Mazerolle v. Daimlerchrysler Corp.
| Decision Date | 30 September 2002 |
| Docket Number | CUM CV-01-581 |
| Parties | ALLEN MAZEROLLE, et al., Plaintiffs v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP., Defendant |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
September 20, 2002.
SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant DaimlerChrysler Corp. has moved to dismiss the class action complaint filed by plaintiffs Allen and Anne Mazerolle. DaimlerChrysler contends that the Mazerolles' request for relief in the nature of a judicial recall of certain Dodge, Chrysler, and Plymouth minivans manufactured during the years 1994-2001 is barred by the doctrine of federal preemption. DaimlerChrysler also contends that this action should be stayed under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to await action by the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA). Finally DaimlerChrysler also contends that each of the Mazerolle's individual causes of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Included within the relief sought by the Mazerolles on behalf of themselves and their putative nationwide class is equitable relief that would amount, in essence, to a judicial recall of Dodge, Chrysler and Plymouth minivans manufactured between 1994 and 2001 with A604 and 41TE transmissions. See Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 2, 6. Pointing out that the U.S. Secretary of Transportation has regulatory authority to order recalls of motor vehicles with safety defects see, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 30117-21, 30166(b), DaimlerChrysler argues that such equitable relief is preempted by federal law and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Three federal district courts have agreed that equitable state law claims are preempted to the extent that relief in the nature of a judicial recall is sought. Lilly v. Ford Motor Corp., 2002 WL 84603 (N.D. Ill. 2002) at *4-*5; In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. Tires Products Liability Litigation, 153 F.Supp. 3d 935 (S.D. Ind. 2001); Namovicz v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 2001 WL 327886 (D. Md. 2001). A federal magistrate judge in the Northern District of California and a Superior Court judge in California have reached the opposite conclusion. Kent v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 200 F.Supp. 2d 1208 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Quocchia v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp., No. 842383-2 (Cal. Superior Court, Alameda County, Oct. 26, 2001).[1] None of these decisions are in any way controlling on this court.
It is well settled that preemption exists (1) where Congress has expressly displaced state law, (2) where Congress has evidenced an intent to occupy a given field to the exclusion of state law, or (3) where there is a conflict between state and federal law. E.g., Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 401 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990), citing Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1988). In this instance, DaimlerChrysler relies on preemption by virtue of what it sees as a conflict between state and federal law. In particular, DaimlerChrysler relies on the principle that conflict preemption exists where state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." E.g.,
Freightliner v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995), quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
Whether preemption applies here is an extremely close question. On the one hand, there is a presumption against preemption, based on the assumption that the historic police powers of the states are not superseded by federal statutes unless that is the clear and manifest intent of Congress. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).[2] Moreover, the relevant statute in this case contains an express non-preemption provision that provides that the existence of a remedy under the statutory sections governing recalls by NHTSA "is in addition to other rights and remedies under other laws of the United States or a state." 49 U.S.C. § 30103(d).
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has squarely held that the existence of an express non-preemption provision in the governing statute does not preclude a finding of preemption where state law results in a sufficient conflict with the federal statutory scheme. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869-74 (2000). In certain circumstances (e.g., where the terms and conditions of a proposed judicial recall would be inconsistent with the terms and conditions of a pending NHTSA recall), the potential for conflict is manifest. In the court's view, the requisite conflict might also exist in a situation where a judicial recall is proposed in a case where NHTSA has decided against recall because an alleged defect has been found to be "inconsequential to motor vehicle safety." 49 U.S.A. § 30118(d).[3]
On this record, however, there is no indication that NHTSA has taken any action with respect to A604 or 41TE transmissions or is even reviewing the issue. The mere possibility that NHTSA might take some action in the future that would conflict with the relief requested by plaintiffs does not, in the court's view, create a sufficient potential for conflict to trigger preemption. To rule otherwise would be to suggest that Congress intended to occupy the field and displace all state law remedies with respect to motor vehicle recalls, and the court is not willing to adopt that suggestion, at least on this record.
The practical and jurisprudential obstacles to any relief in the nature of a judicial recall are formidable, see, e.g., Quocchia v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp., No. 842383-2 (Cal. Supreme Court, Alameda County, Oct. 26, 2001), slip opin. at 7-11, and it may be extremely unlikely that a Maine Superior Court would ever thrust itself into NHTSA's area of expertise by undertaking the kind of judicial recall proposed by plaintiffs. Cf. Lilly v. Ford Motor Co., 2002 WL 84603 (N.D. Ill. 2002) at *5. On this record, however, the court does not conclude that the Mazerolle's request for a judicial recall is preempted from the outset, and DaimlerChrysler's preemption argument is therefore denied without prejudice.
DaimlerChrysler argues that this action should be stayed to allow referral of the issue to the NHTSA under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. See generally American Automobile Manufacturers Ass'n v. Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection, 163 F.3d 74, 80-82 (1st Cir. 1998); Ashburnham Municipal Light Plant v. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co., 1998 ME 270 ¶ 8, 721 A.2d 651, 654. If the only issues in the case concerned the Mazerolles' request for a judicial recall or other injunctive relief, a strong argument could be made that the court should stay its hand until plaintiffs' complaints with respect to the A604 and 41TE transmissions are presented to and acted upon by NHTSA.[4]
However, where the remainder of the Mazerolles' claims seek monetary damages and where those claims are based on contract claims, warranty claims, and claims under the Unfair Trade Practices Act - claims that do not fall within the special competence of NHTSA but rather within the traditional fare of the Maine courts - a stay of this action to allow NHTSA to exercise primary jurisdiction is not warranted.[5]
The remaining issues for decision involve DaimlerChrysler's challenges to the legal viability of each of the Mazerolles' six causes of action.
According to the complaint, see ¶¶ 30-35, 129, the Chrysler vehicle purchased by the Mazerolles had an express 3 year/36,000 mile warranty and the Mazerolles' transmission failed after that warranty had expired. In count IV of the complaint the Mazerolles nevertheless assert a claim for breach of express warranty. They further allege that DaimlerChrysler was aware that the A604 or 41TE transmission was defective and had specifically reduced its warranty in 1992 to 3 years/36,000 miles in order to avoid paying repair costs for defective A604 or 41TE transmissions.
These allegations are insufficient to overcome the express terms of the warranty. Indeed, plaintiffs' breach of warranty claim fails for the same reason outlined by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Abrahams v. Volkswagen of America, 795 F.2d 238, 240 (2d Cir. 1986):
[V]irtually all product failures discovered in automobiles after expiration of the warranty can be attributed to a "latent defect" that existed at the time of sale or during the term of the warranty. All parts will wear out sooner or later and thus have a limited effective life. Manufacturers always have knowledge regarding the effective life of particular parts and the likelihood of their failing within a particular period of time. Such knowledge is easily demonstrated by the fact that manufacturers must predict rates of failure of particular parts in order to price warranties and thus can always be said to "know" that many parts will fail after the warranty period has expired. A rule that would make failure of a part actionable based on such "knowledge" would render meaningless time/mileage limitations in warranty coverage.
The First and Third Circuits have similarly rejected arguments that latent defects - defects that do not manifest themselves until after the warranty period has expired - may provide a basis for express warranty claims. Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 616 (3rd Cir. 1993); Canal Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 973 F.2d 988, 992-93 (1st Cir. 1992).
In counts II and VI of the complaint the Mazerolles allege that the 3 year/36,000 mile warranty nevertheless cannot be enforced against them because it was either unconscionable under UCC § 2-302 or failed of...
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