MC Holdings, L.L.C. v. Davis Cnty. Bd. of Review, 11–1501.

Decision Date03 October 2012
Docket NumberNo. 11–1501.,11–1501.
Citation822 N.W.2d 745
PartiesMC HOLDINGS, L.L.C., Petitioner–Appellee, v. DAVIS COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, Respondent–Appellant.
CourtIowa Court of Appeals

822 N.W.2d 745

MC HOLDINGS, L.L.C., Petitioner–Appellee,
v.
DAVIS COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, Respondent–Appellant.

No. 11–1501.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Oct. 3, 2012.


Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Davis County, Joel D. Yates, Judge.
The Davis County Board of Review appeals a district court's ruling denying summary judgment in a taxpayer protest.
REVERSED.
Jamie L. Cox and Frank W. Pechacek Jr. of Willson & Pechacek, P.L .
C., Council Bluffs, for appellant.

Steven Gardner of Denefe, Gardner & Zingg, P.C., Ottumwa, for appellee.


Heard by EISENHAUER, C.J., and DOYLE and TABOR, JJ.

TABOR, J.

In this appeal, we must determine whether a taxpayer's protest that included a cover letter addressed to the county board of review listing the property at issue, but enclosed a petition involving an unrelated property in another county substantially complied with the filing requirements in Iowa Code section 441.37 (2009). After the board refused its protest, the taxpayer appealed to the district court, which ruled the error was “clerical in nature” and directed the board to consider the late filing.

Because the statute permits late challenges when clerical errors are made by the government but not the taxpayer, the “clerical error” exception does not save the defective filing. Because nothing in the original mailing provided the board with reasonable notice of the grounds for the taxpayer's protest, it did not substantially comply with section 441.37 and was properly denied by the board. Accordingly, the district court should have granted the board's motion for summary judgment.1

I. Background Facts and Procedures

In April 2009, the Davis County Assessor assessed property located in Davis County and owned by MC Holdings, L.L.C. MC Holdings intended to protest the tax assessment. Counsel prepared a letter and petition to send to the Davis County Board of Review on behalf of his client, MC Holdings. He also prepared a similar letter and petition regarding a protest to Van Buren County regarding that county's assessment of property belonging to a separate client, Keo Rental, L.L.C.

Although the cover letters for both taxpayers were sent to the correct counties, the petitions were inadvertently switched. The Davis County board received MC Holdings' letter, but a petition for Keo Rental's property in Van Buren County. The Van Buren County Board of Review received Keo Rental's letter, but a petition for MC Holdings' property. Both petitions were postmarked on May 5, 2009, the statutory deadline for filing a protest. The Van Buren County board sent a letter to MC Holdings' attorney on May 11 explaining that because the relevant property was located in Davis County, the board had no jurisdiction over the property, and therefore could take no action on the protest. On May 19, Davis County denied MC Holdings' protest.

Three days later, MC Holdings filed an “Application for Reconsideration” with the Davis County Board of Review, requesting the board consider the Davis County property petition inadvertently sent to the Van Buren County board. The Davis County Board of Review denied the request on May 28, reasoning that because the filing was beyond the statutory deadline, granting the request “would result in inequity to other property owners that have had other hardships/excuses which resulted in untimely filings.”

In June 2009, MC Holdings appealed the 2009 assessment to the Davis County district court. The Davis County Board of Review (“the board”) filed a motion for summary judgment in April 2011, again contending it lacked jurisdiction to consider MC Holdings' challenge. The district court held hearings on the board's motion, which it consolidated with a similar suit initiated by Keo Rental against the Van Buren County Board of Review. It denied the Davis County board's motion on August 17, 2011, prompting this appeal.2

II. Scope and Standard of Review

Because a property tax assessment appeal is a claim in equity, our review of the district court's decision is de novo. Iowa R.App. P. 6.907; Soifer v. Floyd Cnty. Bd. of Review., 759 N.W.2d 775, 782 (Iowa 2009); Riley v. Iowa City Bd. of Review, 549 N.W.2d 289, 290 (Iowa 1996). But despite the nature of these causes of action, we cannot find facts de novo on appeal from summary judgment. Baratta v. Polk Cnty. Health Servs., 588 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Iowa 1999). We accordingly review the ruling for correction of errors of law. Freedom Fin. Bank v. Estate of Bosen, 805 N.W.2d 802, 806 (Iowa 2011).

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R.App. P. 1.981(3). A fact is considered “material” only if its determination would affect the outcome of the case. Keokuk Junction Ry. Co. v. IES Indus., 618 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 2000). The moving party holds the burden to show the evidence is undisputed. Kolarik v. Cory Int'l Corp., 721 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Iowa 2006). We view the facts in the light most favorable to the resisting party. Robinson v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 816 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Iowa 2012). Every legitimate inference that can be reasonably deduced from the evidence is afforded to the nonmoving party. Tetzlaff v. Camp, 715 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Iowa 2006). Therefore, our review consists of determining whether any disputed material fact exists, and if not, whether the trial court correctly applied the law. Shriver v. City of Okoboji, 567 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Iowa 1997).

III. Analysis

The board argues because the May 5 cover letter and enclosures it received from MC Holdings do not meet the statutory requirements for appeal, the matter was not properly raised before the board, and it lacked jurisdiction to consider the protest. Specifically, it argues although MC Holdings listed the property location, because its notice did not include grounds for protest, the Iowa Administrative Code forbids the board's review. It asserts the district court lacked jurisdiction as well.

MC Holdings contends because the enclosure of the wrong petition was nothing more than a clerical mistake, it substantially complied with the statutory requirements for appeal. It maintains the board wrongfully denied the protest and the district court had jurisdiction to review the appeal.

A taxpayer may protest a property tax assessment by means of the board of review. Compiano v. Bd. of Review, 771 N.W.2d 392, 396 (Iowa 2009). The board hears the protest and is authorized to modify the assessment. Id. Grounds for protesting an assessment are limited by Iowa Code section 441.37(1)(a) (2009), which reads in part:

Any property owner or aggrieved taxpayer who is dissatisfied with the owner's or taxpayer's assessment may file a protest against such assessment with the board of review on or after April 16, to and including May 5, of the year of the assessment.... Said protest shall be in writing and signed by the one protesting or by the protester's authorized agent.... Said protest must be confined to one or more of the following grounds:

(1) That said assessment is not equitable....

(2) That the property is assessed for more than the value authorized by law....

(3) That the property is not assessable....

(4) That there is an error in the assessment....

(5) That there is fraud in the assessment....

Our case law reinforces a taxpayer's limitation to these five grounds as the...

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