina Fitzgerald, and Dr. Lealani Rodriguez (the "Doctors," and collectively with Women's Health Center, "Defendants"). See Compl. at 1-2 [Doc. 1]. Plaintiffs allege that in November 2018, while Mayes neared the end of a pregnancy, Mayes was subjected to drug testing for marijuana without her consent. Id. at 3.
Plaintiffs state that Mayes learned about the drug tests when she was admitted to Griffin Hospital in Derby, Connecticut for a scheduled delivery. Id. The drug tests allegedly were ordered by doctors at Women's Health Center, where Mayes had been a patient. Id. Although Plaintiffs allege that Mayes maintained that she had not used drugs during her pregnancy, her son was tested for drugs at birth. Id. at 3-4. Even after the child tested negative for the presence of any drugs, the Connecticut Department of Children and Families ("DCF")1 was contacted by a nurse at Griffin Hospital, beginning a process that resulted in DCF filing a neglect petition against Plaintiffs. Id. at 4. Plaintiffs state that they "beat DCF in a trial" in May 2019, allowing them to retain custody of their son, but that in the interim they were subject to harassing and defamatory conduct by DCF employees. Id. at 5-6.
Plaintiffs allege that, while the child neglect proceedings were ongoing, they contacted Women's Health Center multiple times to discuss the drug tests performed on Mayes, expressing "serious concerns on why any abnormal results were not discussed with Mrs. Mayes and why a drug test was given with no noted concerns or informed consent." Id. at 4-5. Plaintiffs claim that Women's Health Center has not responded to Plaintiffs' questions and concerns. Id. at 5.
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges three causes of action under state and/or common law: for "discrimination for drug testing without informed consent of any documented medical reason"; "deviation from the standard of care"; and "infliction of emotional distress." Id. at 6-7. Plaintiffs plead these claims separately, with each claim preceded by a sub-caption reciting that the claim is asserted against the Doctors. Id. In addition, Women's Health Center is listed as a party Defendant in the main caption to the Complaint and is referred to throughout the pleading. See generally Compl. The Court accordingly construes the Complaint as asserting these claims against Women's Health Center as well.2
Plaintiffs represent that this Court has jurisdiction over their claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, because "complete diversity exists and the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000." Id.at 2. Plaintiffs state that they are citizens and residents of Connecticut, id., and their pleading reflects an address in the town of Branford, id. at 1, 8. With respect to the individual Defendants, Plaintiffs allege only that the Doctors "were all employed at [Women's Health Center]." Id. at 2. Plaintiffs do not allege the citizenship of any of the Doctors. As for Defendant World Health Center, Plaintiffs do not allege whether this entity is a corporation, and if so, its state of incorporation and principal place of business.
At the inception of a case, a federal District Court is required to consider whether the case falls within the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Federal District Courts, such as this Court, are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction, able to hear and rule upon only those types of cases to which the federal Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States, and of which Congress has granted the District Courts jurisdiction. 13 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3522 (3d ed. 2020). This stands in contrast to many state courts, including Connecticut Superior Courts, which as courts of general jurisdiction are presumed to be able to hear all causes of action, except those where their jurisdiction evidently has been removed. See, e.g., Raftopol v. Ramey, 299 Conn. 681, 695, 12 A.3d 783, 792 (2011) () (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship is one of the few permissible bases on which cases may proceed in this Court, allowing the Court to hear "all civil actions where there is diversity ofcitizenship [among the parties] and the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied." Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 335, 340 (2d Cir. 2006).
As relevant here, while the federal Constitution contemplates a rule of minimal diversity of citizenship among plaintiffs and defendants in an action, State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967), Congress's statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction to the federal district courts is narrow. This statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction, in 28 U.S.C. § 1332, requires complete diversity of citizenship among parties. Tagger v. Strauss Group Ltd., 951 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2020); Van Buskirk v. United Grp. of Cos., Inc., 935 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 2019) () ; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Univ. Builders Supply, 409 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) () (citations omitted).
In the case of a natural person, citizenship is determined by the person's domicile at the time of the filing of the complaint. Van Buskirk, 935 F.3d at 53 ( ); see also Canedy v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1997) () (emphasis added) (citing Leveraged Leasing Admin. Corp. v. PacifiCorp Capital, Inc., 87 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1996)).
In the case of a corporation, the corporation's citizenship is determined by its places of incorporation and its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Hertz Corp. v. Friend,559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010) () .
In the case of an unincorporated entity, such as a partnership, association, or limited liability company, the entity is a citizen of each state of which each of its partners or members is a citizen. See, e.g., Platinum-Montaur Life Sciences, LLC v. Navidea Biopharms., Inc., 943 F. 3d 613, 615 (2d Cir. 2019) (); Bayerische Landesbank, N.Y. Branch v. Aladdin Capital Mgmt., 692 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 2012) ().
"It is well-settled that '[t]he party seeking to invoke jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 bears the burden of demonstrating that the grounds for diversity exist and that diversity is complete.'" Finnegan v. Long Island Power Auth., 409 F. Supp. 3d 91, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Advani Enter. Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 140 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1998)). This burden exists even at the pleading stage: a plaintiff who has filed suit with the Court claiming that diversity jurisdiction exists must allege sufficient facts such that the Court's exercise of jurisdiction is proper on its face. See Zuro v. Town of Darien, 432 F. Supp. 3d 116, 121 (D. Con. 2020) () (internal quotation marks and emendation omitted) (quoting Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 547F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008)); see also Komondy v. Gioco, 59 F. Supp. 3d 469, 474 (D. Conn. 2014).
The Court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over an action is a non-waivable defect, and it can be raised at any time, including by the Court on its own accord. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) ( ). When reviewing a matter for the existence (or lack) of subject matter jurisdiction, "courts may consider evidence, such as affidavits, of the facts on which jurisdiction rests." Techno-TM, LLC v. Fireaway, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 2d 694, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Gualandi v. Adams,...
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