Mayo v. Bossenbury

• Decision Date: 01 December 1942
• Citation: 152 Fla. 16,10 So.2d 725
• Parties: MAYO, Commissioner of Agriculture, et al. v. BOSSENBURY.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

10 So.2d 725

152 Fla. 16

MAYO, Commissioner of Agriculture, et al. v. BOSSENBURY.

Florida Supreme Court

December 1, 1942

William C. Pierce, of Tampa, for petitioners.

Erle B Askew and Clair A. Davis, both of St. Petersburg, for respondent.

CHAPMAN, Justice.

The Commissioner of Agriculture, the Honorable Nathan Mayo, filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida seeking the issuance of a restraining order against P. A Bossenbury, doing business in Pinellas County, Florida, under the trade name of Silver Poultry Farm. It was alleged that an Egg Dealer's Certificate had been issued by the State Agricultural Department to the defendant below, respondent here, under the provisions of Chapter 16982, Acts of 1935 Laws of Florida. The defendant, after receiving the Egg Dealer's Certificate, continuously refused to conform with or abide by the several provisions of the aforesaid Act on the theory that the Act was in contravention of the rights guaranteed or safeguarded to him by the United States Constitution. He filed a motion to dismiss the bill of complaint largely on constitutional grounds stated in the motion, and the Chancellor below held that enumerated provisions of the Act were unconstitutional and void and the enforcement of the remaining portions were thereby rendered impotent or unenforceable. The order of dismissal is challenged here on petition for an interlocutory writ of certiorari.

Section 1 of Chapter 16982, supra, defines a dealer, as referred to in the Act, as any person, firm, corporation or association selling or offering for sale in or into the State of Florida one thirty-dozen case, or its equivalent, or more, of eggs in any one week. The respondent at the time of the filing of the bill of complaint, it was alleged, was an egg dealer in the State within the meaning of Section 1 of the Act. The Chancellor below concluded that Section 1 of the Act established an arbitrary and unreasonable classification between persons engaged in the same kind of business. The Act makes a person selling thirty dozen eggs in any one week a dealer, although he would or may sell less than 30 dozen for 51 weeks of the year; while a person selling 29 dozen and 11 eggs for 52 weeks in the course of a year would not by the terms of the Act be classified as a dealer. He concluded that Section 1 of the Act violated Section 1 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution and the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.

It is settled law that the constitutionality of an Act cannot be questioned by a party whose rights are not affected. It is necessary to establish that some constitutional right or privilege has been denied before the court will hear a person. See Morrison v. Braddock, 100 Fla. 1152, 131 So. 124; Robinson v. Florida Dry Cleaning Board, 141 Fla. 899, 194 So. 269. On the motion to dismiss, all facts well pleaded are admitted to be true. The respondent is shown to be a holder of Certificate No. 4893, issued under the provisions of Chapter 16982, supra, and on the record it appears that he is a dealer selling each week 30 dozen eggs or more and is not shown to be within the class selling less than 30 dozen each week. It must appear that his rights are affected under the challenged Act before the courts will hear his complaint.

In the case of Mayo v. Polk Co., 124 Fla. 534, 169 So. 41, 44, the court had before it the constitutionality of Chapter 16860, Acts of 1935, Laws of Florida, which regulated the purchase, sale and handling of citrus fruit. The terms of the Act defined a citrus dealer as every person other than a producer, consignor, commission merchant, consignment shipper, cash buyer, broker, or agent, who in any manner makes or attempts to make money or any other thing of value on citrus fruit by dealing in the same in any manner whatsoever. This court sustained the Act and, in part, said:

'The fact that a single industry is singled out for regulation is not material. Legislative classification for this purpose may rest on narrow distinctions. Such legislation is grounded on the existence of some evil or evils to be corrected, and the Legislature is generally the judge as to whether they exist and the necessity for their correction. The act will not be held invalid merely because it fails to regulate all businesses even though they be similar in nature. Discriminations that are subject to resistence are those in which persons engaged in the same business are regulated differently or are granted different privileges under similar conditions. The rule is general that the Legislature may constitute classes for the purpose of police regulation if there is no discrimination among those similarly situated and there is otherwise a reasonable basis for the classification. Because of the hazards and other circumstances affecting the citrus fruit industry, we have reached the conclusion that the regulation and classification complained of was within the power of the Legislature to make. Cahoon v. Smith, 99 Fla. 1174, 128 So. 632, reversed for other reasons 283 U.S. 553, 51 S.Ct. 582, 75 L.Ed. 1264; West v. Town of Lake Placid, 97 Fla. 127, 120 So. 361; State v. Walter Bowen & Co., 86 Wash. 23, 149 P. 330, Ann.Cas.1917B, 625; Northern Cedar Co. v. French, 131 Wash. 394, 230 P. 837.'

It is settled that a business clothed with a public interest is the subject of regulation, and when the regulations are reasonable and not arbitrary, there is no denial of due process of law. See McRae v. Robbins, Fla. 9 So.2d, 284; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, § 672, pp. 1424, 1425. Due process of law is not denied by the imposition of reasonable regulations relative to food products for the protection of the public. See 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 674, pp. 1426, 1427; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 24 S.Ct. 349 48 L.Ed. 525. The enactment of Chapter 16982, supra, was for the purpose of protecting the health of the people of Florida by providing them with pure and wholesome food in the form of eggs. If an egg dealer within the meaning of the Act buys eggs from those...