Mazurek v. Rapelje

• Decision Date: 22 February 2012
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 2:09-CV-11048
• Parties: KENNETH JOSEPH MAZUREK, Petitioner, v. LLOYD W. RAPELJE, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

KENNETH JOSEPH MAZUREK, Petitioner,

v.LLOYD W. RAPELJE, Respondent.

CASE NO. 2:09-CV-11048

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Dated: February 22, 2012

HONORABLE ARTHUR J. TARNOW

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND

GRANTING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner, Kenneth Joseph Mazurek, filed this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He was convicted after a jury trial in the Arenac Circuit Court of involuntary manslaughter with a motor vehicle. MICH. COMP. LAWS 7750.321. The state trial court sentenced Petitioner as a third-time habitual felony offender to a prison term of fourteen years and three months to thirty years, and he is now imprisoned at the Saginaw Correctional Facility. Petitioner claims in his habeas application that: (1) he was erroneously prevented from presenting defense evidence; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct; and (3) the sentencing guidelines were incorrectly scored. For the reasons that follow, the petition will be denied.

I. Factual Background

This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009):

Defendant's conviction arises from a single car accident in which Scott Pickvett, a passenger in defendant's vehicle, was killed. The accident occurred at approximately midnight on February 12, 2006. According to witnesses, defendant attended a party earlier that night and was drinking beer both at the party and while driving to the party. After the party, defendant went to a bar where he had a mixed drink. Defendant left the bar with Pickvett and Stacey Bouckaert. According to Bouckaert, after leaving the bar, defendant began driving crazy, swerving in and out of lanes and driving very fast. She became very scared and repeatedly begged defendant to let her drive. Another motorist, Scott Hidden, testified that defendant passed in front of his stopped vehicle at a high rate of speed before losing control and flipping over 2-1/2 times. Hidden estimated that defendant was traveling 65 to 70 mph in a 35-mph zone. An accident reconstructionist believed that defendant was traveling approximately 69 mph when he lost control and opined that the cause of the accident was excessive speed and possible alcohol usage. Defendant left the scene after the accident.

Defendant testified that he had consumed only one beer and part of a mixed drink before the accident, and denied being intoxicated. He claimed that he lost control of the vehicle because of icy road conditions and because Pickvett grabbed the steering wheel. He testified that he did not remember getting out of the car and leaving the accident scene because he sustained a head injury. His next recollection after the accident was waking up at the home of a friend, Richard Mendoza.

People v. Mazurek, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1111, *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. May 29, 2008).

Following his jury trial in which this evidence was presented, Petitioner was convicted of involuntary manslaughter with a motor vehicle. Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial. He asserted that the trial court erroneously excluded defense witnesses who would have testified that Petitioner suffered from a post-crash head injury. According to Petitioner, this evidence would have rebutted the prosecutor's argument that his flight from the scene of the accident indicted consciousness of guilt. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Petitioner's appellate counsel requested to present these witnesses' testimony. The trial court denied the request to present the testimony but accepted the uncalledwitnesses' affidavits. The trial court then denied Petitioner's motion, finding that the proposed testimony was irrelevant.

Petitioner thereafter filed his claim of appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising the following issues:

I. The erroneous ruling excluding Mr. Mazurek's defense witnesses denied defendant his constitutional rights to present a defense, to compulsory process, and to the presumption of innocence.

II. The prosecutor's misconduct denied defendant a fair trial.

III. Defendant was denied his right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information because OV 3 and OV 18 were scored erroneously; the trial court improperly considered his failure to admit guilt, and he is entitled to a resentencing.

On May 29, 2008, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction. Mazurek, supra.

Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, raising the same claims. The Michigan Supreme Court denied defendant's application for leave to appeal on the ground that it was "not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court." People v. Mazurek, 482 Mich. 1033 (2008) (table).

Petitioner has now commenced this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising the same claims he raised in the State courts.

II. Standard of Review

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) bars habeas relief for claims adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court adjudication runs contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law, or if it results from an unreasonable application of that law or an unreasonabledetermination of the facts. A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application occurs" when "a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal-habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 410-11.

III. Discussion

A. Exclusion of Defense Witnesses

Petitioner's first claim asserts that the trial court's ruling prohibiting him from calling defense witnesses to testify about his condition after the accident violated his right to present a defense. Respondent contends that the Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably rejected this claim on the merits.

Federal law is clear on the right to present a defense. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he also has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of the due process of law. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). However, an accused in a criminalcase does not have an unfettered right to offer evidence that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under the standard rules of evidence. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996). The Supreme Court gives trial court judges wide latitude to exclude certain evidence. Id. (quoting Delaware, 475 U.S. at 679). A violation of the right to present a defense is not established by showing merely that the trial court excluded evidence relevant to a defense. Rather, a petitioner must show that the exclusion of evidence "significantly undermined fundamental elements of the accused's defense." United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 315 (1998).

The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner's claim as follows:

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by preventing him from calling several defense witnesses who would have testified concerning his post-accident injuries and state of mind, thereby denying him his constitutional right to present a defense and to compulsory process. The trial court determined that evidence of post-accident events was not relevant and, therefore, barred defendant from calling the proposed witnesses.

A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. McGhee, 268 Mich. App. 600, 636 (2005).

A defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense and call witnesses. People v. Anstey, 476 Mich. 436, 460 (2006); People v. Hayes, 421 Mich. 271, 278-279 (1984); People v. McFall, 224 Mich. App. 403, 407 (1997). But this right is not absolute, and the accused must still comply with established rules of procedure and evidence. Hayes, supra at 279. All relevant evidence is generally admissible, and evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. Michigan Rule of Evidence 402. In People v. Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich. 43, 56-57 (2000), our Supreme Court discussed the concept of relevancy:

Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Relevant evidence thus is evidence that is material (related toany fact that is of consequence to the action) and has probative force (any tendency to make the existence of a fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence). Materiality, however, does not mean that the evidence must be directed at an element of a crime or an applicable defense. A material fact is one that is in issue in the sense that it is within the range of litigated matters in controversy. [Citations and quotations omitted.]

In other words, evidence is admissible if it is helpful in shedding light on any material point. People v. Aldrich, 246 Mich. App. 101, 114; (2001).

In this case, the principal issue for the jury to decide was whether defendant operated his vehicle in a grossly negligent manner, thereby causing Pickvett's death. The prosecutor argued that defendant was grossly negligent because he drove his

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